



1 June 2022

[REDACTED]

Ref: OIA-2021/22-1216

Dear [REDACTED]

Official Information Act request for various national security briefings

Thank you for your Official Information Act 1982 (the Act) request received on 5 April 2022. You requested:

- "1) [05 Feb 2021] Briefing: Early Priorities for National Security and Intelligence Portfolio Meetings*
- 2) [16 Feb 2021] Aide Memoire: Meeting with Brendan Horsley, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security*
- 3) [03 May 2021] Briefing: Royal Commission of Inquiry Response: Potential pathways to strengthen the Intelligence and Security Committee*
- 4) [01 Jun 2021] Aide-Memoire: Talking points for Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee: Intelligence and Security Committee*
- 5) [18 Jun 2021] Aide-Memoire: Draft Cabinet paper: Intelligence and Security Committee*
- 6) [22 Jul 2021] Briefing: United States Domestic Terrorism Strategy*
- 7) [24 Aug 2021] Briefing: Massey University Research Report - 'Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Society'*
- 8) [15 Sep 2021] Briefing: Advancing the Public Conversation on National Security Risk through the Long-Term Insights Briefing*
- 9) [29 Oct 2021] Briefing: Improving Reporting and Triaging/Response Systems for Concerning Behaviours, Cybercrime and Online Harms"*

On 4 May 2022, you were advised that the time frame for responding to your request was extended under section 15A of the Act by 20 working days because consultations were needed before a decision could be made on the request. Following this extension, I am now in a position to respond.

We also advised you that papers numbers 3, 4, 5 and 9 were withheld in full.

I have decided to release the relevant parts of the documents listed below, subject to information being withheld as noted. The relevant grounds under which information has been withheld are:

- Section 6(a), to protect the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand;
- Section 9(2)(a), to protect the privacy of individuals;
- Section 9(2)(f)(iv), to maintain the confidentiality of advice tendered by or to Ministers and officials; and
- Section 9(2)(g)(i), to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinion.

Item	Date	Document Description/Subject
1.	5 February 2021	<i>Briefing: Early Priorities for National Security and Intelligence Portfolio Meetings</i>
2.	16 February 2021	<i>Aide Memoire: Meeting with Brendan Horsley, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security</i>
3.	24 August 2021	<i>Briefing: Massey University Research Report - 'Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Society'</i>
4.	15 September 2021	<i>Briefing: Advancing the Public Conversation on National Security Risk through the Long-Term Insights Briefing</i>

I have decided to withhold in full the briefing *United States Domestic Terrorism Strategy*, dated 22 July 2021, under section 6(a) of the Act, to protect the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand.

In making my decision, I have taken the public interest considerations in section 9(1) of the Act into account.

You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to investigate and review my decision under section 28(3) of the Act.

This response may be published on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet's website during our regular publication cycle. Typically, information is released monthly, or as otherwise determined. Your personal information including name and contact details will be removed for publication.

Yours sincerely



**Acting Deputy Chief Executive
National Security Group**



DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

Briefing

EARLY PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE PORTFOLIO MEETINGS

To Minister for National Security and Intelligence (Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern)

Date	5/02/2021	Priority	Routine
Deadline	15/02/2021	Briefing Number	2021NSP/023

Purpose

This briefing proposes initial priorities for the National Security and Intelligence portfolio, further to our Briefing to Incoming Minister. We invite you to indicate the topics you would like to prioritise in our early fortnightly meetings with you.

Recommendations

1. **Note** we have considered opportunities for enhancing the way in which we engage you on both strategic-level discussions and cross-system security issues within the National Security and Intelligence portfolio, and
2. **Indicate**, at Attachment A, the topics you would like to prioritise for engagement with officials.


