



8 August 2023

Ombudsman Ref: 571551  
DPMC Ref: OIA-2021/22-0477

Dear [REDACTED]

**Official Information Act request for information associated with the National Risk Register and Draft National Risk Report 2018**

I refer to your Official Information Act 1982 (the Act) request received by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) on 25 October 2021. You requested:

*"...a list of every risk profile in the register, including the following details for each profile*

- 1) The profile title*
- 2) The identity of the coordinating agency or agencies*
- 3) The date that the current profile was issued (month and year).*
- 4) The profile security classification*

*I would also like to request copies of these briefings:*

- 1) November 2017: "Improving the management of nationally significant risks" [document ID 4000794]*
- 2) December 2017: "National Risk Register 2018" [document ID 4015680]*
- 3) April 2018: "Cover-note in explanation of attached National Risk items" [document ID 4377343]*
- 4) June, July and August 2018: "Updates on the New Zealand National Risk Report" [document IDs 4057532, 4068687 and 4067533]*
- 5) August 2018: "Aide-Memoire: Ministerial meeting on New Zealand National Risk Report" [document ID 4077370]*
- 6) December 2018: "Managing National Security Risks" [document ID 4101239]*
- 7) January 2019: "Benefits of a publicly available national risk report" [1819NSPD/070]*
- 8) Any other briefings, dated since February this year, that deal with the topic of the National Risk Register"*

After discussions with the Office of the Ombudsman, in relation to the investigation of your complaint about DPMC withholding information, we advised of our intention to reassess these for release. We have reassessed the documents and decided the information you have requested will be provided to you, subject to some information being withheld. Following extensive consultations, we have now completed a further assessment and can release the documents to you. I apologise for the delay in finalising the release of these documents to you and regret we were not able to meet our anticipated timeframe. This was for the most part due to the large amount of information to be reassessed and prepared for release and the number of agencies and Ministers that needed to be consulted before a final decision was made.

Please find attached the requested documents as set on in the table below:

Doc No	Title	Comment and withholding grounds
Doc 01	November 2017: "Improving the management of nationally significant risks"	Sections: 6(a) 9(2)(a)
Doc 02	December 2017: "National Risk Register 2018"	Section: 9(2)(a)
Doc 03	April 2018: "Cover-note in explanation of attached National Risk items"	<i>No redactions.</i> Pg 28, Para 3. Note –Draft National Risk Report 2018 is available on the DPMC website at: <a href="https://dPMC.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-12/oia-2020-21-0511-draft-national-risk-report.pdf">dPMC.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-12/oia-2020-21-0511-draft-national-risk-report.pdf</a> .
Doc 04	June, July and August 2018: "Updates on the New Zealand National Risk Report"	Pg 84, Attachment B: Note –Draft National Risk Report 2018 is available on the DPMC website at: <a href="https://dPMC.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-12/oia-2020-21-0511-draft-national-risk-report.pdf">dPMC.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-12/oia-2020-21-0511-draft-national-risk-report.pdf</a> .  Pg 84, Attachment C: Withheld in full under 9(2)(g)(i).  Sections: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i)
Doc 05	August 2018: "Aide-Memoire: Ministerial meeting on New Zealand National Risk Report"	Section: 9(2)(g)(i)
Doc 06	December 2018: "Managing National Security Risks"	Sections: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(f)(iv)
Doc 07	January 2019: "Benefits of a publicly available national risk report"	Sections: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(g)(i)
Doc 08	August 2021 "Public Risk Report Plan & Opportunities to Advance the Public Conversation" within the scope of the request.	Sections: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(g)(i)  Attachment B 'Risk Report Talking Points' Withheld in full under 9(2)(g)(i).

Doc No	Title	Comment and withholding grounds
Doc 09	Summary of risk profile details including “title, risk-coordinating agency, date the current profile was issued, the profile security classification” (as at July 2023).	<i>No redactions.</i>

As noted in the table above, and in the documents themselves, some information continues to be withheld under the following sections of the Act:

- section 6(a), to protect the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand
- section 9(2)(a), to protect the privacy of individuals
- section 9(2)(ba), to protect the supply of similar information in the future
- section 9(2)(f)(iv), to maintain the confidentiality of advice tendered by or to Ministers and officials
- section 9(2)(g)(i), to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinion

Document 04 Attachment C “Communications Plan” and Document 08 Attachment B “Risk Report Talking Points” are withheld in full under s 9(2)(g)(i).

Set out below is some important context on the release of information relating to the National Risk Register and the development of a now historical draft 2018 document entitled the ‘National Risk Report’. Also provided is information and links to more current information on New Zealand’s nationally significant risks.

### **The National Risk Register**

The government has a National Risk Register – a tool that can help us build resilience to nationally significant risks in a proactive and coordinated way. Government agencies work together to anticipate, prepare for, and mitigate risks. Our assessment of risks on the National Risk Register is constantly evolving.

Much of the information released as part of this request on the National Risk Register is now several years old and is out-of-date. It should not be assumed to reflect government’s current views, as the content of these briefings and attachments predate recent events that have further shaped our understanding of the risks we face.

We recently published information about the National Risk Register on our website to increase transparency and public awareness of the range of nationally significant risks we face: [dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-risk-approach-0](https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-risk-approach-0).

### **The Draft National Risk Report 2018**

The briefings included for release illustrate the iterative process taken by officials to develop the ‘National Risk Report’, a historical draft document from 2018. The purpose of the report was to provide information on many of the risks on the National Risk Register, and outline some of the ways government was working to mitigate these at the time. The DPMC coordinated the production of this report, with input from several government agencies and stakeholders. The draft report was provided to Ministers for consideration, but ultimately did not progress beyond a draft stage and was never formally endorsed or lodged to Cabinet for approval to release.

This draft is now considerably out-of-date and does not represent the government's assessment of the current risk landscape, particularly given recent significant domestic and global events such as the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and severe weather events, including Cyclone Gabrielle earlier this year.

The Draft National Risk Report 2018 was published on the DPMC website in December 2022 in response to an Official Information Act request. You can read the Draft National Risk Report 2018 here: [dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-12/oia-2020-21-0511-draft-national-risk-report.pdf](https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-12/oia-2020-21-0511-draft-national-risk-report.pdf)

### **Opportunities to communicate publicly on nationally significant risks**

We are committed to increasing engagement with New Zealanders on nationally significant risks and to being more transparent on matters of national security. This is in line with the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019.

The option to develop a National Risk Report was considered in 2021, however this was superseded by the development of the National Security Long Term Insights Briefing entitled '*Let's talk about our national security: Engaging an increasingly diverse Aotearoa New Zealand on national security risks, challenges and opportunities*'. This briefing shares information on some of the most significant threats and risks New Zealand could face over the next 10 - 15 years, and outlines work currently underway to prepare. We consider this a valuable source of information on some of the nationally significant risks we face, and you can find out more and read this briefing on the DPMC website at: [dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-security-long-term-insights-briefing](https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-security-long-term-insights-briefing).

I remind you that you have the right to ask the Ombudsman to investigate and review my decision under section 28(3) of the Act.

This revised response will be published on DPMC's website, your personal information including name and contact details will be removed for publication.

Yours sincerely



Dan Eaton  
**Acting Deputy Chief Executive  
National Security Group**

Enc: Requested Documents relating to the National Risk Register  
Cc: Office of the Ombudsman  
Ombudsman reference: 571551

## List of Documents

Doc No	Pages	Title	Annexes/attachments	Comment and withholding grounds
Doc 01	3-14	November 2017: "Improving the management of nationally significant risks"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Annex A 'Security Focused Cabinet Committee – forward agenda'.</li> <li>Annex B 'Guide to attachments': <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brief example 'heat maps' that plot risk likelihood against probability.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Sections: 6(a) 9(2)(a)
Doc 02	15-27	December 2017: "National Risk Register 2018"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Annex A containing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Risk profile and example risk card for pests and diseases.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Section: 9(2)(a)
Doc 03	28-74	April 2018: "Cover-note in explanation of attached National Risk items"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Letter to Ministers from Minister for National Security and Intelligence</li> <li>Draft Cabinet Paper from Office of the Minister for National Security and Intelligence</li> </ul>	<i>No redactions.</i> Pg 28, Para 3. Note –Draft National Risk Report 2018 is available on the DPMC website.
Doc 04	75-97	June, July and August 2018: "Updates on the New Zealand National Risk Report"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Attachment A: Draft Cabinet Paper on Improving the Management of National Security Risks.</li> </ul>	Pg 84, Attachment B: Note –Draft National Risk Report 2018 is available on the DPMC website.  Pg 84, Attachment C: Withheld in full under 9(2)(g)(i).  Sections: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(ba) 9(2)(f)(iv) 9(2)(g)(i)
Doc 05	98-101	August 2018: "Aide-Memoire: Ministerial meeting on New Zealand National Risk Report"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Attachment A: Ministerial meeting agenda and talking points</li> </ul>	Section: 9(2)(g)(i)
Doc 06	102-127	December 2018: "Managing National Security Risks"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Attachment A: Hazard Risk Board: Better Management of National Security Risks 2018 (report to Min NSI)</li> <li>Attachment B: Security and Intelligence Board: Better Management of National Security Risks 2018 (report to Min NSI)</li> </ul>	Sections: 6(a) 9(2)(a) 9(2)(f)(iv)

Doc No	Pages	Title	Annexes/attachments	Comment and withholding grounds
Doc 07	128-132	January 2019: "Benefits of a publicly available national risk report"	N/A	Sections: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(g)(i)
Doc 08	133-140	August 2021: "Public Risk Report Plan & Opportunities to Advance the Public Conversation" within the scope of the request.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attachments A: Plan for developing public Risk Report alongside other key system-level workstreams</li> <li>• Attachment B: Risk Report Talking Points</li> </ul>	Sections: 9(2)(a) 9(2)(g)(i)  Attachment B 'Risk Report Talking Points' Withheld in full under 9(2)(g)(i).
Doc 09	141-142	Summary of risk profile details including "title, risk-coordinating agency, date the current profile was issued, the profile security classification" (as at July 2023).	N/A	<i>No redactions.</i>

DEPARTMENT  
of the PRIME MINISTER  
and CABINET



### BRIEFING: Improving the management of nationally significant risks

<b>Date:</b>	24 November 2017	<b>Tracking number:</b>	4000794
<b>Security classification:</b>	In confidence	<b>Priority:</b>	Routine
<b>For:</b>	Agreement and discussion	<b>Required by:</b>	1 December 2017

Contact for telephone discussion (if required)				
Name	Position	Telephone		1st contact
Andrew Kibblewhite	Chief Executive, DPMC	s9(2)(a)	N/A	
Howard Broad	Deputy Chief Executive, Security & Intelligence		N/A	✓
Mark Evans	Manager, National Risk Unit		s9(2)(a)	

Minister's office to complete:

- Approved
- Declined
- Noted
- Needs change
- Seen
- Overtaken by events
- See Minister's notes
- Withdrawn

Comments:

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
Prime Minister

## **BRIEFING: Improving the management of nationally significant risks**

<b>Date:</b>	24 November 2017	<b>Tracking number:</b>	4000794
<b>Security classification:</b>	In confidence	<b>Priority:</b>	Routine
<b>For:</b>	Agreement and discussion	<b>Required by:</b>	1 December 2017

### **Background**

This report provides you with an overview of the work officials have done to date to improve how national security risks (which includes hazards as part of a comprehensive 'all-hazards, all-risks' definition of national security system risks) are being systematically addressed.

In our view there is a need to be responsive to ever increasing public expectations about transparency in government while aligning that expectation with the government's duty to safeguard its citizens. To that end, we explain how we are managing risks of national significance, in particular the development of a national risk register and the establishment of a National Risk Unit within DPMC. The report suggests specific steps to improve the management of nationally significant risks, including engagement with Ministers and 'communicating on uncertainty' with the public.

The principal objective of these steps is to better identify and reduce the consequences and, where possible, the probability of events that would seriously affect the country's economic, social, built, environmental and fiscal interests. An effective risk management system enhances decision makers' confidence or appetite to take measured risks—accelerating the achievement of objectives across those parameters.

Some risks have effects across the system, beyond the remit of any single agency. Managing for such risks can only be done in a cross-entity way that collectively involves identifying those system-wide effects, and related capabilities, priorities, effort and investment.

New Zealand's national security system has, historically, tended to be reactive and focus on response to events, rather than bringing a systemic approach that looks to identify, manage and invest ahead of possible risk events. We are not without experience in managing risk, but it has also tended to be an agency's single perspective that struggles with system-wide issues. The national security system is changing towards a forward-looking approach intended to build public confidence in government action, resilience in communities and the private sector, and in local and central government. Improved risk management can mean some risks are less likely



to eventuate, responses to and recovery from events are more effective, consequences of events are reduced, and recovery is faster i.e. improvements in reduction, readiness, response and recovery (the 4Rs).

A forward looking approach also brings transparency to risk treatment judgements and decisions by Ministers and senior officials. Providing visibility to Ministers of officials' ongoing risk management decisions (in officials' usual areas of responsibility) should provide assurance, and some protection, for Ministers. Documenting the rationale for risk treatment also protects those decisions and enables stakeholders to understand tough government calls on levels of investment and tolerance for certain risks. The experience of partner governments shows that communicating about uncertainty with the public can help the public deal with fear and uncertainty.

## Recommendations

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet recommends that you:

- (i) **note** the following steps could be taken to improve the management of nationally significant risks;
  - a. **schedule** regular Cabinet Committee meetings on nationally significant risks to provide top-down support/direction to improve management of those risks;
  - b. **task** officials to consider ways of lifting Ministers' awareness of, and accountability for, nationally significant risks in their remit, this might include ;
    - Establishing a strategic dialogue about specific risks – with a rolling conversation at the appropriate Cabinet Committee, setting out officials' views of where gaps exist (see proposed forward schedule at Annex A); and
    - Having an annual paper to Cabinet Committee from each of the Security and Intelligence Board and Hazard Risk Board on risks, setting out those committees' views of the risk landscape, including recent key decisions and priorities for action.
  - c. **task** officials to consider and report back to Cabinet Committee on where there are barriers and opportunities for better cross-agency coordination and resourcing of nationally significant risk management;
  - d. **task** the National Risk Unit to continue the development of an operational National Risk Register, including reporting back to Ministers on its use and development;
  - e. **task** the National Risk Unit to continue leading the development of a public-facing National Risk Report to be launched, subject to Cabinet approval, in the first half of

2018 to increase public awareness of government's management of nationally significant risks; and,

(ii) **invite** officials to meet with you to discuss the specifics of this brief.

Yes/No

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Andrew Kibblewhite  
Chief Executive  
**Department of the Prime Minister and  
Cabinet**  
Date:

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
Date:

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## Improving the management of nationally significant risks

1. In our digital age, we face an ever growing expectation that information is readily available and that government decision-making be the subject of public scrutiny. Yet, we remain conscious that transparency in government decision making must be balanced against the government's duty to safeguard its citizens—the disclosure of some information may work in the favour of those who would act against the safety of New Zealanders.
2. Balancing these considerations is made more complicated as areas of uncertainty<sup>1</sup> or risk are constantly evolving. For this reason, we feel a duty to put in place ways to identify, evaluate and, where possible, reduce risks of national significance. Open discussion about those methods should act to inform, empower and reassure the New Zealand public. In this regard, we note in this brief our suggestion to develop a public-facing National Risk Report. This follows suit with other open democratic countries, such as the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands who have also published national risk reports or assessments
3. As noted in our briefing to you as incoming Minister of National Security and Intelligence, the national security system has tended to be more focused on the response to events, rather than systematically bringing a forward-looking, all-hazards, all-risks, approach to risk management. Risk management is often conducted as a single agency endeavour. New Zealand has had significant experience in dealing with, and has borne the social, physical, economic and fiscal consequences of, major events. Accelerating change to a more forward-looking approach would build resilience in communities, the private sector, and in local and central government. Good risk management across the 4Rs<sup>2</sup> can mean some risks are less likely to eventuate, responses to events are more effective, consequences of events are reduced, and recovery is faster.

### *Developing a National Risk Register*

4. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), in conjunction with agencies, has developed a National Risk Register (NRR), which aims to support better identification, comparison and understanding of nationally significant risks, and to highlight where current risk management is appropriate or where there are opportunities for better cross-agency collaboration. The Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management has a specific requirement to identify hazards and risks of national significance in Part 2, Section 8 (2)(b) of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002. As a risk identification and assessment tool, the NRR will assist the Director in meeting that requirement.
5. With building a secure and resilient country assumed as the normal business of government, risk management provides a means for weighting decisions for the necessary investments. The development of the NRR to date provides a standardised framework for identifying, assessing and comparing an array of hazards and risks that have the potential to significantly disrupt the conditions required for a secure and prosperous nation. It considers all-hazards, including both traditional and non-traditional security risks, providing a consistent method and approach. We have supplied (please see Annex B) a spreadsheet with this brief that lists the risks (and risk categories) identified in the development of the NRR, which agencies 'own' each risk, and the assets/national security objectives impacted by each risk. Another attached

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<sup>1</sup> The international standard, ISO 31000, defines risk as 'the effect of uncertainty on objectives'.