Tony Lynch
Deputy Chief Executive
National Security Group

5.02/2021

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern
Minister for National Security and
Intelligence

...../...../2021

Contact for telephone discussion if required:

Name	Position	Telephone		1st contact
Dan Eaton	Director, National Security Policy	DDI s9(2)(a)	Mobile	✓
Pip Swaney	Manager, Security and Intelligence Policy	s9(2)(a)		

Minister's office comments:

- ☐ Noted
- ☐ Seen
- ☐ Approved
- ☐ Needs change
- ☐ Withdrawn
- ☐ Not seen by Minister
- ☐ Overtaken by events
- ☐ Referred to

EARLY PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE PORTFOLIO MEETINGS

Executive Summary

1. Our Briefing to Incoming Minister noted key areas of focus for the National Security and Intelligence portfolio within the first 100 days and options for shaping the future direction of the portfolio. We have also identified a range of opportunities for proactive engagement, utilising our fortnightly meetings with you.
2. Beginning with a discussion on your priorities for the portfolio, including those arising from the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019 (the Royal Commission report), and options for working with other ministers on matters of national security, we propose discussions on both system-level strategic guidance to the sector and on specific cross-sector security issues.
3. The system-level strategic guidance items include discussion on our work to review the overarching strategic policy settings for national security, reviewing the National Security and Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs) and improving their governance, and strengthening our risk-based approach to national security.
4. New Zealand's engagement in s6(a) mis/disinformation, the national security implications of COVID-19 and National Security System budget coordination are all cross-sector security issues that would benefit from early discussion along with relevant portfolio ministers. We suggest an end-to-end demonstration of a national security incident response, showing how intelligence, operations and policy link together. You may also like to engage on the Defence Assessment 21 and meet with the new Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) and the members of the IGIS Advisory Panel.

Purpose

5. This briefing proposes initial priorities for the National Security and Intelligence portfolio, further to our Briefing to Incoming Minister. We ask you to indicate the topics you wish to prioritise in our early fortnightly meetings with you.

We have identified a range of opportunities for proactive engagement with the National Security and Intelligence portfolio

6. s9(2)(g)(i)
7. The topics are a mix of system-level strategic guidance discussions, as well as specific cross-system security issue discussions. Topics not covered in our Briefing to Incoming Minister are outlined further below.
8. The system-level initiatives are at early stages of development and provide an opportunity for you to shape their future direction. The cross-system security issues are more developed and would benefit from discussion with other ministers to confirm next steps.

We would like to discuss your priorities for the portfolio, including how you would like to work with other ministers on matters of national security and intelligence

9. We suggest that our first meeting in 2021 focus on your priorities for the portfolio, including those that arise out of the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019 (the Royal Commission report).
10. You are lead Minister for 11 of the national security recommendations arising from the Royal Commission report, including the establishment of a new National Intelligence and Security agency (see Attachment B). Implementing these recommendations will require a multi-year work programme, informed by a broader review of the overarching strategic policy settings for national security. We would like to discuss your priorities from within these recommendations as we develop that work programme, noting the budget bid you have submitted to secure resource for this work. It is also an opportunity to discuss the extent of public engagement you would like to undertake as these recommendations are progressed.

11. s9(2)(f)(iv)



12. s9(2)(f)(iv)



13. We also suggest an early meeting cover your priorities for the work programme of the Prime Minister's Special Representative for Cyber and Digital, including on the Christchurch Call. We can also provide an overview of work underway within the wider national security and intelligence portfolio.

There is opportunity for you to shape improvements in the way the national security and intelligence sector operates

14. We are developing several strategic-level initiatives to further enhance the way the national security and intelligence sector operates. These may address some issues raised by the Royal Commission report and therefore could be included as part of the government response to the report.

Review of overarching strategic policy settings for national security

15. As noted in our Briefing to Incoming Minister, prior to the release of the Royal Commission report we had commenced work to develop a more strategic approach to national security.

Now that the Government's response to the Royal Commission report will include a review of overarching strategic policy settings for national security, we would like to discuss what that could look like and the opportunities that exist through the review to support the national security and intelligence sector in long-term planning and forward-looking approaches.

Reviewing the National Security and Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs) and evolving the system

16. The NSIPs provide you an opportunity to govern what national security and intelligence agencies do, ensuring they focus on what the government of the day and people of New Zealand want, in line with our values and interests. These are also crucial for the agencies themselves, as these provide direction, and help set mandates and work programmes for the next two years.
17. Our Briefing to Incoming Minister noted that the two-yearly refresh of the NSIPs was due to be considered by Cabinet before the end of 2020, but that we intended delaying this to consider any implications arising from the Royal Commission report. While the report made no specific findings in relation to the NSIPs, the report does canvas the challenges faced in making collective, cohesive decisions about where agencies should concentrate effort, and recommends both public and parliamentary engagement in the setting of the priorities.