<sup>2</sup> Reduction, readiness, response, recovery.

'national risks and objectives' diagram illustrates connections between risks and national security objectives.

6. Beginning in August 2015, over thirty central government agencies and Crown Research Institutes were identified to lead risk assessments and develop risk profiles. Risk profiles contextualise, describe and summarise the level of risk from various hazards to form the basis of a register. They also summarise existing risk management strategies across the 4Rs (reduction, readiness, response and recovery), allowing assessment of current gaps and areas for improvement. A project team comprising officials from DPMC, MCDEM and The Treasury led the framework development and coordinated a collaborative review of the risk assessment and profiles developed by 'risk-owning' agencies.
7. Each risk is assessed by using a 'maximum credible event' scenario to show the highest consequences, based on current understanding of the risk, and determining the likelihood of that scenario occurring in the next five years under current risk management. These scenarios are then given risk ratings based on their potential to adversely affect New Zealand's social well-being, economy, governance, and built and natural environments. We have supplied with this brief example 'heat maps' that plot risk likelihood against probability (please see Annex B).
8. Assessments incorporate historical evidence, international experiences and the best available science and research. Some risks we know more about than others, hence a level of judgment has been used in risk assessments completed by some lead agencies.

#### *Use of the NRR and the establishment of a National Risk Unit*

9. Use of the NRR in its current form has evolved as the project has developed. ODESC's Hazard Risk Board (HRB) and Security & Intelligence Board (SIB) have taken responsibility for maintaining strategic oversight of the national risks within their jurisdiction.
10. Cabinet's National Security Committee (NSC) considered the NRR on 9 August 2016 and requested it be further developed. An arranged follow-up with NSC did not occur as a result of the Kaikoura earthquake in November 2016, at which time a judgement was made to build a more comprehensive 'bottom-up' assessment of risks before further engagement with Cabinet.
11. As the NRR evolved, it became apparent that the additional commitment of dedicated DPMC resources was needed to ensure delivery of NRR objectives. Work on the NRR was therefore transitioned into a newly established National Risk Unit (NRU). A key driver for establishing the NRU was the Office of the Auditor-General's Governance of the National Security System report, which recommended DPMC 'sharpen the focus' of governance of national security risks, with better definition and clearer accountabilities for risk governance and management.
12. The NRU commenced operation in June 2017. The NRU's core purpose is to support the National Security System's governance role and the identification, assessment and management of national risks by agencies. The NRU manages the NRR as a primary tool to assist in this. The NRU will support development of tools that build a comprehensive picture of the system's capability to manage national risks. These tools include risk profiles, which are summaries of identified national risks, and 'risk cards', which are even shorter snap shots used to introduce identified risks. By way of illustration, we have supplied a select few examples of risk profiles and risk cards with this brief (please see Annex B).

13. The intention is that the National Security System is better prepared for events and to address long-term drivers of risk. To achieve this, Ministers, government departments, risk-owning agencies need to further develop a culture of identifying, assessing, managing and governing national risks.

#### *The role of ODESC*

14. ODESC's boards (Hazard Risk Board, with a focus on civil contingency issues, and Security and Intelligence Board, with a focus on threats arising from the actions of adversaries) have a system-improver function for New Zealand's national risks. Regular monitoring and reporting from lead agencies to the boards will support better oversight of how risks are inter-related, how they are changing and help with identification of emerging or chronic issues. ODESC boards are making consideration of national risks a business as usual function.
15. NRU works with risk-owning or lead agencies to assess the maturity of the framework by which each national risk is managed, and to help clarify accountabilities. This includes identifying any gaps in risk management and treatment options, so that we are better prepared for a range of possible future events. When ODESC boards discuss a national risk, they focus on obtaining 'system level' assurance that the risk is well understood, appropriate levels of management are in place or under development and residual risk is deemed acceptable.
16. Where there are gaps identified in risk management, ODESC boards can be used to coordinate agencies' efforts. They can influence the collective effort, prioritising so that effort is applied where there is confidence it can bring the greatest overall benefit.
17. By way of example, the failure of critical infrastructure, such as the recent failure of the Wiri pipeline, illustrated the need to take a systems approach to both response and management of national risks. While specific sectors (e.g. oil and gas) manage risks related to their specific outputs, there is a need for national oversight to identify and to discuss mitigations for those vulnerabilities.
18. It also highlights that managing national risks often requires a whole-of-society effort, with key roles for private sector entities, such as lifelines utilities. The NRU is supporting lead agencies in bringing additional agencies with risk management responsibilities into the conversation around national risk management.
19. There is also a role for the wider public in understanding and being prepared for the possible effects of some national risks. Public-facing national risk reports have been published in the UK, Canada and other countries to build transparency and public understanding of the government's approach to risk management. They also engage communities in understanding and managing risk.
20. The NRU has set up a project team and has begun working with the Prime Minister's Chief Science Advisor (PMCSA) and MCDEM to develop a public-facing report on New Zealand's risks. If you agree, we suggest a public report be launched in the first half of 2018. Progress on this work will form part of future reporting to ODESC and Ministers about national risks.
21. Building on transparency and public understanding, ODESC forums and other platforms will continue to build awareness of risk management and the need for it to be built into other core business functions, such as policy development.

### *Engagement with Ministers*

22. Whilst individual agencies have variously engaged with their Ministers, we have not yet reflected the HRB/SIB dialogue on risk to Ministers. We suggest this could be done in two ways:

- Establishing a strategic dialogue about specific risks— with a rolling conversation at the appropriate Cabinet Committee, setting out officials' views of where gaps exist; and
- Having an annual paper to Cabinet from each of the SIB and HRB on risks, setting out those boards' views of the risk landscape, including recent key decisions and priorities for action.

### *Next Steps*

Specific steps that should improve the management of nationally significant risks might include:

- regular Cabinet Committee meetings on nationally significant risks to provide impetus to improved governance and management of those risks.
- Lifting Ministers awareness of, and accountability for, the steps to be taken to better manage nationally significant risks in their risk-owning agencies.
- ODESC's continued focus on consideration and reporting about nationally significant risks.
- The operationalisation of the National Risk Register so ODESC and risk owning agencies use it as a tool to inform their risk-based decisions.
- Convening ODESC forums and other platforms to build central government awareness of risk management and how it fits with other core business (such as policy development).
- Launch of a public-facing National Risk Report in the first half of 2018 to 'communicate on uncertainty' and increase public awareness of nationally significant risks.

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## ANNEX A: Security Focused Cabinet Committee – forward agenda

1. Recommendations (a) and (b) above suggest more regular Cabinet Committee meetings on nationally significant risks. These meetings would support an annual cycle of risk governance providing top-down guidance and clarifying accountabilities for nationally significant risks.
2. This Annex suggests topics that could form a forward agenda. Suggested topics include nationally significant risks as well as emerging issues and systems stresses, policy issues, and other matters of current importance or concern in the national security system.
3. Officials would support these topics with documentation that:
  - Clearly identifies the risk, the threat level and strategic importance of the topic, including what effect uncertainty is having on particular national objectives;
  - Situates the topic in relation to other significant risks and provides summary supporting data and evidence behind intelligence or risk assessments;
  - Clearly describes the background to recent relevant decisions and areas where there are gaps about either understanding of the risk or about the general issue;
  - Identifies the lead or risk owning agency(s); and
  - Sets out points of decision required for risk reduction, policy choices and trade-offs, or priorities for action, including the decisions or input needed from Ministers and the Committee.
4. Not necessarily in priority order, we suggest a selection of the following topics would form the forward agenda for the appropriate Cabinet Committee in 2018. As listed, these topics are risk categories, system trends or policy matters to which supporting papers would add specificity.
  - Foreign interference in NZ and the Pacific
  - s6(a) [REDACTED]
  - Critical infrastructure resilience
  - Tsunami (geological)
  - Infectious human disease (pandemic)
  - Biosecurity
  - Climate change related
  - Counter-terrorism
  - Transnational organised crime
  - Cyber-related
  - s6(a) [REDACTED]
  - Regional instability, mass arrivals and maritime security
  - Border security, transnational organised crime, and corruption
  - Space related infrastructure


## **ANNEX B: Guide to attachments**

1. Example documents are provided for you in the supplementary booklet of attachments appending this briefing document.

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# Draft SIB Grouped Shocks/Stresses MCE Scenarios



GROUPED SHOCKS/STRESSES	NRR SHOCKS/STRESSES
C Conflict	Armed conflict
	Weapons of mass destruction proliferation*
CU Civil unrest	
IM Irregular migration	
MC Major cyber incident	
RI Regional instability	
TC Transnational crime	Transnational organised crime*
	Smuggling
TI Territorial incursion/threat	
Te Terrorism	

\*Scenarios with highest MCE risk score

**Disclaimer:**


This Draft SIB Heat Map has been compiled using indicative data and includes the grouping of some of our nationally significant risks.

The grouped 'high-level' risk dots are assigned by selecting the highest risk scores (combined likelihood and consequence) for the Maximum Credible Event (MCE) scenarios within each group.

The grouped scores should not replace the MCE's for individual Shocks and Stresses, but can be used to inform discussion on 'high-level' risks.

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# Draft HRB Grouped Shocks/Stresses MCE Scenarios



DOMAIN	GROUPED SHOCKS/STRESSES	NRR SHOCKS/STRESSES
Environmental	PD Biosecurity – Pests and diseases	
	ED Ecosystem disruption (appropriate ownership of this Shock/Stress group is being investigated)	Ecosystem failure Major biodiversity loss* Over exploitation/resource depletion
	Dr Drought	
	Eeq Earthquake	
	NP Natural hazard event in the Pacific	
	Me Meteorological	Coastal hazards Floods Landslide* Severe weather
	MI Meteorite impact	
	S Space weather	
	Ts Tsunami	
	V Volcanic activity	
Technological	W Wild fire	
	CI Critical infrastructure	GNSS disruption Infrastructure failure* Major transport incident
	IA Industrial accident	Fires/explosion Hazardous substance emergency* Major oil spill Radiological event
Societal	Di Diseases	Communicable diseases* Vector-borne diseases
	FS Food safety incidents	Food safety incidents

\*Scenarios with highest MCE scores in each group

**Disclaimer:**

This Draft HRB Heat Map has been compiled using indicative data and includes the grouping of some of our nationally significant risks.

The grouped 'high-level' risk dots are assigned by selecting the highest risk scores (combined likelihood and consequence) for the Maximum Credible Event (MCE) scenarios within each group.

The grouped scores should not replace the MCE's for individual Shocks and Stresses, but can be used to inform discussion on 'high-level' risks.

DEPARTMENT  
of the PRIME MINISTER  
and CABINET



### BRIEFING: National Risk Register 2018

<b>Date:</b>	4 December 2017	<b>Tracking number:</b>	#4015680
<b>Security classification:</b>	In confidence	<b>Priority:</b>	Routine
<b>For:</b>	Noting	<b>Required by:</b>	N/A

Contact for telephone discussion (if required)				
Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact	
Andrew Kibblewhite	Chief Executive, DPMC	s9(2)(a) N/A		
Howard Broad	Deputy Chief Executive, Security & Intelligence	N/A		✓
Mark Evans	Manager, National Risk Unit	s9(2)(a)		

**Minister's office to complete:**

- Approved
- Declined
- Noted
- Needs change
- Seen
- Overtaken by Events
- See Minister's Notes
- Withdrawn

**Comments:**

DRAFT  
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Hon Damien O'Connor  
**Minister of Agriculture**  
**Minister of Biosecurity**

## BRIEFING: National Risk Register 2018

<b>Date:</b>	4 December 2017	<b>Tracking number:</b>	#4015680
<b>Security classification:</b>	In confidence	<b>Priority:</b>	Routine
<b>For:</b>	Noting	<b>Required by:</b>	N/A

### Background and Purpose

This report provides you with a brief overview of the work officials have done to date to improve how national security risks (which includes hazards as part of a comprehensive “all hazards – all risks” definition of national security system risks) are being systematically addressed. We have recently provided a similar brief to the Prime Minister.

In our view there is a need to be responsive to ever-increasing public expectations about transparency in government while aligning that expectation with the government’s duty to safeguard its citizens. To that end, we briefly explain the steps we are taking for managing risks of national significance, in particular the development of a National Risk Register and the establishment of a National Risk Unit within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The principal objective of these steps is to better identify and reduce the consequences and, where possible, the probability of events that would seriously affect the country’s economic, social, built, environmental and fiscal interests. Some risks have effects across the system, beyond the remit of any single agency. Managing for such risks can only be done in a cross-entity way that collectively involves identifying those system-wide effects, and related capabilities, priorities, effort and investment.

New Zealand’s national security system has, historically, tended to be reactive and focus on response to events, rather than bringing a systemic approach that looks to identify, manage and invest ahead of possible risk events. We are not without experience in managing risk, but it has also tended to be an agency’s single perspective that struggles with system-wide issues.

The national security system is changing towards a forward-looking approach intended to build public confidence in government action, resilience in communities and the private sector, and in local and central government. Improved risk management can mean some risks are less likely to eventuate, responses to and recovery from events are more effective, consequences of events

are reduced, and recovery is faster i.e. improvements in reduction, readiness, response and recovery (the 4Rs).

A forward looking approach also brings transparency to risk treatment and decisions by Ministers and senior officials. Providing visibility to Ministers of officials' ongoing risk management decisions (in officials' usual areas of responsibility) should provide assurance, and some protection, for Ministers. Documenting the rationale for risk treatment also protects those decisions and enables stakeholders to understand tough government calls on levels of investment and tolerance for certain risks. The experience of partner governments shows that communicating about uncertainty with the public can help the public deal with fear and uncertainty.

This text below provides you with an overview of:

- The work officials have done to date to improve how national risks, which includes traditional (e.g. espionage and terrorism) and non-traditional security risks (e.g. pandemics, floods and wild fires) as part of our "all hazards – all risks" approach, are being systematically addressed;
- The establishment of the National Risk Unit to support national security system governance and the identification, assessment and management of national risks; and
- How the primary industries related risks are currently positioned within the broader register and suggested areas of focus for 2018.

## Recommendations

We recommend that you:

1. **Note** the development of a forward looking, comprehensive approach to risk management in the national security system, supported by a National Risk Register housed in the newly established National Risk Unit.
2. **Note** the proposal for the Hazard Risk Board to focus on the pests and diseases risk category in 2018.

Andrew Kibblewhite  
**Chief Executive**  
**DPMC**

## Background and National Risk Unit Establishment

1. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), in conjunction with 30 government agencies and Crown Research Institutes, developed the National Risk Register (NRR) between August 2015 and May 2017. The NRR aims to support better identification and understanding of nationally significant risks, and to highlight where current risk management is appropriate or where there are opportunities for better cross-agency collaboration.
2. The NRR provides a standardised framework for identifying and comparatively assessing national risks, which have the potential to significantly disrupt the conditions required for a secure and prosperous nation. It considers “all hazards – all risks”, including both traditional (e.g. espionage and terrorism) and non-tradition security risks (e.g. floods and wild fires), utilising a consistent methodology. We have supplied (please see Annex A) a table with this brief that lists the national risks identified in the NRR, which agencies ‘own’ each risk, and the key assets<sup>1</sup> and national security objectives impacted by each risk. Another attached ‘national risks and objectives’ diagram illustrates connections between risks and national security objectives.
3. After the first phase of the NRR work it became apparent that an additional commitment of dedicated DPMC resources was needed to ensure the delivery of a ‘working’ NRR. Work was therefore transitioned into the newly established National Risk Unit (NRU) in June 2017.
4. The NRU now houses the NRR and is supporting its further development to build a comprehensive picture of the national security system’s capability for managing national risks. Key discussion tools include risk profiles, which are summaries of the assessment and current management of identified national risks, and risk cards, which are shorter ‘snap shots’ used to introduce national risks – risk cards also list the main national security objective to which the risk applies. We have supplied the risk profile and an example risk card for pests and diseases (plant and animal biosecurity), for which MPI is the lead agency or risk-owner.

## The National Risk Register and the primary industries/natural resources area

5. The NRU has been supporting lead agencies or risk owners with updates to assessments and by convening discussion about future risk management arrangements and priorities. The NRR, as it currently stands, identifies 41 separate national risks grouped into five domains: environmental (16 risks), societal (3 risks), security (13 risks), economic (2 risks) and technological (7 risks).
6. Risks have been allocated to either the Hazard Risk Board or the Security Intelligence Board as part of the Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) system. ODESC provides governance oversight and assist with priority setting across the range of hazards and risk under their mandate.
7. Of the 41 risks currently identified in the NRR, the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) is the lead agency for 4 risks. The risk profiling work also included other key agencies in the natural resources sector. The four risks for which MPI has the lead are:

- a. Pests and diseases (plant and animal biosecurity);

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<sup>1</sup> Assets in this sense encompasses anything that we value that can be exposed and vulnerable to national risks.