18. s6(a)

19. s9(2)(f)(iv)

Strengthening New Zealand's risk-based approach to national security

20. Taking a risk-based approach to national security means we can be better prepared for the biggest hazards and threats potentially facing New Zealanders. The last few years have highlighted the significant impact national security-related risks can have on our society when these play out (such as terrorism, communicable diseases, major cyber incidents, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions). The Royal Commission report highlighted the need for the Government to pursue greater commitment to transparency and engagement with New Zealanders on national security issues, so that everyone understands their roles and responsibilities in keeping New Zealand safe, secure and cohesive.

21. s9(2)(f)(iv)

22. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

There are several cross-sector security issues which would benefit from ministerial discussions to shape future direction

s6(a)

23. s6(a)

24.

25.

s6(a)

26. s6(a)

27.

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

National security issues associated with COVID-19

28. The COVID-19 global pandemic has created a new set of national security challenges – and exacerbated old ones – for New Zealand and our region. We suggest a meeting which discusses assessments of those challenges and potential responses to them ^{s6(a)}

s6(a)

Demonstrating an end-to-end process in the National Security System

29. We propose one meeting be reserved for a range of agencies to give you, and relevant Ministers, a demonstration of an end-to-end process of incident response in the National Security System, using a cyber security example. This will show the link between intelligence, operations and policy.

National Security System Budget Coordination

30. Over recent years, the Security and Intelligence Board (SIB) and Hazard Risk Board (HRB) have resolved to create a more joined-up National Security System approach to budgets, as often this work affects multiple agencies and funding streams play out over more than a single budget cycle. ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}

s9(2)(g)(i)

31. ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)}

32.

33. ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)}

Defence Assessment 2021

34. The Ministry of Defence is currently undertaking a Defence Assessment which is due to be completed in the first quarter of 2021. The Defence Assessment will consider New Zealand's strategic environment and the implications for our defence policy settings and will provide a basis for future analysis and decisions on force structure and capability, should Government choose to commission a Defence White Paper 2022.

35. Given the key elements of the strategic environment outlined in the assessment will also have implications for matters falling into the National Security and Intelligence Portfolio

and for the sector more broadly, we suggest one of our fortnightly meetings include the Minister of Defence to discuss the Defence Assessment.

Introductory meetings with the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) and with the IGIS Advisory Panel

36. A key part of your role as Minister for National Security and Intelligence is providing strategic policy and legislative overview responsibilities for the intelligence and security agencies. As Prime Minister, you chair the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), which is an important component of the oversight regime for those agencies.
37. We suggest a meeting with Brendan Horsley, the new IGIS, before the first meeting of the ISC scheduled for 24 February (which will consider the IGIS annual report). His insights coming into the role on how oversight of the intelligence and security agencies could be strengthened, including potentially through greater engagement by the ISC, would be useful in informing future work.
38. We also suggest a separate meeting with the IGIS Advisory Panel members (Angela Foulkes, Chair and Lyn Provost) prior to the same ISC meeting. [REDACTED]
- s9(2)(g)(i)

Next steps

39. We invite you to indicate at Attachment A the priority you place on the proposed topics (and any additional we have not proposed) for our fortnightly National Security and Intelligence meetings when they resume a full schedule in 2021. We will then develop a forward calendar and prepare supporting materials for each meeting, as required.

Attachment:		
Attachment A:	RESTRICTED	Proposed topics for inclusion in fortnightly National Security and Intelligence portfolio meetings in 2021
Attachment B	UNCLASSIFIED	Summary of national security recommendations from the Royal Commission report you are lead minister for implementing

ATTACHMENT A

Proposed topics for inclusion in fortnightly National Security and Intelligence portfolio meetings in 2021