- b. Over exploitation/resource depletion (esp. marine fisheries);
  - c. Drought; and,
  - d. Food safety incidents.
8. As it is difficult for all of the HRB-allocated risks to be comprehensively considered at any one time, HRB tends to focus on a select few risks within the National Risk Register framework from one year to the next. Pests and diseases is currently proposed as an area of focus for HRB in 2018.
  9. Some of the reasons for proposing Pests and Diseases as an area of attention for 2018 are:
    - The risk assessment for pest and diseases gave a high risk rating—the highest in the environmental domain. This is largely because scenario work brought out the potential for significant economic and environmental consequences for key primary and natural resource assets should particular events occur in this domain.
    - Pests and diseases incursions are complex to manage as each event requires a specialised response depending on the characteristics of the particular pest or disease – of which MPI is well aware. At the same time, given MPI's operational tempo, the department has, or is developing, capabilities that could be of use in managing other areas of national risk.
    - Currently there is potentially also a high public profile/interest in terms of several events being managed throughout the country (e.g. myrtle rust and mycoplasma bovis).
    - There is a view that some events in this area may need better multi-agency arrangements. As/when events become far-reaching (multiple regions) and increase in severity, a multi-agency response with appropriate resources may be required across the 4R's (reduction, readiness, response and recovery) and therefore it may be worth 'mapping-out' various management arrangements to support MPI (as the lead agency) further.
  10. A focus on pests and diseases in 2018 should allow ODESC and the lead agency(s) to test current risk management arrangements and facilitate a conversation about where better cross-agency collaboration might be required.
  11. In the mid-term, we consider a rolling conversation in the appropriate Cabinet Committee about strategic risks would be of benefit. This might include an annual paper to Cabinet from the Hazard Risk Board and Security Intelligence Board, setting out views on the risk landscape, including recent key decisions and 'priorities for action'.
  12. We are also developing a public-facing risk report. Public-facing national risk reports have been published in the UK, Canada and other countries to build transparency and public understanding of the government's approach to risk management. They also engage communities in understanding and managing risk.

## Annex A

13. Attachments include:

- a. Draft National Risk Register 'list of risks' table;
- b. 'National risks and objectives' diagram, and;
- c. Risk profile and example risk card for pests and diseases.

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# RISK PROFILE – PESTS AND DISEASES (FLORA AND FAUNA)

Rating: Very High

## Shock/Stress Description

### Context

Biosecurity threats are presented by pests/diseases which have the potential to establish in NZ and cause unwanted impacts to our economy, environment, human health, or to our socio-cultural values.

These threats are increasing as the volumes of trade and tourism increase. Each year around 5.5M passengers are processed, 54k cargo consignments inspected, and 50M items of mail cleared. In 2014/15 over 13.5k reports of suspected pest and disease incursions were received, of which 2k were referred for further risk assessment, and 23 new responses were initiated.

NZ is currently free from many of the major pests and diseases of concern and maintaining this enables us to maintain and grow our export trade – a key rationale for our biosecurity system. NZ already has a strong system in place where many different participants, including government agencies, primary sector industries and the general public play a crucial role. The system involves; risk assessment, off-shore treatments, border inspection, surveillance, diagnostics, readiness, surveillance and responses to incursions. It also manages pests that are already established.

Over the recent past (and forecast to continue) NZ has experienced considerable growth in trade and tourism, increasing the probability of incursions through new and busier pathways. Climate change is likely to increase the impacts of already established pests provide additional habitat and range and make it easier for new pests to establish. It will also alter the biosecurity risk of those countries we trade with. Social changes such as increasing ethnic diversity, land use change and global consumer preferences will also increase pressure on the system.

This risk profile includes biosecurity risks to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. It focuses on the more serious threats as defined in the event definitions.

### Magnitude

The magnitude of biosecurity events (post-border detection and incursion of pests/diseases) can vary hugely, depending on the nature of the pest/disease, what plants, animals or environment it affects, its ability to disperse within NZ, and whether it is also an unwanted pest/disease by our trading nations.

Some biosecurity events can result in responses to manage domestic and trade impacts that can arise from a detection of a single pest/disease case, even if the pest/disease has not established a population in NZ.

Overall impact usually assessed in a cost benefit analysis. Although it is often difficult to assess the environmental, social and health impacts.

### Units:

- Number of biosecurity events.
- Nature of the biosecurity event:
  - **post-border detection** (a risk organism, not known to be present in NZ, is found but there is no evidence that a self-sustaining/breeding population is present. e.g. a single adult fruit fly).
  - **incursion** (occurrence of an organism not previously known to be present in NZ, where there is a likelihood that the specimen(s) found is part of a self-sustaining/breeding population).
- Scale of biosecurity response that would be justified (severe, major, moderate, minor; judged in terms of potential impact (economic, environmental, and social), feasibility, resource requirements and urgency of response).
- Potential magnitude of unwanted **domestic impact** (economic, environmental, socio-cultural, human health) and **trade impact** (measured by loss of trade (measured in dollars, and number, size & nature of markets affected), and cost of measures imposed by trading nation (dollars, reduction in competitive advantage). Also the cost of the response itself.

## Risk Analysis

### Likelihood/Probability (Based on Maximum Credible Event)

Likelihood Score: 4

**Note:** FMD represents an event of maximum consequences but as the likelihood is rare we have focused on those maximum credible events we expect to have to manage within a realistic timeframe, i.e. five years. Example pests and diseases are provided.

**Maximum Credible Event:** Frequency ~one in a five year event

- **Domestic:** A biosecurity event resulting in a) severe loss of regional productivity of a major horticulture/agriculture/aquaculture/forestry industry, with potential for the pest/disease to spread further, resulting in severe productivity losses in all regions participating in that industry; or b) disease or death of one or more native plant or animal species at the landscape level, or ecosystem change. Requiring a major eradication response, or long-term management/change in production systems, or change in land-use; or c) significant health impacts, e.g. the Zika virus from mosquitos.
- **Trade:** Loss of country freedom status of a pest/disease which is regulated by our trading partners, resulting in a) suspension of trade of a major export product for at least a year; and/or b) application of measures that severely impacts economic sustainability of export trade. Depending on the exported commodity, the loss of trade could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars (e.g. kiwifruit exports worth \$0.9 billion in 2014).
- **Examples include:** events like PSA (2010), Varroa (2002), clover root weevil (1996), myrtle rust, pine pitch canker, brown marmorated stink bug, high pathogenic avian influenza, and predatory marine animals such as a sea-star or crab.

**Most Likely Event:** Frequency ~ average of twelve per year (some years 20-30)

- **Domestic:** A biosecurity event resulting in a) response costs up to ~\$15 million and eventual eradication of pest/disease over period of up to three years; or b) permanent establishment of a new to NZ pest/disease whose impact on industry, environment, socio-cultural and human health values is minor and can be managed sustainably.
- **Trade:** Suspension of trade of a minor export product for up to a year; or a major export product for a short period of time (days/weeks); or b) intense negotiation required to avoid suspension of trade.
- **Examples include:** events like potato psyllid and the associated bacteria that causes zebra chip of potatoes (2006), Australian subterranean termites (2009 - present), Eucalyptus leaf beetle (2012), fruit fly detection or fruit fly incursion (e.g. the fruit fly incursion in Auckland 2015), *Bonamia ostreae* in flat oysters (2014), brown dog ticks in Canterbury & Wellington (2015); bivalves (e.g. pacific oysters 1960's) as a result of biofouling.

### Key Assets at Risk

#### Social

Public Health issues resulting from certain pests and diseases and/or from the response itself. Increased stress and mental health problems for those directly involved in affected companies/industries. A range of social issues arising from increased levels of unemployment from company downsizing or closures. This has greater impacts in the regions.

#### Governance/Sovereignty

NZ's international reputation as a country free from the major pests and diseases of concern.

#### Economic/Financial

Impacts on the demand and growth of sectors/markets and their net worth. Impact both regional and national economies.


## Risk Management

### Pests and Disease (Flora and Fauna)

The exclusion, eradication or effective management of risks posed by pests and diseases to the economy, environment, human health and socio-cultural wellbeing.

### Current Risk Management

Biosecurity activities are managed using a system-wide perspective. The approach is multi-layered. Risks are prevented from reaching the border using offshore activities; they are managed at the border; and readiness and capability to respond post-border (when the need arises) is maintained and enhanced. Priority established pests are also managed ongoing.



**Reduction:** Pre-border and border activities associated with reducing the arrival or chance of establishment of risk organisms. This involves Government agencies working together with international trading partners, the private sector and travellers to keep biosecurity risks offshore.

At the border it's about ensuring passengers and importers take the necessary steps to minimise risk.

Within NZ it applies to generic prevention activities, including, education, social marketing, etc. The impacts of established pests are reduced using a range of management measures.

**Readiness:** Activities to ensure NZ is ready to manage a biosecurity response. These include developing readiness and response plans, running response exercises, and building the required capacity and capability across the system. It also includes surveillance to detect risk organisms, and changes in the extent of established pests.

**Response:** Investigation and identification (if possible) of suspected risk organisms. Options to respond to a pest/disease post-border include, eradication, slowing

**Extent:** Pests/diseases affect animals and plants and can occur on land, in waterways, or in our marine environment. They can be restricted to discrete localities or regions of NZ, or occur throughout NZ if the pest/disease can spread easily. The area affected varies depending on the life-cycle and biology of the pest/disease. It is also a direct function of the type of plant or animal species potentially affected, where these occur, and the extent to which the areas that these occur in also coincide with suitable climate/ecosystem factors required by the pest/disease. Area affected or extent of spread can be measured in terms of:

- Number of hectares, regions, and ecosystems affected e.g. hectares of affected crop; hectares of quarantine zone.
- Number of farms, orchards, primary industries (horticulture, agriculture, aquaculture, and forestry) affected.
- Type of ecosystem affected (e.g. an economically important ecosystem within horticulture, agriculture, aquaculture, forestry; or an environmentally important ecosystem).
- Native biodiversity, ecosystems and species impacts.

#### **Duration:**

- **Trade impacts:** Varies depending on the pest/disease, international standards (e.g. OIE, IPPC, ISPM) and ability of NZ to demonstrate country-area, or production-area freedom status from pests/diseases.
- **Domestic impacts:** Varies depending on the pest/disease. Duration can be temporary (ranging from weeks to months to years), or permanent (non-eradicable).

### Frequency

The nature and risks from biosecurity threats varies with season, country of import, passenger volumes, etc. However these threats are routinely managed by the system as 'business as usual'. The focus of this risk profile is on the more serious threats we expect to have to manage within a realistic timeframe, i.e. five years.

### Vulnerability/Exposure

The exposure and vulnerability of assets vary depending on:

- The pest/disease (life-cycle; host-range; geographic/climate/ecosystem range; ability to spread; amenability to control or management).
- The nature and location of the asset: animal or plant; land-based, or aquatic-based; in protected environments (e.g. sheds; glass houses) or open environment; geographic distribution (e.g. in just one or two regions; or in all regions); and if limited to one or two regions, in which climatic zone/ecosystem zone; genetic diversity (e.g. monoculture, or polyculture).
- The nature and species composition of the natural environment.

Export-dependent primary industries (e.g. horticulture, dairy, forestry which account for \$22.8 billion) are particularly vulnerable to trade impacts. Industries that have dependencies on plants are vulnerable to biosecurity events that affect those plants (e.g. livestock industries and dairy are highly dependent on rye grass and clover). Aquaculture is highly dependent on the state of the aquatic environment.

The plant and aquatic sectors are more vulnerable to exposure from pests/diseases than the animal sector. This is because there are fewer pests/diseases of concern to our animals, and they are well understood and managed by international standards set by OIE, e.g. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). Yet, the risks (the product of exposure and consequence) do remain high in the animal sector because the consequences of a detection or incursion are likely to be significant (even though the likelihood of exposure is much lower than in the plant sector).

In contrast the plant sector is vulnerable to exposure to a vastly higher number of pests/diseases; the majority of which are less well understood.

The vulnerability of the aquatic-based assets is linked to the inherent difficulties of managing the exposure pathways; and biosecurity in this space is far more difficult to manage.

Wider economic factors and shifting demand is changing the use of land. This in turn affects the profile and distribution of pests and diseases specific to that use. E.g. the rapid conversion to dairy farming over the last 5 years has significant implications for biosecurity risk and vulnerability.

#### **Built**

Residential housing, buildings and property, e.g. termite infestation.

#### **Environmental/Natural**

Numerous environmental/natural assets would be at risk:

- Primary production – land includes forestry and farming (loss of productive land, crops and animals if destruction required).
- Primary production – marine and freshwater.
- Native species - loss of native species, biodiversity and ecosystems.
- Marine – biodiversity and ecosystems.
- Land – biodiversity and ecosystems.

spread, standing down, self-managed, and long term management. Responses are evaluated with learnings fed back into the system.

**Recovery:** Activities that help individuals and communities recover from a significant biosecurity incursion. This includes tax relief, welfare measures, grants to rural support trusts, and/or restoration of market access. It may also include long term changes to land use and/or production systems.

**Lead Agency:** Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI).

### Future Treatment Options

- **Biosecurity Research Programmes:** Continue to provide strategic and technical input into external research programmes such as Better Border Biosecurity (B3) and the National Science Challenge (NSC) – Biological Heritage, to maximise uptake of research outputs.
- **Continued Improvement:** In risk analysis processes. Development of a common database (Biosecurity Common Data Project) bringing together numerous databases and provide a 'single version of the truth' around organisms and pathways.
- **Emerging Risk System:** Enable earlier intervention and reduce the risk of pest and disease incursions.
- **GIA Partnership:** working in partnership with industry in readiness activities and response planning.
- **National Biocontainment Laboratory:** Construction of a new purpose-built facility to increase capacity and capability in the identification and management of high risk organisms.
- **Trusted Traveller/Trusted Trader:** Partner with Customs, Immigration, AVSEC and MoH to develop the required accreditation/authorisation schemes so 'trusted' entities can receive a 'lighter touch'.
- **Joint Border Management System:** Partner with Customs to replace current information systems and provide MPI, Customs and industry with better information and risk assessment tools.
- **Risk Return in Biosecurity Risk Management:** Develop an economic model to apply cost-effective/cost benefit analysis and comparative risk return information to risk managers.
- **Pathway management:** Identification, isolation and management of specific high risk pathways.

**Uncertainty/Confidence**

**Uncertainty (quantification):**

This risk profile is based on previous biosecurity events (BMAC reports) and pests/diseases for which MPI has undertaken pest risk assessment, or has profiled in MPI's organism ranking system, or emerging risk system.

The economic asset values at risk were sourced from the Situation and Outlook for Primary Industries 2015.

The risk profile assumes that the source of the pest/disease risk is from standard trade and movement of craft (planes, ships and yachts), goods and people. This includes risk items deliberately brought into NZ, but does not include the deliberate introduction of harmful pests or diseases (bio-terrorism).

MPI recognises the very serious impact that an incursion of FMD would have on NZ. However, the measures applied pre-border and at the border maintain a high level of protection against this disease so this has not been used as one of the examples to build the scenario for maximum credible event. The maximum credible events are far less impactful than FMD, but have a far higher likelihood of occurring.

**Confidence Ranking: B**

High confidence in judgement based on a very large body of knowledge on the hazard, the large quantity and quality of relevant data and very consistent relevant assessments.

**System Trends**

**Climate change:** will affect:

The survival and distribution of some pests and diseases. Previously benign species could become significant risks altering the viability of some industries.

Pest distribution patterns may change as plant distribution changes. Some pests will reduce in impact in an area while others will increase.

Changes to the global spread of pests and diseases. How trading partners manage their own biosecurity will impact NZ; the habitats or conditions suitable for new pests and diseases.

**Shifts in societal expectations:** resulting in:

Increased international travel by NZers and tourist arrivals. International visitors from some countries and cultures which do not have an understanding of the role or importance of biosecurity.

Increased trade volumes along with increases in both the types of goods and countries of origin – increasing the risk at the border.

Increased demand for online shopping. This also raises implications for the traceability and management of risk goods, especially couriered plants/food.

Changing patterns of consumer demand, in particular for exotic products. This is placing pressure on the biosecurity system to adapt which may lessen its effectiveness.

Concerns about chemical and non-chemical pest and disease treatments place pressure to find alternatives or face market losses. E.g. The EPA requires that all methyl bromide is recaptured by 2020.

Increasing value placed on the natural environment, native biodiversity and ecosystems; An increasingly conservative approach from industry to how risk should be managed.

**Economic volatility:** wider economic factors and shifting demand is changing the use of land. This in turn affects the profile and distribution of pests and diseases specific to that use. E.g. the rapid conversion to dairy farming over the last 5 years has significant implications for biosecurity risk.