Topic	Related event/milestone/upcoming decision	Other Ministers/relevant ministerial portfolios	Please indicate the priority this topic should be given (High/Medium/Low)
Portfolio priorities , including: <i>(likely to be split across over two meetings)</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Priorities for the portfolio, including those arising from the Royal Commission report, and engaging with other ministers on matters of national security and intelligence. - Priorities for work of the PM's Special Representative on Cyber and Digital. - Overview of additional work underway within the portfolio. 	s9(2)(f)(iv) Direction on national security and counter-terrorism priorities arising from the Royal Commission report. Development of work programme for the PM's Special Representative (including Christchurch Call).	NSI only	
Review of national security strategic policy settings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discuss approach to this review, to be completed as part of the response to the Royal Commission report 	Ministerial input into planned approach.	NSI only	
Reviewing the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and evolving the system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv) 	s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)	NSI only	
Strengthening the risk based approach to national security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - s9(2)(f)(iv) 	s9(2)(f)(iv)	NSI only	
s6(a)			
Strengthening New Zealand's resilience to mis/disinformation (as noted in separate briefing 2021NSP/031) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discuss advice on the coordination of, and development of a strategic framework for, strengthening New Zealand's resilience to mis/disinformation, including potential links to social cohesion work. 	Ministerial discussion on development of the proposed strategic framework.	Education COVID-19 Response Health GCSB and NZSIS Broadcasting & Media Justice Internal Affairs Digital Economy and Communications	

s6(a)			
Counter Terrorism work programme (as noted in our BIM) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Briefing on new CTAG annual national terrorism threat environment and outlook paper and revised threat level - Discussion on key elements of the CT work programme and progression of related Royal Commission recommendations. 	Public release of annual review of the national terrorism threat level.	NZSIS Police Justice Internal Affairs	
National security issues associated with COVID-19 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussion of national security implications from COVID-19, including vaccine security (roll out, systems, and networks) 	Portfolio relevant issues associated with COVID-19.	COVID-19 Foreign Affairs	
Cyber security policy issues: (as noted in our BIM) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussion on how to progress policy work related to ensuring effective public safety and law enforcement in a digital age – including consideration of negotiating a CLOUD Act Executive Agreement with the US, encryption and public safety issues. - s6(a) 	Consider approaches to this work, lead agencies and lead Ministers, including link to Royal Commission recommendations.	NZSIS & GCSB Foreign Affairs Police Justice Internal Affairs Digital Economy and Communications	
Demonstration of an end-to-end process in the national security system – cyber security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A demonstration of an incident response in the national security system, showing the link between intelligence, operations and policy. 		GCSB Foreign Affairs Police Digital Economy and Communications	
National Security System budget coordination <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussion on proposed approach to budget coordination across the National Security System, including consideration of national security strategic goals for future budgets. 	Development of Budget 2021.	Finance	
Defence Assessment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opportunity to invite the Minister of Defence to discuss Defence Assessment 2021, which will inform the next Defence White Paper. 	Defence Assessment is scheduled to be completed in Q1 of 2021.	Defence	
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introductory meeting with the new IGIS, Brendan Horsley, ahead of first Intelligence and Security Committee meeting. 	First meeting of the Intelligence and Security Committee of the 53 rd parliament, 24 February 2021.	NSI only	
IGIS Advisory Panel <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Separate meeting with the IGIS Advisory Panel members (Angela Foulkes, Chair and Lyn Provost) to discuss their views on the role of the IGIS and the Advisory Panel. 	First meeting of the Intelligence and Security Committee of the 53 rd parliament, 24 February 2021, and upcoming appointment of new Deputy IGIS.	NSI only	

ATTACHMENT B

Summary of national security recommendations from the Royal Commission report you are lead minister for implementing

#	Recommendation
1	Appointment of a Minister with responsibility and accountability to lead and coordinate the CT effort
2	Establish a new national intelligence and security agency (NISA) that is well-resourced and legislatively mandated to be responsible for strategic intelligence and security leadership functions.
3	Investigate alternative mechanisms to the voluntary nature of the Security and Intelligence Board, including the establishment of an Interdepartmental Executive Board.
4	Develop and implement a public facing CT/CVE strategy.
6	Strengthen the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
7	Establish an Advisory Group on CT.
8	Include a summary of advice from the Advisory Group and actions taken in response, when providing advice on the National Security and Intelligence Priorities and annual threatscape report.
14	Establish a programme to fund independent NZ-specific research.
15	Create opportunities to improve public understanding on violent extremism and terrorism in NZ, with ongoing public discussions.
16	Establish an annual hui on CVE and CT.
17	Require in legislation publication of the NSIPs and referral to ISC for consideration; publication of an annual threatscape report; and the ISC to receive and consider submissions on the NSIPs and threatscape report.