**Environmental degradation:** A number of primary production sectors are highly reliant on a relatively small number of monocultures. There are considerable risks associated with low genetic diversity; Development of monocultures with higher biosecurity vulnerability, e.g. dairy, pine forests, and kiwifruit.

**Consequence Ranking**


Both the domestic and trade events were assessed together as the consequences were the same. The final score was 3.3.

Domains	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Major	Extreme
Social		✓			
Governance	✓				
Economic		✓			
Built	✓				
Environment			✓		

**Note:** For scoring consequences it was assumed that events would be managed efficiently and effectively.

**Consequence Score: 3**

**Risk Heat Map (w/Current Treatment Measures)**



**Note:** The grey star shows where FMD would rank, i.e. rare likelihood and a consequence score of 4.5.

# RISK MANAGEMENT – PESTS AND DISEASES (FLORA AND FAUNA)

## Reduction and Readiness

**Note:** All biosecurity threats are managed by applying a risk based approach that uses a range of tools from rapid and simple to detailed and quantitative. For major risks, e.g. FMD, specific readiness and response plans, capability requirements and processes are developed, tested and ready to be stood up (within 24 hours) if required.

### Legislation:

- **The Biosecurity Act 1993:** provides the legal framework for MPI and others to help keep harmful organisms out of NZ and respond if any do make it into the country.
- **National Animal Identification and Tracing Act 2012:** establishes an animal identification and tracking system for a number of reasons which include improving biosecurity management. The Act applies to cattle and deer.
- **Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996:** to protect the environment, and the health and safety of people and communities by preventing or managing the adverse effects of hazardous substances and new organisms.
- **Resource Management Act 1991:** sets out how NZ should manage its environment.

**Powers of the Director General:** Extends to places and facilities, inspection systems and fees.

**Powers of the Chief Technical Officers:** relates to goods and organisms – primarily their importation, seizure, treatment, movement and destruction.

### International Bodies and Agreements:

Biosecurity must be considered in the global context. NZ is a member of various international bodies relevant to managing biosecurity and facilitating trade. The most important standard-setting bodies are:

- **World Trade Organisation (WTO):** application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement): Sets in place rules that protect each country's right to take the measures necessary to protect the life or health of its people, animals, and plants while at the same time facilitating trade.
- **International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC):** aims to secure coordinated, effective action to prevent and to control the introduction and spread of the pests of plants and plant products in order to preserve food security, biodiversity and to facilitate trade.
- **World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE):** intergovernmental organisation responsible for improving animal health worldwide. Its primary objectives are to safeguard world trade by publishing health standards for international trade in animals and animal products, and encourage international solidarity in the control of animal diseases.
- **International Maritime Organisation:** a specialised body of the United Nations charged with regulating shipping. Includes maritime safety, environmental impacts, and legal, technical and security issues. Shipping is the predominant vector for the global spread of invasive marine species.

### International Plant and Animal Standard Development

- Influence international plant and animal standards that allow NZ to set the rules to protect us from import risks.

### Science & Research activities

- A number of initiatives and projects that provide the research and science evidence that underpin Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery activities. The two major current research programmes (B3 and National Science Challenge – Biological Heritage) follow a collaborative approach between research providers to maximise the scientific capability and resources available in NZ.
- International collaboration for research and sharing of information, e.g. Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA).
- Fund a range of Operational Research Programmes, e.g. \$500k over three years to study Bee Pathogens.
- Sustainable Farming Fund.

### Trade Agreements and Bilateral Agreements

- Negotiate country-to-country agreements that play an important role in ensuring risks are largely managed offshore.
- Overseas certification for many plant and animal products that provide assurance that the required risk management processes have been carried out during; growing, harvest, slaughter, packing and transport.
- Help establish (and audit) the risk management systems within many exporting countries to ensure that NZ's

## Response and Recovery

### Response

- Investigate and report on suspected exotic pests or diseases.
- Depending on the risks, a formal response team may be established. Response teams may be multi-agency.
- Follow the Single and Scalable Response Model that sets out the principles, structures, functions, processes and terminology that will be used in a response. Develop response plans.
- Subject matter expertise in response management and leads responses; severe or major responses may be escalated to the Major Incident Management Team.
- Where industry/Government agreements exist any responses will be delivered jointly with relevant industry partners.
- The Plant Health and Environment & Animal Health Laboratories support field investigations, and provide laboratory screening and diagnostics.
- Deliver the required national and regional briefings for officials, key stakeholders and the media.
- The National Animal Identification and Tracing (NAIT) system provides information on rural properties and the location of stock animals that is essential to ensure a rapid response to a biosecurity outbreak.

### Pest Management

- Manage diseases and pests that have already established in NZ in partnership with DoC, Regional Councils, primary industry partners (GIA signatories) and Māori.
- Coordinate national partnerships and accords that reduce pest spread and impacts, and promote voluntary behaviour change, e.g. the Kauri Dieback management programme, and the Check Clean Dry campaign for freshwater pests.
- Drive system innovation and improve access to tools and knowledge, e.g. by implementing the improvements in the Pest Management National Plan of Action.
- Develop management strategies for nationally significant pest or pathway issues, e.g. to improve management of Wilding Conifers or reduce the domestic spread of marine pests.
- Maintain oversight of crown funding for industry led programmes, e.g. the crown invests \$33M annually in the national bovine Tb management programme.
- Development and implementation of National and Regional Pest Management Plans.

### Recovery

- Administer the compensation scheme established under the Biosecurity Act. Involves assessing, calculating and managing the settlement process. May include consideration of ex-gratia payments.
- Provide other financial and non-financial support to industry, communities, or businesses in accordance with the Primary Sector Recovery Policy. These include: Welfare measures, Grants to Rural Support Trusts; and Long-term changes to land-use and production systems.
- Provide ongoing information and assurances to Governments and markets to restore NZ's reputation.

### Key Domestic Agency Relationships

- Maintain and enhance relationships with the following agencies on a range of response and recovery activities; Ministry of Health, Land Information Management, Department of Conservation, Regional Councils. DPMC, Police and Defence (for major incidents/responses).

requirements are met.

#### **Risk Assessment and Import Health Standard (Standards) Development**

- The Organism Ranking System that ranks different organisms of biosecurity interest based on their impacts to NZ's economy, environment and people, and the likelihood of those consequences occurring. This is also key information for GIA stakeholders.
- The Emerging Risk System that enables early prioritisation and coordination of risk based interventions for new and emerging risks.
- Deliver science based risk assessments on the pests and diseases associated with imports; their likelihood of entering, establishing, or spreading; and consequences on, animal, plant, human health, the economy and the environment.
- Develop new (and revise current) standards that set out the requirements for importing risk goods into NZ. This includes reviewing the efficacy of interventions.

#### **Working with Industry**

- On developing industry guidance, e.g. for: Aquaculture, Biofouling and Marine Invasion Management.

#### **Border Interventions**

- Verify and act on non-compliance with the standards that set out biosecurity clearance requirements for imported goods. Includes; verification of consignment integrity, verification of treatment during shipment, documentation checks, testing, inspection, fumigation, and post-entry quarantine for specified periods.
- Determine if passengers, cargo, craft, and mail presenting at the border are carrying risk goods. Risks are managed through the following types of interventions:
  - Voluntary Compliance; e.g. amnesty bins, in-flight videos, biosecurity information at time of ticket purchase.
  - Anticipating or detecting risk goods, e.g. profiling and intelligence, passenger declarations, detector dogs, x-ray screening, search/inspection, verification of cargo documentation.
  - Managing risk goods through treatment, reshipment or destruction.
  - Managing non-compliant behaviour through instant fines or (if required) stronger forms of enforcement.
- Provide induction training (to become warranted) for all Frontline Officers, and ongoing role specific training to maintain currency in required technical and behavioural competencies.
- Provide Intelligence and profiling to identify high risk goods, craft, people, and pathways that is used to guide if, how, and when to intervene.
- Availability of an eLibrary containing the required forms, templates and guidelines as well as registers and lists of facilities and operators, associated with importing containers and cargo.
- Provide information on meeting NZ's biosecurity requirements for arriving passengers, and for bringing private yachts, boats and planes into NZ.
- Approve and audit:
  - Transitional facilities that hold un-cleared imported goods likely to have some associated biosecurity risk, until they can be inspected and cleared.
  - Post-entry quarantine facilities for products, e.g. plant propagative material, where it is difficult (from visual inspection) to ascertain whether it contains quarantine pests (e.g. bacteria, viruses). These products are held and grown in facilities to a stage whereby any associated pests may be detected by inspection and/or testing.

#### **Surveillance**

- Work with a number of agencies, including DoC, LINZ, MoH, and Regional Councils to carry out surveillance activities. Includes:
  - High Risk Site Surveillance at high-risk sites such as sea and air ports, and transitional facilities.
  - Targeted surveillance that look for a specific organism in specified hosts or regions, e.g. surveillance for fruit fly.
  - Monitoring for changes in the extent and impact of established pests.
- Manage passive surveillance through The Pests and Diseases Hotline (0800 80 99 66). This involves investigating notifications of suspected unwanted pests and diseases, and also monitoring and analysing any trends in information.

#### **Readiness**

- Develop, maintain (test and exercise) response plans for high risk pests and diseases, e.g. FMD and Fruit fly.
- Capability Development:
  - Identify the range of resources required for a (large) response.
  - Train those staff involved in responses on the Single Scalable Response Model that is used to deliver MPI led biosecurity responses.
- Contingency Planning:
  - The Peak Season Response Management Plan to ensure MPI can manage multiple responses during 'high seasons'.

- Defined the processes, people and accountabilities to be used in different response scenarios.
- Exercise Programme:
  - Participate in the NZ National Exercise Programme that test cross agency response scenarios.
  - Deliver MPI's Exercise Programme, including Biosecurity incidents.
- Government Industry Agreements: Partner with industry to identify the biosecurity risks of greatest concern. Jointly invest to manage these through readiness and response activities.

#### Diagnostics

- Maintain accreditation to International Standard ISO 17025, and certification to the relevant biosafety and containment standards.
- Maintain scientific expertise for high risk diseases and pests.
- Develop, validate and maintain diagnostic capability for high risk diseases and pests to enable surveillance, response and long term management.
- Develop, maintain and enhance relationships with national and international animal and plant health laboratories.

#### Key Domestic Agency Relationships

- Maintain and enhance relationships with the following agencies on a range of reduction and readiness activities; Ministry of Health, Land Information Management, Department of Conservation, and Regional Councils.

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# NSS NATIONAL RISK CARD: PESTS AND DISEASES



DEPARTMENT  
of the PRIME MINISTER  
and CABINET



NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVE	RISK EVENT	CONSEQUENCES	VULNERABILITY & EXPOSURE	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK MANAGEMENT CONTROLS	RISK-OWNER(S) & KEY RELATED RISKS
PRIORITY AREA/WORK FOCUS					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Determine potential priorities for action</li> </ul>	
<p>7. Protecting the natural environment</p> <p>Environmental domain/assets</p>	<p>Domestic biosecurity incursion affecting horticulture, agriculture, aquaculture of forestry</p>	<p>Public (societal) health impacts</p> <p>Loss of reputation; suspension of trade with international trading partners and flow-on economic impacts</p> <p>Loss of regional productivity in primary industries</p> <p>Death or disease of one or more native plant/animal species and/or ecosystem damage</p>	<p><b>Vulnerability</b> – Plant and aquatic sectors are more vulnerable to incursions than animal sectors, because there are fewer animal pests/ diseases of concern, and aquatic pathways are difficult to manage.</p> <p><b>Exposure</b> – Growing volumes of trade and tourism increase the exposure to biosecurity incursions through busier and/or new trade and tourism pathways; shifting demand (to new commodities) also increases exposure.</p>	<p><b>Confidence ranking: B</b></p> <p>Confidence in the assessment is rated as 'High', based on a large body of knowledge and ongoing response to several incursions (incl. myrtle rust and mycoplasma bovis).</p> <p><u>Climate change</u> is likely to increase the impacts of some of the already established pests/diseases by providing additional habitats/range.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Complexity in managing the risk as each event requires a specialised response, depending on the characteristics of the particular pest or disease.</li> <li>The system has a general tolerance to risks, managed through business as usual processes such as:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A range of readiness and response plans</li> <li>• High-level border protection and incursion prevention activities</li> <li>• Participation in the National Exercise Programme</li> <li>• Membership to a number of international bodies managing biosecurity</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Priorities for action:</i> <i>TBC by MPI</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MPI</li> </ul> <p>Supporting agencies include DoC, MfE and Local Government</p> <p>The risk profile assumes source of the risk is through a trade or tourism pathway, and does not include deliberate introduction of a pest/disease (i.e. bio-terrorism).</p>



## Memorandum

### Details

Subject			
Cover-note in explanation of attached National Risk items			
<b>To</b>	<b>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</b>	<b>Prepared by</b>	<b>The National Risk Unit</b>
<b>From</b>	Howard Broad, Deputy Chief Executive, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet	<b>Date</b>	3/04/2018

Please find attached with this memorandum the following items:

1. **Letter to Ministers:** I have drafted a letter for you to send to Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee (ERS) members and other colleagues with portfolios relevant to the National Risk Register. The letter outlines:
  - a. The ambition to move to more proactive and forward-looking management of national security risks;
  - b. The importance of risk-owning agencies monitoring and updating their risk assessments in the National Risk Register;
  - c. Your intention to table a paper to ERS on 8 May to improve the management of national security risks; and
  - d. The publication of a public-facing National Risk Report.

The letter also invites your colleagues to discuss the Cabinet Paper and a draft version of the National Risk Report with you and DPMC officials, noting that formal departmental consultation on both those documents will still be underway 3-16 April.

2. **Draft Cabinet Paper:** I have included the latest draft Cabinet paper, which will come to you for final sign-off post consultation. This paper:
  - a. Notes the development of a National Risk Register framework to improve the management of nationally significant risks across government;
  - b. Proposes officials report to Cabinet annually on the management of those risks; and
  - c. Recommends the release of a public National Risk Report.
3. **Full draft of the New Zealand National Risk Report:** I have included a full draft version of the New Zealand National Risk Report (the 'Report'). As noted, the Report is currently undergoing formal agency consultation. In the interim, we will ask agencies for any key amendments before making ready a copy for use in consultation with your colleagues.



The intent of the report is to facilitate an open and transparent public discussion about what our national security risks are, how they are assessed, and what steps we are taking to manage them.

The report does not include classified information. We will arrange with your office for you a launch date for release the report in May/June 2018.

4. I am available to discuss any questions you may have about the above and the attachments.
5. We ask for you to approve the 'Letter to Ministers' and the process it and the draft Cabinet Paper outlines for ministerial consultation, including use of the draft National Risk Report to support said consultation.

**Approve/disapprove**



Howard Broad  
**Deputy Chief Executive**

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Hon Shane Jones  
**Minister for Infrastructure**

Dear Minister

**Improving the management of national security risks: Cabinet Paper and a public report on national security risks**

Our government is committed to an ambitious agenda that builds a better future for all New Zealanders, by putting the wellbeing of people and the environment at the centre of what we do. We are making considerable investments in housing, health, education, police and infrastructure, and looking after our natural environment, to help New Zealanders thrive.

To achieve our ambition and objectives as a country, we need to be clear about the things that will get in our way. This means we need to work beyond the immediate and bring together our ambitions for New Zealand as part of an open, future-focused dialogue. As Minister of National Security and Intelligence, I would like to make sure national security is a key component of that dialogue.

As we know, national risk events have effects across the system, beyond the control of any single portfolio or agency. Long established trends such as climate change, shifts in geopolitical power, and an aging domestic population, gradually change how risks affect New Zealand. Managing the effects of such trends and complex, interrelated national risks can only be done with collective effort. It requires something from all of us, Ministers, officials, the public, and private organisations.

The system has considerable experience responding to major events. However, the next step is to move to a more proactive, forward-looking approach to manage nationally significant risks across the 4R's of risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery. We need a structured approach to managing that range of risks. DPMC, in close consultation with my Chief Science Advisor, Sir Peter Gluckman, and other agencies, has led the development of a National Risk Register to underpin such a structured approach.

The National Risk Register provides a standardised framework for identifying, assessing and comparing the range of threats and hazards that could significantly affect New Zealand's security and prosperity. It is designed to support agencies, and in turn Ministers, to:

- ensure that risks to national security are appropriately identified;
- build a comprehensive picture of the national security risks New Zealand faces, how they are inter-related and the Government's capability to manage each risk;
- identify opportunities to effectively reduce risk and improve resilience;
- support clearer accountability for risk management;
- strengthen the evidence-base for decision-making on national security and prioritisation, including where tough choices need to be made between national security investment and tolerance for certain risks.

For the National Risk Register to keep pace of the evolving risk landscape, it is important that agencies monitor and update assessments, their associated profiles, and report on any significant changes.

As Ministers, we have a responsibility to maintain oversight of how officials are managing these risks. I intend to table a paper on improving the management of national security risks in the 8 May meeting of the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee (ERS). That paper will propose that officials report annually to the ERS on actions taken to improve the management of national security risks.

DPMC is also leading the development of a public National Risk Report. This report would be a non-statutory document aimed at raising the awareness of individuals, public and private organisations, communities, and our international partners, about New Zealand's national risks, and the steps government has put in place to manage them. Publication of such a report would be consistent with similar publications made in countries like the UK, Netherlands and Canada.

The Report includes examples of national risks grouped by type and drawing upon the unclassified information previously developed by agencies. Examples in these risk groupings will inform readers with a general understanding of the scope of national risk, but directs them to risk-owning agencies on specifics.

The Cabinet Paper will seek the ERS's approval of the draft Report before its release. DPMC have sent your officials consultation copies of the Report (with the formal consultation period running 3-16 April). You will receive a full draft version of the National Risk Report, reflecting feedback from agency consultation, in the usual manner in the week ahead of the 8 May ERS meeting.

However, DPMC officials would be happy to discuss the contents of the Report with you earlier should you wish. If that would be helpful, this could take place separately or in concert with briefings you may wish to arrange from your own department. For that purpose, I have attached to this letter the latest version of the Report, noting that it is close to complete, but has not yet been amended to reflect all feedback from agency officials.

I ask that you consider carefully the Report as a whole and any risk summaries in the Report pertaining to your particular portfolio(s). Risk summaries will likely engender public interest and wider discussion about future priorities. Officials are developing a communication plan to assist with stakeholder interest after release of the Report.

I look forward to discussing the details with you.

Kind regards,

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Phil Twyford  
**Minister of Transport**

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**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Nanaia Mahuta  
**Minister of Local Government**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Dr Megan Woods  
**Minister Responsible for the Earthquake Commission**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon James Shaw  
**Minister for Climate Change**

Dear Minister

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I look forward to discussing the details with you.

Kind regards,

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Eugenie Sage  
**Minister of Conservation**

Dear Minister

**Improving the management of national security risks: Cabinet Paper and a public report on national security risks**

Our government is committed to an ambitious agenda that builds a better future for all New Zealanders, by putting the wellbeing of people and the environment at the centre of what we do. We are making considerable investments in housing, health, education, police and infrastructure, and looking after our natural environment, to help New Zealanders thrive.

To achieve our ambition and objectives as a country, we need to be clear about the things that will get in our way. This means we need to work beyond the immediate and bring together our ambitions for New Zealand as part of an open, future-focused dialogue. As Minister of National Security and Intelligence, I would like to make sure national security is a key component of that dialogue.

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Kind regards,

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Iain Lees-Galloway  
**Minister of Immigration**

Dear Minister

**Improving the management of national security risks: Cabinet Paper and a public report on national security risks**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Meka Whaitiri  
**Minister of Customs**

Dear Minister

### **Improving the management of national security risks: Cabinet Paper and a public report on national security risks**

Our government is committed to an ambitious agenda that builds a better future for all New Zealanders, by putting the wellbeing of people and the environment at the centre of what we do. We are making considerable investments in housing, health, education, police and infrastructure, and looking after our natural environment, to help New Zealanders thrive.

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Dr David Clark  
**Minister of Health**

Dear Minister

**Improving the management of national security risks: Cabinet Paper and a public report on national security risks**

Our government is committed to an ambitious agenda that builds a better future for all New Zealanders, by putting the wellbeing of people and the environment at the centre of what we do. We are making considerable investments in housing, health, education, police and infrastructure, and looking after our natural environment, to help New Zealanders thrive.

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Kris Fafoi  
**Minister of Civil Defence**

Dear Minister

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Clare Curran  
**Minister of Broadcasting, Communications and Digital Media**

Dear Minister

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Damien O'Connor  
**Minister for Biosecurity**  
**Minister for Food Safety**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Kelvin Davis  
**Minister for Crown/Māori relations**  
**Minister of Corrections**  
**Minister of Tourism**

Dear Minister

**Improving the management of national security risks: Cabinet Paper and a public report on national security risks**

Our government is committed to an ambitious agenda that builds a better future for all New Zealanders, by putting the wellbeing of people and the environment at the centre of what we do. We are making considerable investments in housing, health, education, police and infrastructure, and looking after our natural environment, to help New Zealanders thrive.

To achieve our ambition and objectives as a country, we need to be clear about the things that will get in our way. This means we need to work beyond the immediate and bring together our ambitions for New Zealand as part of an open, future-focused dialogue. As Minister of National Security and Intelligence, I would like to make sure national security is a key component of that dialogue.

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The system has considerable experience responding to major events. However, the next step is to move to a more proactive, forward-looking approach to manage nationally significant risks across the 4R's of risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery. We need a structured approach to managing that range of risks. DPMC, in close consultation with my Chief Science Advisor, Sir Peter Gluckman, and other agencies, has led the development of a National Risk Register to underpin such a structured approach.

The National Risk Register provides a standardised framework for identifying, assessing and comparing the range of threats and hazards that could significantly affect New Zealand's security and prosperity. It is designed to support agencies, and in turn Ministers, to:

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For the National Risk Register to keep pace of the evolving risk landscape, it is important that agencies monitor and update assessments, their associated profiles, and report on any significant changes.

As Ministers, we have a responsibility to maintain oversight of how officials are managing these risks. I intend to table a paper on improving the management of national security risks in the 8 May meeting of the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee (ERS). That paper will propose that officials report annually to the ERS on actions taken to improve the management of national security risks.

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I look forward to discussing the details with you.

Kind regards,

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon David Parker  
**Minister for the Environment**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Andrew Little  
**Minister Responsible for the GCSB**  
**Minister Responsible for the NZSIS**

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**Improving the management of national security risks: Cabinet Paper and a public report on national security risks**

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Kind regards,

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**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Stuart Nash  
**Minister of Police**  
**Minister of Fisheries**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Rt Hon Winston Peters  
**Minister of Foreign Affairs**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Grant Robertson  
**Minister of Finance**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Hon Ron Mark  
**Minister of Defence**

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Prime Minister**  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Office of the Minister for National Security and Intelligence

## **National Security System: Improving the Management of National Security Risks**

### **Proposal**

- 1 This paper:
  - informs the Committee of the development of a National Risk Register framework to improve the management of nationally significant risks across government;
  - proposes that officials report to Cabinet annually on the management of those risks; and
  - recommends the release of a public National Risk Report to increase transparency and raise public awareness of our most significant national security risks and the government's management of them.

### **Executive Summary**

- 2 Our government is committed to an ambitious agenda that builds a better future for all New Zealanders, by putting the wellbeing of people and the environment at the centre of what we do. We are making considerable investments in housing, health, education, police and infrastructure, and looking after our natural environment, to help New Zealanders thrive. To achieve our objectives for the country, we need to be clear about the things that will get in our way – and ensure that we take collective responsibility in managing them.
- 3 As we know, national risk events have effects across the system, beyond the control of any single portfolio or agency. Long established trends such as climate change, shifts in geopolitical power, and an aging domestic population, gradually change how risks affect New Zealand. Managing the effects of such trends and complex, interrelated national risks can only be done with collective effort. It requires something from all of us, Ministers, officials, the public, and private organisations.
- 4 New Zealand's National Security System (the NSS) provides a structured approach to managing the range of risks that could significantly affect New Zealand's security and prosperity. The system acts so that New Zealanders can go about their daily life confidently and take opportunities to advance their way of life.
- 5 The NSS has a depth of experience responding to major events. However, the next step is to move to a more proactive, forward-looking approach to manage nationally significant risks across the 4R's of risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) has led, in concert with other agencies and my Chief Science Advisor, Sir Peter Gluckman, the development of a National Risk Register to underpin this approach.
- 6 The National Risk Register is in practice a standardised framework for identifying, assessing and comparing the range of threats and hazards that could significantly affect New Zealand's security and prosperity. It is designed to support agencies, and in turn Ministers, to:



- ensure that risks to national security are appropriately identified;
  - build a comprehensive picture of the national security risks New Zealand faces, how they are inter-related and the Government’s capability to manage each risk;
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  - support clearer accountability for risk management; and
  - strengthen the evidence-base for decision-making on national security and priority-setting, including where there tough choices need to be made on competing interests.
- 7 The National Risk Register is comprised of a regularly updated series of risk profiles, which are supported by a risk assessment methodology, the results of those risk assessments, and a summary of how identified risks are managed. A ‘risk-owning’ agency is identified for each risk. That agency is responsible for monitoring and updating the risk assessment and associated risk profile, and for reporting any significant changes in status of that risk. The Officials’ Domestic and External Security Committee (ODESC) national security governance boards share responsibility for strategic oversight of the risks, including effective risk mitigation and management.
- 8 I seek endorsement of the National Risk Register framework as the primary coordinating mechanism for identifying and managing national security risk across government. I propose that officials, through the Hazard Risk Board and Security and Intelligence Board, report annually to the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee, to ensure we maintain oversight of how officials are managing these risks.
- 9 I further propose that we engage the New Zealand public more proactively to raise awareness of New Zealand’s most significant national security risks and provide assurance about the steps government has in place to manage them. DPMC is leading the development of a public National Risk Report to support this. I see this as an important part of our commitment to increase public participation, transparency and openness around official information and the work of our Government. I have attached a draft National Risk Report (the Report) with this paper and seek the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee’s approval to release the Report in May/June of 2018.

## **Background**

### *National Security System*

- 10 The National Security System (the NSS) is the architecture for governing national security. New Zealand takes an “all hazards, all risks” approach to national security. This means the NSS covers the range of risks that might have a major impact on the country, including:
- sudden onset events (e.g. earthquakes, industrial accidents, terrorist attacks);
  - gradual onset events (e.g. pandemics, biodiversity loss); and
  - steady-state conditions (e.g. transnational organised crime).
- 11 Managing these complex, interrelated national security risks requires collective effort across government. At officials’ level, ODESC is the group of chief executives and their

agencies who coordinate national security issues. ODESC has two national security governance boards:

- the Security and Intelligence Board, which focuses on threats and intelligence issues; and
- the Hazard Risk Board, which focuses on hazards risks.

12 The ODESC national security governance boards, chaired by DPMC, ensure capabilities and systems are in place to identify major risks facing New Zealand, and that appropriate arrangements are made to efficiently and effectively reduce and manage risk.

13 ODESC also coordinates response to events or crises, for example the 2017 failure of the Wiri pipeline. This was an example where the immediate response benefited from national oversight and coordination of multiple agencies. However, it showed there is still room for improving how Central Government works with stakeholders (such as those entities that provide essential infrastructure services) to better clarify responsibilities for 'peacetime' efforts to reduce risk before crises occur.

#### *Previous consideration of a National Risk Register*

14 The Cabinet National Security Committee considered an earlier draft National Risk Register on 9 August 2016. DPMC had developed that draft over 2015-2016 in conjunction with over thirty central government agencies and Crown Research Institutes, with significant input from the Strategic Risk and Resilience Panel, an independent panel of external experts. At that time, Cabinet requested it be developed further [NSC-16-MIN-0022]. Further consideration by the Committee, scheduled for November 2016, did not occur due to the Kaikōura earthquake.

15 Since then, DPMC has established a National Risk Unit to work with agencies to build a comprehensive assessment of risks, as described here. The National Risk Unit has continued to work at the direction of the ODESC Boards to develop the National Risk Register framework to put greater emphasis on 'pre-event' risk management.

16 Throughout this time, the National Risk Register has remained relatively closely-held within the agencies involved in its drafting, and while it has been adopted by ODESC governance boards, it has not yet been endorsed by Ministers as a primary mechanism for identifying and managing national security risks across government. Officials advise that the National Risk Register process is now at a sufficient stage in its development for this to happen.

#### **Comment**

##### *Adopting a forward-looking approach to managing national security risk*

17 New Zealand has significant experience in dealing with catastrophic events and the government's response to these has generally been assessed positively. To continue improving our ability to manage national security risk, the next step is to take a more proactive approach to considering and planning for nationally significant risks, to minimise the social, physical, economic and fiscal consequences for New Zealand and New Zealanders. Formal adoption of the National Risk Register framework by ODESC, and endorsement by Ministers underpins this approach.

... through a National Risk Register

- 18 The National Risk Register is comprised of a regularly updated series of risk profiles, which are supported by a risk assessment methodology, the results of those risk assessments, and a summary of how identified risks are managed. A national security risk as ‘*an uncertain event<sup>1</sup> or condition that could conceivably occur in the next five years, with a potentially catastrophic impact for New Zealand’s security and prosperity, requiring large-scale government intervention to manage*’. The National Risk Register and associated risk profiles provide a standardised framework for identifying, assessing and comparing the range of threats and hazards that could significantly affect New Zealand’s security and prosperity. This builds a comprehensive picture of our capability to manage each risk and, in turn, helps to identify opportunities to effectively reduce the overall level of risk borne by our country.
- 19 The National Risk Register framework builds on previous work, but a focus on ‘pre-event’ risk management represents a maturing and evolving of the governance of the NSS. The National Risk Register is designed to ensure officials are appropriately identifying and managing risks to national security. The process supports clearer accountability for risk management by assigning each risk to an agency (a ‘risk-owning’ agency), and provides useful information about the rate of occurrence of risk events to date. Transparent documentation of risk management decisions also provides a supporting evidence-base should those decisions be questioned or reviewed.
- 20 The National Risk Register also enables comparative assessment of national security risks. The management of national security involves balancing many competing interests: short-term and long-term, domestic and external, public and private and financial and non-financial. Risk assessments that inform the risk register work strengthen the evidence-base for decision-making when balancing these interests. Risk assessments, analysis and treatment identify national vulnerabilities and exposure to risk; and provide oversight of strengths or gaps in risk management and where risks are interconnected. Therefore, the process can be used to build a case for intervention or risk treatment options that make sense in terms of cross-system priorities, resources, and capabilities.

... which is underpinned by a robust methodology

- 21 Each risk in the National Risk Register is assessed by using a ‘maximum credible event’ scenario to identify the highest possible consequences that could eventuate for New Zealand, based on current understanding of the risk, and to determine the likelihood of that scenario occurring in the next five years.
- 22 These assessments form the basis for risk profiles, which also describe the current framework by which each risk is managed. Profiles can be supplemented by risk cards, which are a snapshot of the current management status of identified risks. To understand the evolving risk landscape, risk-owning agencies monitor and update their risk assessments and associated risk profiles, and to report any significant changes.
- 23 The draft National Risk Report as attached (see below) includes risk summaries that describe the main components of the risk profiles, establishing a (public) version of named

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<sup>1</sup> The international standard, ISO 31000, defines risk as ‘the effect of uncertainty on objectives’.

national risks and risk owning agencies, and notes the national security objective(s) affected by those risks.

*... and supports accountability for risk management*

- 24 The National Risk Register framework is designed to provide assurance to Ministers that risks to national security are being identified and managed by officials appropriately across government. At officials' level responsibility for strategic oversight of each risk has been assigned to an ODESC national security governance board.
- 25 I propose that officials, through the ODESC national security governance boards, report to the Cabinet National Security and External Relations Committee on an annual basis, to ensure we retain oversight of how officials are managing these risks. Reporting will include the key national security risk decisions made in the preceding year and the priorities for improving management of risks in the coming year. This will ensure a strong link between ODESC's responsibility for coordinating the strategic governance and stewardship of New Zealand's national security, and Ministers' role of governing those agencies responsible for managing national security risks.

*A public National Risk Report will raise awareness of the risks faced by New Zealand*

- 26 I also propose that we engage the New Zealand public more actively to enhance their understanding of the nationally significant risks that may affect them. To support this, DPMC has developed a New Zealand National Risk Report, a public version of the National Risk Register, in concert with other agencies and Sir Peter Gluckman, my Chief Science Advisor.
- 27 The publication of a National Risk Report would facilitate an open and transparent public discussion about what our national security risks are, how those risks are assessed, and what steps government is taking to manage them. It will provide New Zealanders with assurance that government is taking steps to better manage risk where it most needs to. Access to that information will help government, individuals, businesses and communities to consider where they can better manage risks and respond to events when they occur.
- 28 The National Risk Report builds on the existing 2007 National Hazardscape Report<sup>2</sup>, which provided a summary of the hazards and threats affecting New Zealand at the time. It aims to bring public perception of risk more in line with the evidence behind a hazard or threat assessment. Similar public risk reports have been published in the UK, Canada and other countries. The experience of these governments shows that communicating with the public about national security risks can help build resilience, reduce fear and uncertainty, and improve understanding of government decisions on managing risk, which sometimes involve tough choices about investment and tolerance for certain risks.
- 29 The publication of the National Risk Report will also support engagement with external stakeholders, which often have a key role in managing risk, including private sector entities such as those responsible for essential infrastructure and services (including water, transport, and energy). Officials will put in place a communication plan for engaging with stakeholders about the National Risk Report.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/resources/national-hazardscape-report/>

- 30 Some risk profiles include classified information and procedures. The National Risk Report will balance the benefits of transparency and the need to protect classified information, including for the safety of citizens.
- 31 I have attached with this paper a full draft version of the National Risk Report. The Report includes 'risk summaries' with examples of national risks. Those risks are grouped by type and draw upon the unclassified information previously developed by agencies for use in the aforementioned risk profiles. The examples in these risk groupings will inform readers with a general understanding of the scope of national risk, but directs them to risk-owning agencies on specifics. I seek approval from the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee for release of the National Risk Report in May/June of 2018.