Aide-Memoire

MEETING WITH BRENDAN HORSLEY, INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

To	Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, Minister for National Security and Intelligence	Report No.	2021NSP/061
From	Tony Lynch, Deputy Chief Executive, National Security Group	Date	15/02/2021

Purpose

1. You are meeting with Brendan Horsley, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) on Wednesday 17 February 12.00 – 12.30pm. This note provides background and talking points to support the meeting.

Brendan Horsley commenced as the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in June 2020

2. Mr Horsley has been in the role for eight months. Mr Horsley came to the IGIS role from the Crown Law Office, where he was the Deputy Solicitor-General (Criminal), and prior to that, the national Director of the Public Defence Service in the Ministry of Justice.
3. The role of the IGIS is to:
 - ensure that security and intelligence agencies carry out their activities lawfully and properly;
 - independently investigate complaints about the intelligence and security agencies; and
 - provide advice about oversight of the intelligence and security agencies to the Government and the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).
4. Mr Horsley will present the IGIS Annual Report to the ISC meeting on Wednesday 24 February 2021. This is his first appearance before the ISC.

Suggested talking points

5. You may wish to raise the following matters / questions during your meeting with Mr Horsley:
 - What are your early insights on the oversight role and on the intelligence and security agencies?

- What are your priorities for the coming year?
- The recommendations from the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain (the Report) will have significant impacts for the intelligence and security agencies. How do you think this will affect your role as an oversight body?
- The Report (on page 620) stated that some of the difficulties with the operation of legislation could have been resolved if your office had a more constructive level of engagement with the agencies. What are your plans to address this?
- At the first Parliamentary ISC meeting – where you will be presenting your Annual Report, we will also consider the Royal Commission's recommendation to strengthen the role of the ISC so it can provide better and informed cross-agency oversight of the national security system. Do you have any views or comments on this?

Recommendations

6. It is recommended that you note the contents of this aide-memoire.

Tony Lynch
Deputy Chief Executive
National Security Group

NOTED
<p>Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern Prime Minister</p>
<p>Date: / / 2021</p>



Briefing

MASSEY UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REPORT - 'TURNING THE DIAL FROM SOCIAL LICENCE TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY'

To Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern Prime Minister

Date	24/08/2021	Priority	Routine
Deadline	31/08/2021	Briefing Number	2122NSP/015

Purpose

This briefing provides a summary of, and comment on, a research report produced specifically for members of the Intelligence and Security Committee by Massey University academics titled *"Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security – New Zealand's Intelligence and Security Agencies and the Case for an Informed Citizenry"*.

Recommendations

1. s9(2)(f)(iv)

3. **Note** the report is to be tabled at the next meeting of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
4. **Agree** to refer this briefing to Hon Andrew Little, Minister Responsible for the GCSB and NZSIS and Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

YES / NO



Tony Lynch
Deputy Chief Executive
National Security Group

24/08/2021

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern
Prime Minister

...../...../2021

Contact for telephone discussion if required:

Name	Position	Telephone		1st contact
Pip Swaney	Manager, Security & Intelligence Policy	s9(2)(a)	s9(2)(a)	✓
Chris Bourne	Principal Policy Advisor, Security & Intelligence Policy	-	s9(2)(a)	

Minister's office comments:

- ☐ Noted
- ☐ Seen
- ☐ Approved
- ☐ Needs change
- ☐ Withdrawn
- ☐ Not seen by Minister
- ☐ Overtaken by events
- ☐ Referred to

MASSEY UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REPORT - 'TURNING THE DIAL FROM SOCIAL LICENCE TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY'

Purpose

1. This briefing provides a summary of, and comment on, a research report produced specifically for members of the Intelligence and Security Committee by Massey University academics titled *"Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security – New Zealand's Intelligence and Security Agencies and the Case for an Informed Citizenry"* (the Report).