### Consultation

- 32 The following agencies have been consulted on this Cabinet Paper and the draft National Risk Report: Department of Conservation; Fire and Emergency New Zealand; Government Communications Security Bureau; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment; Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Ministry for the Environment; Maritime New Zealand; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Transport; Ministry for Primary Industries; New Zealand Customs Service; New Zealand Defence Force; New Zealand Police; New Zealand Security Intelligence Service; Treasury.

### Financial, Human Rights, Gender and Legislative Implications, Disability Perspective

- 33 There are no implications arising from this paper.

### Regulatory Impact Analysis

- 34 Regulatory Impact Analysis requirements do not apply to this paper.

### Publicity

- 35 I intend to launch the Report at a suitable occasion in May/June of 2018 after it is ready for publication. Embargoed copies of the National Risk Report will be sent to relevant Ministers and agencies ahead of its release. A communications plan is being developed which will include supporting material for Ministers to use after the launch.

### Recommendations

The Minister for National Security and Intelligence recommends that the Committee:

- 1 **note** that the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, in conjunction with central government agencies, the Prime Minister's Chief Science Advisor, and other supporting agencies, have developed a National Risk Register framework;
- 2 **note** that the National Risk Register and its associated risk profiling provides a standardised, forward-looking framework for identifying, assessing and comparing the full range of threats and hazards to New Zealand's national security, which supports better accountability and for risk management across government;
- 3 **note** that the Officials' Domestic and External Security Committee uses the National Risk Register framework to provide strategic governance of national security risk, through the Hazard Risk Board and the Security and Intelligence Board;

- 4 **endorse** officials' use of the National Risk Register and associated risk profiles as a primary coordinating mechanism for identifying and managing national security risks across government;
- 5 **agree** that officials, through the Hazard Risk Board and Security and Intelligence Board, report to the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee annually on the management of national security risks and priorities for improving management of those risks;
- 6 **note** officials have drafted a New Zealand National Risk Report to increase transparency and raise public awareness of the government's management of national security risk;
- 7 **note** that a communications plan for engaging with interested stakeholders on the National Risk Report will be developed; and
- 8 **agree** the Minister for National Security and Intelligence will release the New Zealand National Risk Report to the public in May/June of 2018.

Authorised for lodgement

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern

**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

~~IN CONFIDENCE~~

**DEPARTMENT OF THE  
PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET**  
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

## Update on the New Zealand National Risk Report

Date:	08 June 2018	Tracking number:	4057532v2
Security classification:	In Confidence	Priority:	Routine
For:	Approval	Required by:	13 June 2018

Contact for telephone discussion (if required)			
Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact
Andrew Kibblewhite	Chief Executive, DPMC	s9(2)(a)	
Howard Broad	Deputy Chief Executive, Security & Intelligence		✓
Mark Evans	Manager, National Risk Unit		

**Minister's office to complete:**

Approved
  Declined  
 Noted
  Needs change  
 Seen
  Overtaken by Events  
 See Minister's Notes
  Withdrawn

**Comments:**



<b>TO:</b>	<b>Minister for National Security &amp; Intelligence</b>
<b>FROM:</b>	<b>Howard Broad, Deputy Chief Executive, DPMC</b>
<b>DATE:</b>	<b>08 June 2018</b>
<b>SUBJECT:</b>	<b>Update on the New Zealand National Risk Report</b>

## Purpose

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1. This briefing provides an update on the status of the NZ National Risk Report (the Report) and seeks your approval for wider engagement on the Report. Officials are also proposing, subject to your agreement, submission of the Report and a Cabinet paper to Cabinet upon your return from leave.

## Commentary

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### Cabinet consideration

2. DPMC officials have been working with you and the wider National Security System agencies on a Cabinet paper describing the framework officials have developed for managing national security risk. Included as part of that framework is the drafting of the public-facing NZ National Risk Report.
3. Underlying this work is the view that the future wellbeing of New Zealanders will be enhanced by a more future-focussed national security system. Trends like climate change and demographic patterns have raised the stakes for New Zealand and other countries—in many ways, the stakes could not be higher insofar as national risk is by definition about the long-term security of the country. The Report paves the way for more discussion about how we – government and citizens alike – can collectively and individually reduce national risk. It establishes the expectation that officials in the national security system will regularly update Ministers on improvements in the management of national risk.
4. The work has received widespread endorsement, and we are now using the time available to work with Ministers and agencies to make changes and increase buy-in for the objectives of the Report and the wider risk-based framework.
5. With the understanding that changes are still underway and that you have already seen previous drafts, I have attached with this brief the latest version of the Report should you wish to review it at this stage.
6. I consider it desirable to have the Report and the risk management and regular reporting framework outlined in the Cabinet paper agreed and approved by Cabinet before any final refinements are made and the Report publically released.
7. I propose submission of the Report and the associated Cabinet paper ready for your signature and submission to Cabinet in late July or early August, once you return from leave.



### Ministerial support

8. In March you wrote to your colleagues outlining your intention for an appropriately transparent and forward-focused National Security System that is aimed at reducing risks that could affect New Zealand's future wellbeing.

9. s9(2)(ba), s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)

10.

11.

12.

13.



14. The communications plan has been worked on by DPMC communications team and has been sent to MFAT, MoH, MCDEM and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for comment. It will be circulated more widely over the next month. Feedback so far has focussed on making sure important messages are clear, such as the contribution the Report will make to the reduction national risk and what officials are doing to facilitate that objective. Officials will work closely with your office on the communications plan.

### Consultation with agencies

15. Consultation with agencies has enabled considerable improvement to the draft Report. Some agencies have expressed views about allocation of responsibilities for management of specific risks, as grouped in the Report. The Report now has responsibilities for 'peacetime' management of risks allocated to risk owners and provides a longer list of support agencies.

16. Agencies also expressed views about how to conduct communications about the Report after release and there is continued interest in making further textual improvements.

17. DPMC continues to engage with central agencies and their Ministers to refine text and ensure their ongoing comfort and support for the Report. This should enable high levels of agency support for the Report at Cabinet.

#### **Wider engagement on the draft Report**

18. Agencies have indicated that discussion with key non-central government stakeholders would add value to the Report and enable a greater understanding of the Report's objectives.
19. Subject to your approval, officials will begin discussions on a confidential basis with a wider set of stakeholders, for example, Local Government New Zealand, GNS Science, NIWA, and relevant universities.

#### **Communications**

20. A communications plan is under development to support the launch of the Report. It will detail how Ministers, risk-owning agencies and other key stakeholders can prepare for launch, briefing sessions we will hold to help with this preparation, and key messaging, FAQ's and back-pocket Q&A's.
21. Key messages in the communications plan will emphasise, among other things, this Government's commitment to transparency and giving New Zealanders visibility of what government is doing to manage national risks. This will help all parties to reduce risk where possible and deal with consequences of events better. It will help ensure the risk management activity of central and local government, industry, iwi, and others, is complementary.
22. Subject to Cabinet approval, officials will work with your office on an event for you to publicly release the Report.

#### **Recommendations**

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23. It is recommended that you:
  1. **Note** DPMC officials' intention to provide you with the Report and the associated Cabinet paper for your approval and submission to Cabinet in late July or early August, once you return from leave.
  2. **Note** DPMC officials will continue to engage with central agencies and their Ministers to refine text and ensure their ongoing comfort and support for the Report.
  3. **Note** that, subject to Cabinet approval, officials will work with your office on an event for you to publicly release the Report.
  4. **Note** that a communications plan is being prepared to support the launch of the Report.
  5. **approve** DPMC officials holding in-confidence discussions on the draft NZ National Risk Report with a wider group of select stakeholders.

**YES / NO**





# Briefing note

## UPDATE ON THE NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL RISK REPORT

To [Name]			
Date	24/07/2018	Priority	Routine
Deadline	30/07/2018	Briefing Number	4068687

### Purpose

1. This briefing note provides you with an update on changes made to the New Zealand National Risk Report (the Report) after wider consultation with a targeted set of stakeholders.
2. The briefing note also serves to inform you that the Report and the accompanying Cabinet Paper on Improving the Management of National Security Risks are presently undergoing a final-round of consultation with National Security System agencies in preparation for lodgement with the appropriate Cabinet Committee.
3. A briefing note similar to this one is being prepared for the Minister for National Security and Intelligence.

### Recommendations

1. **Note** the changes made to the Report.
2. **Note** that the Report and Cabinet Paper are currently undergoing a final round of consultation with National Security System agencies.

Howard Broad <b>Deputy Chief Executive</b>		Hon Kris Faafoi <b>Minister for Civil Defence</b>
...../...../2018		...../...../2018

Contact for telephone discussion if required:

Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact
Andrew Kibblewhite	Chief Executive, DPMC	s9(2)(a)	
Howard Broad	Deputy Chief Executive, DPMC		✓
Sarah Stuart-Black	Director, MCDEM		
Mark Evans	Manager, National Risk Unit, DPMC		

Minister's office comments:

- Noted
- Seen
- Approved
- Needs change
- Withdrawn
- Not seen by Minister
- Overtaken by events
- Referred to

Released under the Official Information Act 1982

# UPDATE ON THE NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL RISK REPORT

## Purpose

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1. This briefing note provides you with an update on changes made to the New Zealand National Risk Report (the Report) after wider consultation with a targeted set of stakeholders.
2. This briefing note also serves to inform you that the Report and the accompanying Cabinet Paper on Improving the Management of National Security Risks are presently undergoing a final-round of consultation with National Security System agencies in preparation for lodgement with the appropriate Cabinet Committee.
3. A briefing note similar to this one is being prepared for the Minister for National Security and Intelligence.

## Background

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4. DPMC officials have been working with National Security System agencies on the drafting of the Report and a Cabinet Paper, which sits within a larger body of work DPMC is coordinating to implement a risk-based approach to national security in New Zealand.
5. The Report represents a proactive step to enable a transparent and consistent conversation about the risks facing the nation. It helps Ministers and other stakeholders visualise where we might strengthen current arrangements across agencies to ensure all possible steps are taken to manage national risks.
6. The Cabinet Paper outlines the National Risk Register and associated risk profiles as a primary mechanism for assessing and managing national security risks across government. It also establishes, through the Hazard Risk Board and Security Intelligence Board, an annual reporting requirement to Cabinet about key changes to the management of national risks and priorities for risk treatment.
7. The Report and Cabinet Paper continue to receive endorsement from agencies and stakeholders, with good 'buy-in' for the overall aims of the Report, including the wider risk management framework and the reporting requirement outlined in the Cabinet Paper. Commensurate with this is the view that, given climate and other important trends, there has never been a better time to build awareness of the importance of national risk management. This includes the need for integrating risk management processes into core government agency functions to support the Government's agenda of strengthening intergenerational wellbeing.
8. To help strengthen the message about intergenerational wellbeing, the Report has also been edited to now introduce earlier a selection of long-term trends that will have a major impact in shaping our future society, including the national risks we face as a country. This helps establish the ground for a more in-depth conversation on intergenerational issues and responses.
9. I have attached the latest version of the Report and Cabinet Paper to this briefing note should you wish to review it, noting that both are presently undergoing a final-round of consultation. The attached latest version of the Report incorporates comments from discussions between DPMC officials and those selected stakeholders (which included local government, Crown Research Institutes, insurers and academics).

10. You should receive a final version of the Report and associated Cabinet Paper ready for submission to Cabinet in late August or early September 2018. We also intend to raise with the Minister for National Security and Intelligence the question of whether a briefing to the Opposition about the Report would be of benefit.

## **Wider stakeholder feedback on the Report**

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11. A diverse range of perspectives and insights have been received and drawn-together after recent discussion with a select wider range of stakeholders. In sum, comments were constructive and showed positive support for the Report, especially in terms of the Report serving as a foundation for furthering stakeholders' discussion on risk management within their own areas.
12. A high-level summary of feedback received and the changes made as a consequence is provided below.
  - a) 9(2)(ba) mentioned the Report's omission of waterborne diseases – this is now included in the Conclusion as a development that requires greater awareness and consideration.
  - b) 9(2)(ba) was encouraged by the inclusion of a longer list of supporting agencies in the summaries that made clear the inclusive nature of effective risk management.
  - c) 9(2)(ba) provided some further refinements to the natural hazard risk summaries, and provided positive comment about the inclusion of information on malicious threats as part of the risk spectrum – applicable refinements have been made to risk summaries.
  - d) 9(2)(ba) felt that the Report needed to explain the likelihood of certain risks better – a figure displaying a range of likelihood examples has been included in the risk assessment section of the Report.
  - e) 9(2)(ba) additionally called for a statement acknowledging the expertise and capabilities that Crown Research Institutes contribute to national risk management – a section has been added to highlight the role and skills of Crown Research Institutes.
  - f) A group of academics working in the risk area 9(2)(ba) and science advisors provided a range of feedback, such as:
    - i) The need to take a longer-term view of national risks – accommodated through new text in the trends section, which has been brought to the front of the Report; also acknowledged by removing direct reference to the 5-year definitional scope, which sits under the risk assessment methodology.
    - ii) Including a range of additional risk concepts (e.g. cascading hazards and black swan events). These have been built-in to the text in appropriate sections.
    - iii) The need for central government to play a greater foresight role – this has been integrated into the discussion on long-term trends.

- iv) Including discussion on the effect of national risks on governance and the institutional arrangements needed to address them – considered out of scope for this edition of the Report, but taken on-board to work-through in the future.
- v) That officials should consider whether review of the Report by Select Committee would be of benefit.

## Other changes

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- g) In parallel to consultation with the wider group of stakeholders, other changes have been made to the Report in response to ongoing agency feedback. These changes have chiefly been refinements to text in the risk summaries, and have also included a change in the term ‘risk owner’ to ‘risk coordinating agencies’, to improve inclusiveness and allay concerns about confusion with the legislated mandates of some agencies.
- h) Other changes also include new text intended to better address the ‘why now?’ and ‘so what?’ questions. The immediacy of the effects of climate change and other trends have been highlighted, especially insofar as they are influencing the risks we face as a nation. The narrative now makes explicit links to the Living Standards Framework and the Four Capitals, and the role effective risk management has as an enabler of national wellbeing.

## Communications

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- 13. The communication plan developed to support the launch of the Report has also been developed further as a consequence of recent consultation. It is attached for your reference.
- 14. Ministers have previously, on the whole, expressed support for the release of the Report and the first step it initiates in stimulating a public conversation about national risks. The new Chief Science Advisor has expressed her support adding that it could have major application for public and private sector Board Directors to guide their risk management activities.
- 15. Subject to Cabinet approval, DPMC officials will keep your office engaged on the public release process for the Report.

Attachments:	
Attachment A:	Cabinet Paper on Improving the Management of National Security Risks
Attachment B:	The New Zealand National Risk Report
Attachment C:	Communications Plan

**[Note: Attachment C "Communications Plan" has been withheld in full under s9(2)(g)(i)]**





# Briefing note

## UPDATE ON THE NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL RISK REPORT

To: Rt. Hon Jacinda Ardern, Minister for National Security and Intelligence

Date	26/07/2018	Priority	Routine
Deadline	3/08/2018	Briefing Number	4067533

### Purpose

1. This briefing note provides you with an update on changes made to the New Zealand National Risk Report (the Report) following wider consultation with stakeholders.
2. The briefing note also advises you that the draft Report and the accompanying Cabinet Paper on Improving the Management of National Security Risks are being prepared for a final round of consultation with relevant agencies before potential lodgement for Cabinet.
3. Minister Faafoi has suggested he, likely with the Minister of Finance, convene a meeting of interested Ministers to discuss the draft Report and Cabinet Paper recommendations as a group, ensure alignment with the Government's strategic direction and collectively prepare for the Report's launch. We think this is a good idea and will work with him to co-ordinate this. If you would like to be involved we will work with your office on timings.

### Recommendations

1. **Note** the changes made to the Report.
2. **Note** that the Report and Cabinet Paper are being prepared for a final round of consultation with relevant agencies.
3. **Note** the intention to provide a final version of the Report and associated Cabinet Paper for your approval ahead of submission to Cabinet in September 2018.

4. **Note** Minister Faafoi has suggested he and Minister Robertson convene a group of interested Ministers to discuss between you and other key Ministers to discuss the draft Report and Cabinet Paper recommendations and collectively prepare for the Report's launch.
5. **Indicate** whether you would like to be involved in those Ministerial discussions.

**YES / NO / DISCUSS**

Howard Broad <b>Deputy Chief Executive</b>		Rt. Hon Jacinda Ardern <b>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</b>
...../...../2018		...../...../2018

**Contact for telephone discussion if required:**

Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact
Andrew Kibblewhite	Chief Executive, DPMC	s9(2)(a)	
Howard Broad	Deputy Chief Executive, DPMC		✓
Mark Evans	Manager, National Risk Unit, DPMC		

**Minister's office comments:**

- Noted
- Seen
- Approved
- Needs change
- Withdrawn
- Not seen by Minister
- Overtaken by events
- Referred to

# UPDATE ON THE NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL RISK REPORT

## Background

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1. DPMC officials have been working with you and relevant agencies on the drafting of the Report and a Cabinet Paper. The Report is key to a larger body of work DPMC is coordinating to implement a risk-based approach to national security within New Zealand.
2. The Report will enable a more transparent conversation about the risks facing our nation. It is designed to help Ministers and other stakeholders understand the nature of risks facing New Zealand and where we might strengthen current arrangements across agencies over time to ensure the right steps are taken to manage national risks.
3. The Cabinet Paper proposes the National Risk Register and associated risk profiles as a standard mechanism for assessing and managing national risks across government. It also establishes, through the Hazard Risk Board and Security Intelligence Board, an annual reporting requirement to Cabinet about key changes to the management of national risks and priorities for risk treatment.
4. The Report and Cabinet Paper continue to receive endorsement from agencies and stakeholders, with good buy-in for the overall aims of the Report, including the wider risk management framework and the reporting requirement outlined in the Cabinet Paper. In addition, given climate change and other trends, there has never been a better time to build awareness of the importance of national risk management. This includes integrating risk management processes into core government agency functions to support the Government's agenda of strengthening intergenerational wellbeing.
5. To strengthen the message about the importance of ensuring intergenerational wellbeing, the Report now prominently features a selection of long-term trends that will shape our future society.
6. I have attached the latest version of the draft Report and Cabinet Paper to this briefing note should you wish to review it, noting that both are being readied for a final round of consultation. As per your approval for consultation with a targeted set of stakeholders, the attached latest version of the Report incorporates comments from discussions between DPMC officials and those selected stakeholders (which included local government, Crown Research Institutes, insurers and academics).
7. I propose to provide you with a final version of the Report and associated Cabinet Paper for your approval and submission to Cabinet in September 2018. You may also like to consider whether a briefing, including an embargoed copy of the Report to the Opposition would be of benefit prior to its release. Members of the Opposition would be aware of work on the current National Risk Register and associated risk profiles, due to its origin over the past 3-4 years.

## Wider stakeholder feedback on the Report

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8. A range of perspectives and insights have been compiled after recent discussions with a select wider range of stakeholders. Overall, comments were constructive and showed positive support for the Report.

9. A high-level summary of feedback received, and the changes made as a consequence, is provided below:
- a) 9(2)(ba) was encouraged by the inclusion of a longer list of supporting agencies in the summaries that made clear the inclusive nature of effective risk management.
  - b) 9(2)(ba) provided some further refinements to the natural hazard risk summaries, and provided positive comment about the inclusion of information on malicious threats as part of the risk spectrum – applicable refinements have been made to risk summaries.
  - c) 9(2)(ba) felt that the Report needed to explain the likelihood of certain risks better – a figure displaying a range of likelihoods has been included in the risk assessment section of the Report.
  - d) 9(2)(ba) additionally called for a statement acknowledging the expertise and capabilities that Crown Research Institutes contribute to national risk management – a section has been added to highlight the role and skills of Crown Research Institutes.
  - e) 9(2)(ba) mentioned the Report's omission of waterborne diseases – this is now included in the Conclusion as a development that requires greater awareness and consideration.
  - f) A group of academics working in the risk area 9(2)(ba) and science advisors provided a range of feedback, such as:
    - i) The need to take a longer-term view of national risks – accommodated through new text in the trends section, which has been brought to the front of the Report.
    - ii) Including a range of additional risk concepts (e.g. cascading hazards and 'black swan' events). These have been included in appropriate sections.
    - iii) The need for central government to play a greater foresight role – this has been integrated into the discussion on long-term trends.
    - iv) Including discussion on the effect of national risks on governance and the institutional arrangements needed to address them – considered out of scope for this edition of the Report, but taken on-board to work-through in the future.
    - v) That DPMC officials should consider whether review of the Report by Select Committee would be of benefit. We will discuss this with you further after feedback from the proposed Ministerial group discussion.

## Other changes

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10. In parallel to consultation with the wider group of stakeholders, other changes have been made to the Report in response to ongoing agency feedback. These changes have chiefly been refinements to text in the risk summaries, and have also included a change in the term 'risk owner' to 'risk coordinating agencies' to improve inclusiveness and allay concerns about confusion with the legislated mandates of some agencies.

11. Other changes include new text intended to better address the ‘why now?’ and ‘so what?’ questions. The immediacy of effects of climate change and other trends have been highlighted. The narrative now makes explicit links to the Living Standards Framework and the Four Capitals, and the role effective risk management has as an enabler of intergenerational wellbeing.

## **Discussions with Minister Fafoi**

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12. We have had some robust and useful conversations with Minister Fafoi on how best to communicate the National Risk Report, and to manage some of the risks that arise. His clear view is that Ministers need to spend some more time discussing the implications of the report and testing how the Government should respond to some of the issues that arise.
13. We think this meeting will be a very useful exercise and officials will work with Minister Fafoi and the Minister of Finance to co-ordinate. We are working on the presumption that you are happy for this discussion to proceed without your direct involvement, so please let us know if you would like to participate and / or lead it.

## **Communications**

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14. The communications plan developed to support the launch of the Report has been developed further as a consequence of recent consultation. Communications objectives, roles and the consultation pathway to-date have been updated. There is also good awareness and preparation for the potential launch in agencies as a result of consultation.
15. Ministers have previously, on the whole, expressed support for the release of the Report as a foundation for officials’ action on, and public conversation about, national risks. The new Chief Science Advisor has also expressed her support adding that it could have major application for public and private sector Board Directors to guide their risk management activities.
16. Subject to Cabinet and your approval, DPMC officials will work with your office to find a suitable event for you to publically release the Report as part of your National Security and Intelligence portfolio. Options might include an event where you launch the Report followed by a panel discussion featuring a range of supportive stakeholders.

<b>Attachments:</b>	
<b>Attachment A:</b>	Cabinet Paper on Improving the Management of National Risks
<b>Attachment B:</b>	The New Zealand National Risk Report (Draft)

Office of the Minister for National Security and Intelligence

## **National Security System: Improving the Management of National Security Risks**

### **Proposal**

- 1 This paper:
  - informs the Committee of the development of a National Risk Register framework to improve the management of national security risks across government;
  - proposes that officials report to Cabinet annually on the management of those risks; and
  - recommends the release of a National Risk Report to increase transparency and understanding of national security risks and the government's management of them.

### **Executive Summary**

- 2 Our government is committed to an ambitious agenda that builds a better future for all New Zealanders, by putting the well-being of people and the environment at the centre of what we do. We are making considerable investments in housing, health, education, police and infrastructure, and looking after our natural environment, to help New Zealanders thrive. To achieve our objectives for the country, we need to be clear about the things that may get in our way – and ensure that we take collective responsibility in managing them.
- 3 As we know, crises or events can occur with impacts beyond the control of any single portfolio or agency. Established trends such as climate change, shifts in geopolitical power, and an aging domestic population are also having a gradual impact on how risks affect New Zealand. In the face of greater uncertainty, managing complex, interrelated national security risks can only be done with collective effort. It requires something from all of us, Ministers, officials, the public, and private organisations.
- 4 New Zealand's National Security System (the NSS) provides a structured approach to managing the risks that could significantly affect New Zealand's well-being. The system acts so that New Zealanders can go about their daily life confidently and take opportunities to advance their way of life.
- 5 The NSS has a depth of experience responding to events and crises. However, the next step is to move to a more coordinated, proactive approach to assess and manage national security risks across the 4R's of risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) has led, in concert with other agencies and my Chief Science Advisor, Sir Peter Gluckman, the development of a National Risk Register to underpin this approach.
- 6 The National Risk Register is a standardised framework for, assessing and comparing the range of threats and hazards that could significantly affect New Zealand's security and prosperity. It is designed to enable or improve:

- The NSS's ability to evaluate, compare and prioritise potential system-wide impacts from national security risks.
- National analyses on gaps and requirements for risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery.
- Ministers' assurance that the NSS is managing risk effectively and holding the wider system to account with regard to risk management policy and practice.
- Ministers' information that can be used to demonstrate that government has given active consideration to the range of risks, their complexities and interconnections.
- NSS planning, through a comprehensive process for identifying risks that have the potential to fall outside individual agencies' legislation, prompting the NSS to assign ownership of these risks, and improve their governance.
- Policy settings on the Government's fiscal buffers, financial buffers in the financial system and capital reserves held by communities and households, through being better informed by evidence on risks.
- The opportunity for Government to lead other sectors to take a more strategic approach to risk management.

7 The National Risk Register framework is comprised of a regularly updated series of risk profiles, which are supported by a risk assessment methodology, the results of those risk assessments, and a summary of how each risk is managed. One or more 'risk-owning' agency is identified for each risk. The Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) governance boards share responsibility for strategic oversight of the risks, including effective risk mitigation and management. Risk-owning agencies support ODESC in developing oversight of risk management activities, and take the lead in updating risk assessments and risk profiles, reporting any significant changes.

8 I seek endorsement of the National Risk Register framework as a primary coordinating mechanism for assessing and managing national security risk across government. I propose that officials, through the Hazard Risk Board and Security and Intelligence Board, report annually to Cabinet, to ensure we maintain oversight of how officials are managing these risks as they evolve over time.

9 I further propose that we engage the New Zealand public more proactively to raise awareness of New Zealand's national security risks and provide information about the steps government has in place to manage them. DPMC is leading the development of a public National Risk Report to support this. I see this as an important part of our commitment to increase public participation, transparency and openness around official information and the work of our Government. I have attached a draft National Risk Report (the Report) with this paper. I seek Cabinet approval for officials to discuss refinements to the draft Report with a select group of stakeholders and for my subsequent public release of the Report at a date to be confirmed.

## Background

### *National Security System*

- 10 The National Security System (the NSS) is the architecture for governing national security. New Zealand takes an “all hazards, all risks” approach to national security. This means the NSS covers risks that might have a major impact on the country, including:
- sudden onset events (e.g. earthquakes, industrial accidents, terrorist attacks);
  - gradual onset events, which may occur over a period of time from days to years (e.g. influenza pandemics, biodiversity loss); and
  - steady-state conditions (e.g. transnational organised crime).
- 11 Managing these complex, interrelated national security risks requires collective effort across government. At an officials’ level, ODESC is the group of chief executives and their agencies who coordinate national security issues. ODESC has two national security governance boards:
- the Security and Intelligence Board, which focuses on threats and intelligence issues; and
  - the Hazard Risk Board, which focuses on hazard risks.
- 12 The ODESC national security governance boards, chaired by DPMC, ensure capabilities and systems are in place to identify national security risks, and that appropriate arrangements are made to efficiently and effectively reduce and manage risk.
- 13 ODESC also coordinates response to events or crises, for example, the outage of the Refinery to Auckland Pipeline in September 2017. This was an example where the immediate response benefited from national oversight and coordination of multiple agencies. However, it showed there is still room for improving how central government works with stakeholders (such as local government and entities that provide essential infrastructure services) to better clarify responsibilities for ‘peacetime’ efforts to reduce risk before crises occur. For many national security risks, ‘whole of government’ risk management must evolve to ‘whole of society’ risk management.

### *Previous consideration of a National Risk Register framework*

- 14 The Cabinet National Security Committee considered an earlier National Risk Register framework on 9 August 2016. DPMC had developed that draft over 2015-2016 in conjunction with over thirty central government agencies and Crown Research Institutes, with significant input from the Strategic Risk and Resilience Panel, an independent panel of external experts. At that time, Cabinet requested it be developed further [NSC-16-MIN-0022]. Further consideration by the Committee, scheduled for November 2016, did not occur due to the Kaikōura earthquake.
- 15 Since then, DPMC has established a National Risk Unit to work with agencies to build a comprehensive understanding of New Zealand’s risks. The National Risk Unit has continued to work at the direction of the ODESC Boards to develop the National Risk Register framework to put greater emphasis on reducing risk and applying comprehensive risk management before events occur.



- 16 Throughout this time, the National Risk Register framework has remained relatively closely-held within the agencies involved in its development, and while it has been adopted by ODESC governance boards, it has not yet been endorsed by Ministers as a primary mechanism for identifying and managing national security risks across government. Officials advise that the National Risk Register framework is now sufficiently mature in its development for this to happen.

## Comment

### *Adopting a forward-looking approach to managing national security risk*

- 17 New Zealand has significant experience in dealing with national security events and crises. To continue improving our ability to manage these risks, the next step is to take a more proactive approach to considering and planning for risks, to minimise the social, physical, economic and fiscal consequences for New Zealand and New Zealanders. Formal adoption of the National Risk Register framework by ODESC, and endorsement by Ministers underpins this approach.

### *... through a National Risk Register*

- 18 The National Risk Register framework is comprised of a regularly updated series of risk profiles, which are supported by a risk assessment methodology. Profiles include the results of those risk assessments, and a summary of how identified risks are managed. A national security risk is '*an uncertain event<sup>1</sup> or condition that could conceivably occur in the next five years, with a potentially catastrophic impact for New Zealand's security and prosperity, requiring large-scale government intervention to manage*'. The National Risk Register framework and associated risk profiles provide a standardised approach for identifying, assessing and comparing the risks arising from a range of threats and hazards that could significantly affect New Zealand's wellbeing. This builds a comprehensive picture of our capability to manage each risk and, in turn, helps to identify the best opportunities to effectively reduce overall risk.
- 19 The National Risk Register framework builds on previous work, but a focus on 'pre-event' risk management represents a maturing and evolving of the governance of the NSS. The National Risk Register is designed to ensure officials are appropriately identifying and managing risks to national security as they emerge and change. The process supports clearer accountability for risk management by assigning each risk to an agency (a 'risk-owning' agency) or group of agencies, and provides useful information about the context, likelihood of occurrence and consequences of risks. Transparent documentation of risk management decisions also provides a supporting evidence-base should decisions relating to national security risks be questioned or reviewed.
- 20 The National Risk Register also enables comparative assessment of risks. The management of national security involves balancing many competing interests: short-term and long-term, domestic and external, public and private and financial and non-financial. Risk assessments strengthen the evidence-base for decision-making when balancing these interests. Risk assessments identify national vulnerabilities and exposures to threats and hazards; and provide oversight of strengths or gaps in risk management and where risks are interconnected. Therefore, the process can be used to build a case for

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<sup>1</sup> The international standard, ISO 31000, defines risk as 'the effect of uncertainty on objectives'.

intervention or risk treatment options that make sense in terms of government priorities, resources, and capabilities.

*... which is underpinned by a robust methodology*

- 21 Each risk in the National Risk Register framework is assessed by using a 'maximum credible event' scenario to identify the highest possible consequences that could eventuate for New Zealand, based on current understanding of the risk, and to determine the likelihood of that scenario occurring in the next five years.
- 22 These assessments form the basis of risk profiles, which also describe the current framework by which each risk is managed. To understand the evolving risk landscape, risk-owning agencies monitor and update risk assessments and associated risk profiles and report any significant changes.

*... and supports accountability for risk management*

- 23 The National Risk Register framework is designed to provide assurance to Ministers that risks to national security are being identified and managed by officials appropriately across government. At an officials' level responsibility for strategic oversight of each risk has been assigned to an ODESC national security governance board.
- 24 I propose that officials, through the ODESC national security governance boards, report to Cabinet on an annual basis, to ensure we retain oversight of how officials are managing national security risks as they evolve. Reporting will include changes to national security risks, the decisions on managing those risks made in the preceding year and the priorities for treating risks in the coming year. This will ensure a strong link between ODESC's responsibility for coordinating the strategic governance and stewardship of New Zealand's national security, and Ministers' role of governing those agencies responsible for managing national security risks.

*A National Risk Report will raise awareness of the risks faced by New Zealand*

- 25 I also propose that we engage local government, the corporate sector, non-government organisations and the New Zealand public more actively to enhance their understanding of the national security risks that may affect them, as well as their ability to plan for and mitigate these risks. To support this, DPMC has developed a National Risk Report, a public version of the National Risk Register, in concert with other agencies and Sir Peter Gluckman, my Chief Science Advisor.
- 26 The draft National Risk Report as attached includes risk summaries that describe the main components of the risk profiles, establishing a (public) version of named national security risks and risk-owning agencies, and notes the national security objective(s) affected by those risks. The main purpose of the risk summaries are to increase the understanding of national security risks and provide examples of how they are managed.
- 27 Regular publication of a National Risk Report would facilitate an open and transparent public discussion about what our national security risks are, how those risks are assessed, and what steps government is taking to manage them. It will provide New Zealanders with information on the steps that government is taking to manage national security risks.