The Report's objective is to challenge conventional thinking on the relationship between the intelligence agencies and the public

2. The Report, due to be publicly released this month, was written by Damien Rogers and Shaun Mawdsley¹ of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Massey University. The Report was prepared specifically for members of the Intelligence and Security Committee. The Report was also copied to the chief executives of DPMC, the New Zealand Security and Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).
3. The authors prepared the report to challenge conventional thinking on the relationship between the intelligence agencies and the public. The authors consider this is particularly necessary considering the public's low trust and confidence in the agencies due to "scandals involving the agencies or parliamentarians".²
4. The Report:
 - a) Critiques the lack of a legislative definition of national security;
 - b) Reviews the major changes to the New Zealand intelligence agencies since the later stages of the Cold War in the late 1980s;
 - c) Describes in some detail previous reviews and inquiries into the intelligence and security agencies;
 - d) Outlines perceptions of public unease with the intelligence agencies, the agencies' links to Police and Defence and New Zealand's wider surveillance apparatus; and
 - e) Outlines academic thinking on social licence, democratic security practice and an informed citizenry.

¹ Damien Rogers is a senior lecturer at Massey University. Before academia Damian had experience within the intelligence community. He is a regular commentator on, and critic of, the intelligence sector. Shaun Mawdsley is a PhD candidate in History at Massey University.

² Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security, page 5.

5. **The Report's key findings are:**

- a) There is very low trust and confidence in the intelligence and security agencies, especially due to unease with the growth in size and perceived role of the agencies, levels of secrecy and successive "scandals";
- b) Previous reviews and inquiries, including the *Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019* (the Royal Commission), did not consider public trust and confidence. The authors consider that the reviewers were not subject matter experts, nor did they challenge conventional thinking;³
- c) The notion of 'national security' is considered too expansive and should be defined in legislation. The authors state that intelligence efforts in New Zealand are now wider than national security and are used, for example 'to support an increasingly militarised Police';⁴
- d) Recent transformations have changed service delivery for the intelligence agencies to include prosperity and economic wellbeing as well as security;
- e) The reach of intelligence agencies throughout New Zealand has widened with changing priorities, increases in agency size, better surveillance technology and closer relationships with Police, Defence, commercial enterprises and international partner intelligence services. The report concludes that 'the surveillance apparatus...is a formidable beast'.⁵

6. **The Report recommends** that, while further reviews of the intelligence and security agencies are not necessary, there is a need to 'foster a society of citizens capable of granting informed consent to be subject to state surveillance ... so agencies [can] hold a social licence to operate'.⁶ The Report sets out ideas for parliamentarians, senior public servants and university leaders that could help achieve this. Some of these are summarised in Attachment A.

s9(2)(g)(i)

7. The Report covers a wide area of topics, drawing only on open source information given the limitations on academic access to classified information and government work programmes underway. Neither DPMC nor the intelligence and security agencies were approached as part of this research. It will make a useful contribution to the public debate on intelligence and security issues.
8. The report does not raise any new issues of significant concern – it largely covers ground that has been raised in previous reviews of the sector. Many of the issues and recommendations from the Report were also raised by the Royal Commission (for example, improving public dialogue on security issues and strengthening the role of the ISC).
9. Ministers have agreed a work programme to respond to the Royal Commission which will address many of the Report's recommendations relating to issues of transparency, an

³ Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security, page 61

⁴ Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security, page 38

⁵ Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security, page 60

⁶ Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security, pages 61 and 68

informed public, academic engagement and increasing public trust and confidence. Some important steps have already been taken or are underway, for example, He Whenua Taurikura held in Christchurch earlier this year and the proposed establishment of a National Centre of Excellence in conjunction with New Zealand universities.

10. s9(2)(f)(iv) [REDACTED]
11. Some of the recommendations made in the Report are being addressed in other work programmes, for example the establishment of an Inspector-General of Defence – a recommendation from the Operation Burnham inquiry.

Next Steps

12. As Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, you may wish to acknowledge receipt of the Report. s9(2)(f)(iv) [REDACTED].
13. s9(2)(f)(iv) [REDACTED]
14. The report is to be tabled at the next meeting of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
15. We recommend you refer this briefing to Hon Andrew Little, in both his capacity as Minister Responsible for the GCSB and NZSIS, and as Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques.

Attachments:		
Attachment A:	In Confidence	Summary of recommended actions from the research report " <i>Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security</i> "
Attachment B	Unclassified	Attachment B in withheld in full under section 9(2)(f)(iv) of the Act [REDACTED]

ATTACHMENT A

Summary of recommended actions from the research report "*Turning the Dial from Social Licence to Democratic Security*"

Parliamentarians

- a) Foster an informed society of citizens through robust debate on security and intelligence issues that not only respect, but also value and encourage differences of opinion, dissent and criticism;
- b) Parliament could provide clearer direction for the intelligence and security agencies, particularly by:
 - i) ISC members engaging with subject matter experts and being willing to re-politicise security issues;
 - ii) Establishing a tighter definition of national security;
 - iii) Ensuring future reviewers of legislation possess relevant expertise;
- c) Frequent engagement with the public on intelligence and security issues, including hosting an annual public conference on New Zealand Security at Parliament.
- d) Establish a Parliamentary Commissioner for Security. The Commissioner's functions would be, essentially, to review and provide advice on security issues and the system of agencies and processes established by the Government to manage security, including intelligence.

Senior Public Servants


- a) Senior public servants (especially the Directors-General of the GCSB and NZSIS) should be more available for interviews. They should also; better resource parts of their agencies responsible for declassifying documents and fulfilling requests for official information;
- b) Commission and publicly release assessments on issues, trends and events impacting on New Zealand's security;
- c) Fund more scholarships, encouraging students to undertake courses in security studies and provide funding for academics to visit New Zealand;
- d) Introduce a new output class of public engagement and capacity building and a new outcome of building a society of informed citizens with an annual report to Parliament against these;
- e) Future reviewers need to be subject-matter experts, credentialed with university qualifications who have authored a body of respected work on intelligence and security matters;
- f) Those performing intelligence work to shift away from viewing minority and marginalised communities as either suspect communities or victim communities;

- g) The Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security should be empowered to examine all use of NZSIS and GCSB products and services provided to, as well as the sharing of any capabilities with, the following:
- the New Zealand Defence Force and the New Zealand Police;
 - the wider intelligence community, including those agencies with responsibilities for regulating the flow of people, goods and services across New Zealand's international border;
 - the National Assessment Bureau and the National Security Group within DPMC.

University Leaders

- a) Universities could, as a matter of strategic priority, fund major research projects that may advance understanding of security in New Zealand;
- b) Academics should co-design and co-deliver courses to develop and enhance understanding of intelligence and security matters by parliamentarians and their staff, public servants within agencies, as well as news media;
- c) Academics with expertise in security matters should plan and coordinate their efforts to engage directly with the New Zealand public through public lectures to build and enhance New Zealanders' political literacy in security and intelligence.

Attachment B in withheld in full under section 9(2)(f)(iv) of the Act



Released under the Official Information Act 1982



Briefing

ADVANCING THE PUBLIC CONVERSATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY RISK THROUGH THE LONG- TERM INSIGHTS BRIEFING

To Prime Minister and Minister for National Security and Intelligence (Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern)

Date	27/08/2021	Priority	Routine
Deadline	N/A	Briefing Number	2122NSP/026

Purpose

This briefing updates you on the proposed topic for the national security Long-Term Insights Briefing (LTIB) being led by NSG. The topic has been re-scoped to deliver many of the outcomes that would be achieved through a public Risk Report, and to ensure engagement with the public on national security over the next 10 months is better streamlined.

Recommendations

1. **Note** DPMC plans to use the Long-Term Insights Briefing to deliver outcomes that would be sought through a public Risk Report, and to streamline public engagement on national security workstreams.

YES / NO

<p>Tony Lynch Deputy Chief Executive, National Security Group</p>
<p>...../...../.....</p>

<p>Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern Prime Minister Minister for National Security and Intelligence</p>
<p>...../...../.....</p>

Contact for telephone discussion if required:

Name	Position	Telephone		1st contact
Nicky Eaton	Director, National Intelligence and Risk Coordination Directorate, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	Mobile	✓
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Minister's office comments:

- ☐ Noted
- ☐ Seen
- ☐ Approved
- ☐ Needs change
- ☐ Withdrawn
- ☐ Not seen by Minister
- ☐ Overtaken by events
- ☐ Referred to

ADVANCING THE PUBLIC CONVERSATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY RISK THROUGH THE LONG-TERM INSIGHTS BRIEFING

Purpose

1. This briefing updates you on the proposed topic for the national security sector Long-Term Insights Briefing (LTIB) being led by NSG. The topic has been re-scoped to deliver many of the outcomes that would be achieved through a public Risk Report, and to ensure engagement with the public on national security over the next 10 months is better streamlined.

Background

s9(2)(f)(iv)

3. Combining key elements of a public Risk Report with the LTIB will result in an effective and engaging product, and help ensure engagements over the next 10 months with the public on national security issues, including the National Security Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs), can be better streamlined. The reframed LTIB will focus on “engaging Aotearoa New Zealand’s increasingly diverse communities on national security risks, challenges and opportunities”.
4. The key intended outcome of this LTIB is a society that has greater visibility and awareness of current and future national security risks, challenges and opportunities that New Zealand faces. It is envisaged this will enable the public to:
 - a. engage in informed, relevant debate and policy development on critical security issues (including the NSIPs), and;
 - b. understand the role they can play, and the practical contributions communities can make to national security.
5. An overview of our concept for the LTIB is included as **Attachment A**.
6. Alongside work on the Review of National Security Strategic Policy Settings and a national security strategy, the LTIB will support the national security sector to build greater social license and to encourage public understanding of issues related to national security. We therefore think the reframed LTIB will mitigate the need for a public Risk Report at this time, although you may still wish to consider future risk reports.

Implications of delivering the outcomes of a Risk Report through the LTIB

7. Delivering the intended outcomes of a public Risk Report through the LTIB is an opportunity to both better position New Zealand to anticipate future national security challenges and risks, and to better engage the public in conversations about these issues.
8. However, the requirements associated with LTIBs also mean this product will have a different look and feel than the public Risk Report as it was originally envisaged. For example, the LTIB lends itself more to a broader narrative about our national security risks and challenges, rather than a comprehensive, detailed inventory of all individual nationally significant risks. It will have less of a focus on enhancing public preparedness 'in the now', and information on what the government currently does to manage specific national risks.
9. Despite this, the LTIB will help to demonstrate to the public that national security risks and challenges are front of mind for government, and that it is committed to fostering greater transparency and engagement on them. The LTIB would also form a substantive and visible component of the Government's longer-term response to the concerns raised in the RCOI report, that extends beyond its counter-terrorism efforts.

Opting to deliver the outcomes of the Risk Report through the LTIB now does not preclude the development of a future public Risk Report

10. The LTIB will highlight future national security risks and challenges, and the issues we think society needs to confront. It could also be a mechanism for testing public attitudes and yielding insights on the range of ways to have these difficult conversations with diversifying communities. These include, but may not be limited to, tools such as a public facing Risk Report. The LTIB could therefore be the first step toward a formal Risk Report, but might also generate a broader suite of insights to consider about how we engage.

Focussing the LTIB on threat-based risks

11. The LTIB should, as a start point, acknowledge the breadth of nationally significant risks, explain New Zealand's current "all-hazards-all risks" approach to national security, and provide an overview of the approach New Zealand takes to managing risk. However, we think there is significant value in focussing our deeper analytical efforts on a smaller subset of 'threat-based' risks that include, for example, terrorism, foreign interference and cyber-attacks. This will:

Allow us to focus our attention on where the "problem" is...

12. Sharpening the focus of the LTIB on threat-based national security risks would maximise our opportunity to generate deeper insights on those areas which – by its own acknowledgement – government has not engaged well with the public on in the past.

...reflect the intent of the RCOI...

13. The LTIB sits outside of the Government's formal Royal Commission of Inquiry response work programme. Focusing our approach in this way is therefore also a demonstration of a longer-term commitment to addressing the intent of the RCOI Report, particularly in relation to fostering greater transparency and a new national conversation on security issues and risks.

...and avoid duplicating the work of those agencies best placed to lead conversations on other hazards...

14. A focus on threat-based risks is also an acknowledgement that public conversations on hazard-type risks such as earthquakes, tsunami and floods tend to be more mature than threat-based national security risks. This is in part due to the large amount of publicly available information on such issues and the longstanding community engagement undertaken by agencies and local authorities in these areas.

Scope may be further refined as a result of consultation with the public on the topic

15. The scope outlined above is our start point for thinking about the LTIB. However, New Zealanders will also have an opportunity to provide feedback on areas of focus within our broad topic as part of the formal topic consultation, which we will undertake in October.

Next steps

16. We will continue to keep you updated on progress with the LTIB through National Security and Intelligence meetings and the fortnightly report.

Attachments:		
Attachment A:	Long-Term Insights Briefing Overview	Withheld in full under section 9(2)(f) (iv) of the Act