Access to that information will help government, individuals, iwis, businesses and communities to consider where they can better manage risks and respond to events.

- 28 The National Risk Report complements the existing 2007 National Hazardscape Report<sup>2</sup>, which provided a summary of the hazards and threats affecting New Zealand at the time. It aims to bring public perception of risk more in line with the evidence behind a hazard or threat assessment. Similar public risk reports are regularly published in the UK, Canada and other countries. The experience of these governments shows that communicating with the public about national security risks can help build resilience, reduce fear and uncertainty, and improve understanding of government decisions on managing risk, which sometimes involve tough choices about investment and tolerance for certain risks.
- 29 Regular publication of the National Risk Report will also support engagement with external stakeholders, which often have a key role in managing risk. This includes local government and private sector entities, such as those responsible for essential infrastructure and services (including water, transport, and energy). Officials will put in place a communication plan for engaging on the National Risk Report with stakeholders.
- 30 Some risk profiles include classified information and procedures. The National Risk Report will balance the benefits of transparency and the need to protect classified information, including for the safety of citizens.
- 31 I have attached with this paper a full draft version of the National Risk Report. The Report includes 'risk summaries' with examples of national security risks. Those risks are grouped by type and draw upon the unclassified information previously developed by agencies for use in the aforementioned risk profiles. The examples in these risk groupings will inform readers with a general understanding of the scope of national security risk, but directs them to risk-owning agencies on specifics. I seek agreement from Cabinet for officials to discuss refinements for the draft Report with a select group of stakeholders and, subject to final consultation with the Minister of Civil Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, my launch of the first National Risk Report later in 2018.

## Consultation

- 32 The following agencies have been consulted on this Cabinet Paper and the draft National Risk Report: Department of Conservation; Department of Internal Affairs; Earthquake Commission; Fire and Emergency New Zealand; Government Communications Security Bureau; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment; Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Ministry for the Environment; Maritime New Zealand; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Transport; Ministry for Primary Industries; New Zealand Customs Service; New Zealand Defence Force; New Zealand Police; New Zealand Security Intelligence Service; Serious Fraud Office; The Treasury.
- 33 *Previous concerns from agencies have been rectified...* Some agencies indicated concerns with aspects of the report during consultation, including the 'grouping' of risks, assignment of responsibility for managing risks, the need for refinement of text in some areas, and how the report will be interpreted by international partners. Following Cabinet consideration, and before launch of the report, there will be a window for some fine-tuning

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/resources/national-hazardscape-report/>

to further address concerns. Agencies have expressed their general comfort with the version attached here.

### **Financial, Human Rights, Gender and Legislative Implications, Disability Perspective**

34 There are no implications arising from this paper.

### **Regulatory Impact Analysis**

35 Regulatory Impact Analysis requirements do not apply to this paper.

### **Publicity**

36 I intend to launch the Report at a suitable occasion after it is ready for publication. Embargoed copies of the National Risk Report will be sent to relevant Ministers, agencies and stakeholders ahead of its release.

37 A communications plan is being developed which includes a process for officials to discuss refinements to the draft Report with a select wider group of stakeholders and supporting material for Ministers to use after the launch. This includes key messages and Q&A's for engaging with the public on the Report.

38 I seek agreement from Cabinet for officials to discuss refinements for the draft Report with a select group of stakeholders and, subject to final consultation with the Minister of Civil Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, my launch of the first National Risk Report later in 2018.

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## Recommendations

The Minister for National Security and Intelligence recommends that the Committee:

- 1 **note** that the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, in conjunction with central government agencies, the Prime Minister's Chief Science Advisor, and other supporting agencies, have developed a National Risk Register framework;
- 2 **note** that the National Risk Register and its associated risk profiling provides a standardised, forward-looking framework for assessing and comparing a full range of threats and hazards to New Zealand's national security, which supports better accountability and for risk management across government;
- 3 **note** that the Officials' Domestic and External Security Committee uses the National Risk Register framework to provide strategic governance of national security risk, through the Hazard Risk Board and the Security and Intelligence Board;
- 4 **endorse** officials' use of the National Risk Register and associated risk profiles as a primary coordinating mechanism for assessing and managing national security risks across government;
- 5 **agree** that officials, through the Hazard Risk Board and Security and Intelligence Board, will develop a reporting framework and report to Cabinet annually on changes to national security risks, the management of those risks and priorities for risk treatment;
- 6 **note** officials have drafted a National Risk Report to increase public understanding of national security risks and the steps government has in place to manage them;
- 7 **note** that a communications plan for engaging with interested stakeholders on the National Risk Report is being developed and that DPMC officials intend to hold in-confidence discussions on the draft NZ National Risk Report with a select wider group of stakeholders (for example, Local Government New Zealand, GNS Science, NIWA, and relevant Universities) before launch; and
- 8 **agree** the Minister for National Security and Intelligence, subject to consultation with a the Minister of Civil Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, will confirm any final changes and launch the New Zealand National Risk Report later in 2018.

Authorised for lodgement

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern

**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**



# Aide-Memoire

## MINISTERIAL MEETING ON NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL RISK REPORT – 6 SEPTEMBER 2018

<b>To</b>	Hon Kris Faafoi, Minister of Civil Defence	<b>Report No</b>	DPMC-2018/19-246
<b>From</b>	Howard Broad, Acting Chief Executive, DPMC	<b>Date</b>	31/08/2018

### Purpose

1. You have convened a meeting of your Ministerial colleagues on 6 September 2018, to discuss the New Zealand National Risk Report (the Report). This aide-memoire attaches a draft agenda and talking points to support your discussions during the meeting.

### Ministerial meeting

2. Details of the meeting are as follows:
  - **Date and time:** 8:00am, Thursday 6 September 2018
  - **Venue:** Ministerial Meeting Room, Executive Wing 2.1
3. A number of Ministers have confirmed their attendance (a full list is provided in **Attachment A**). Ministers who are unable to attend have indicated they are likely to send an advisor from their office.
4. Officials from DPMC will provide a short briefing on the rationale for the Report, and will be on hand to answer any specific questions that Ministers may raise.
5. Gabriel Makhoulf, Secretary of the Treasury, and Prof Juliet Gerrard, the Prime Minister's Chief Science Advisor have confirmed attendance.

### Agenda and talking points

6. Officials have prepared a draft agenda (**Attachment A**), with talking points to support the discussion.
7. The general nature of the conversation is intended to centre around Ministers' degree of comfort with the Report, and the public release. Specific questions that you may wish to ask are outlined in the talking points, and include:
  - a. how comfortable are you with the content of the Report and the proposed release?

- b. how satisfied are you that, if questioned, you could outline how these risks are currently being managed by the Government and/or your agency?

**Recommendations**

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- 8. It is recommended that you note the contents of this aide-memoire.

NOTED	
Howard Broad <b>Acting Chief Executive</b> <b>DPMC</b>	Hon Kris Faafoi <b>Minister of Civil Defence</b>
Date:     /     / 2018	

Attachment A     Ministerial meeting agenda and talking points

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## Ministerial meeting on the New Zealand National Risk Report – Agenda

<b>Date</b>	Thursday 6 September 2018
<b>Time</b>	8:00am
<b>Venue</b>	Ministerial Meeting Room, Executive Wing 2.1
<b>Attendees</b>	Hon Kris Faafoi (Chair) Hon Kelvin Davis Hon Phil Twyford Hon Dr Megan Woods Hon Andrew Little Hon Dr David Clark Hon Iain Lees-Galloway Hon Damien O'Connor Hon Ron Mark Hon James Shaw Hon Eugenie Sage
<b>Officials</b>	Howard Broad, Acting Chief Executive, DPMC Gabriel Makhoul, Secretary of the Treasury Dr Mark Evans, National Risk Unit, DPMC Prof Juliet Gerrard, Prime Minister's Chief Science Advisor

Item	Topic	Lead	Timing
1.	Welcome and introductions	Hon Faafoi	8:00am
2.	Rationale for the Report and intended audience	Howard Broad	8:05
3.	Comments on draft content	Hon Faafoi	8:10
4.	Comments on the proposed release	Hon Faafoi	8:20
5.	Next steps	Hon Faafoi	8:25



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# Briefing

## MANAGING NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS

To Minister for National Security and Intelligence (Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern)			
Date	18/12/2018	Priority	Routine
Deadline	21/12/2018	Briefing Number	1819NSS/[002]

### Purpose

To update you on the way in which the national security system's governance structures have organised themselves to better manage New Zealand's highest priority national security risks.

### Recommendations

1. **Note** the progress made by the ODESC Hazard Risk Board (HRB) and Security and Intelligence Board (SIB) in better managing New Zealand's national security risks, as outlined in the attached papers. **YES / NO**
2. **Note** that these reports represent a baseline for proposed regular performance reporting from now on to you on the ODESC boards' management of national security risks. **YES / NO**
3. **Forward** this briefing and its attachments to relevant Ministers with responsibility for agencies represented on HRB and SIB respectively (listed overleaf). **YES / NO**

Andrew Kibblewhite  
**Chief Executive, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet**

...../...../2018

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
**Minister for National Security and Intelligence**

...../...../2018

**HRB and SIB Reports to:**

- Rt Hon Winston Peters
- Hon David Parker
- Hon Stuart Nash
- Hon Iain Lees-Galloway
- Hon Ron Mark
- Hon Kris Faafoi

**HRB Report only to:**

- Hon Phil Twyford
- Hon Dr David Clark
- Hon Damien O'Connor
- Hon Tracey Martin

**SIB Report only to:**

- Hon Andrew Little

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Contact for telephone discussion if required:

Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact
Andrew Kibblewhite	Chief Executive	s9(2)(a)	✓
Howard Broad	Deputy Chief Executive, National Security		

Minister's office comments:

- Noted
- Seen
- Approved
- Needs change
- Withdrawn
- Not seen by Minister
- Overtaken by events
- Referred to

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## Better Management of National Security Risks

1. As you know, New Zealand's ODESC system is designed to provide a resilient, coordinated machinery to enable the Government to discharge its national security responsibilities. In recent years, DPMC has endeavoured to improve the way in which the ODESC system identifies, analyses, prioritises and treats significant national security risks. At a strategic level, the system's work on national risk has been governed by two cross-agency Chief Executive-level boards: the Hazard Risk Board (HRB) and the Security & Intelligence Board (SIB).
2. This briefing outlines for you the progress which those two Boards have made in the past year against the risks which they have each prioritised for closer attention. I anticipate that DPMC will continue to provide regular performance reporting of this nature to you, in your capacity as Minister for National Security and Intelligence, to enable you better to understand how well the system is doing in terms of grappling with, and improving management of, the most significant national security risks on your behalf.
3. I am proud of the progress that has been made to date. While we are still new to this and there is much left to do, I believe that the attached reports demonstrate the rigour with which the two Boards have gripped up the challenge of becoming a truly risk-based national security system. Both have been active in collaboratively tackling the risks that they have taken oversight of. The work programmes of both Boards rest on solid foundations.

Attachments:		
<b>Attachment A:</b>	Hazard Risk Board: Better Management of National Security Risks 2018	<del>RESTRICTED</del>
<b>Attachment B:</b>	Security and Intelligence Board: Better Management of National Security Risks 2018	<del>RESTRICTED</del>

~~RESTRICTED~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE  
PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET  
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

# Security and Intelligence Board

Report on Better Management of National Security Risks 2018

December 2018

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~~RESTRICTED~~

## Report Addressees

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<b>To</b>	Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, Minister for National Security and Intelligence
<b>From</b>	Andrew Kibblewhite, CE DPMC
<b>Copied to</b>	Rt Hon Winston Peters, Hon Andrew Little, Hon David Parker, Hon Stuart Nash, Hon Iain Lees-Galloway, Hon Ron Mark, Hon Kris Faafoi.

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## Key points

1. New Zealand's Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) works to address all significant risks to New Zealanders and the nation, so that people can live confidently and have opportunities to advance their way of life. At the strategic level, work across ODESC is governed by two Chief Executive-level boards: the Hazard Risk Board (HRB) and the Security & Intelligence Board (SIB).
2. A draft Cabinet Paper and associated documentation, currently under consideration by Ministers and led by Minister Faafoi, proposes that ODESC Boards report to Cabinet on an annual basis on the steps officials are taking to better manage national security risks. This will ensure a strong link between ODESC's responsibility for coordinating New Zealand's national security and Ministers, who preside over the ODESC system. The draft Cabinet Paper also includes a proposal for a public-facing report about national risk, but that is a separate discussion that this paper stands apart from. This paper focuses primarily on officials' use of the National Risk Register framework, which is an important tool to improve the management of national risk.
3. This briefing provides a baseline for proposed ongoing reporting from SIB. It provides you, as Minister for National Security and Intelligence, with an update on recent steps taken by SIB to improve the management of national security risks. Alongside an equivalent report for HRB, it reflects the intention to move the ODESC system onto a more proactive footing, anticipating and providing good governance and management of national risk rather than defaulting to a reactive state.
4. SIB works specifically to support New Zealand against those who would wish us harm. Key achievements of SIB and its member agencies over the reporting period include:
  - a. Development of a comprehensive strategic counter-terrorism framework and work programme and initiation and consultation on a legislative reform programme;
  - b. Convening of a cross-agency group to establish an approach to foreign interference in New Zealand's economy and democracy resulting in clear advice to Ministers;
  - c. s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
  - d.
  - e. Refreshing the national cyber security strategy;
  - f. Delivery of the Cyber Threat Assessment Report;
  - g. The Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act 2017 came into full effect in June 2018. The National Security System subsequently conducted national security risk reviews of outer space activities regulated under the Act;
  - h. Presiding over a full refresh and simplification of the Protective Security Requirements and the supporting guidance material. This continues the Cabinet requirement to ensure the PSR advice remains best practice across New Zealand; and



- i. Whole of system approach to counter-narcotics importation, notably the increased role of intelligence in informing on these importations.
5. Future reporting will also provide an assessment of how SIB's national security risks have changed, based on a review by agencies using the National Risk Register methodology. This will provide Ministers with assurance that SIB is focusing on the right risks as they develop, and that progress is being made with reducing risks over time.

## Background

6. The National Risk Register (NRR) framework supports officials' identification, assessment and coordinated treatment of all hazards and threats that could significantly disrupt the conditions required for a secure and prosperous nation.
7. It also provides Ministers with assurance that ODESC is managing risk effectively and holding the system to account. It provides a supporting evidence-base for Ministers should officials' decisions on national security risks be reviewed.
8. In late 2016, the Office of the Auditor-General assessed the effectiveness of the governance arrangements for the National Security System. A key recommendation was to use the National Risk Register to establish clear accountabilities for risk management and for reporting against those accountabilities.
9. ODESC's Hazard Risk Board (HRB) and Security and Intelligence Board (SIB) share responsibilities for oversight of national security risk management. Core accountabilities for coordinating and managing each of the risks in the National Risk Register have been delegated to relevant agencies.
10. SIB's strategic purpose is to support a resilient New Zealand against those who would wish us harm. SIB has increasingly realised this purpose through developing a strong 'future focus' underpinned by system-stewardship and strategic assessment. Over the reporting period, SIB increased its focus on guiding agencies towards building arrangements that effectively strengthen New Zealand's national security for both current and future generations.
11. ODESC agencies manage a great number of risks. The comprehensive framework of the National Risk Register enables SIB to identify and prioritise a small number of these which are most critical at a strategic level. SIB can then focus on ensuring that these risks are being managed by agencies in a way that is both effective and proportionate to the level of risk.
12. SIB's adoption of this approach means that there is a systematic way for the variety of hazards and threats to be assessed. Sometimes SIB will need to engage Ministers at the point the risk is being assessed as there may be public risk perception to be managed or information shortfalls to be considered. Ideally, by the time a risk reaches Ministers for their strategic decisions, relevant agencies have been engaged, the risk has been comprehensively assessed, and the logic behind any additional treatments proposed has been tested.
13. SIB would like to draw your attention (Table 1 below refers) to actions it has taken on improving management of several key national security risks over the reporting period:

- a. Terrorism
  - b. Pacific instability
  - c. Foreign interference
  - d. Malicious cyber activity
  - e. Transnational organised crime
  - f. Space-related threats
14. These risks were prioritised by SIB after evaluation against a range of criteria s6(a)

15. Improving the effectiveness of the system's approach to these risks has provided a consistent structure and strategic focus for SIB meetings. Each risk has had a significant part of a SIB monthly agenda dedicated to it. Risk-coordinating agencies have supported SIB discussions by leading clear, timely and comprehensive presentations on the risk and current risk management efforts. These risks are usually multi-sectoral. Hence, by bringing relevant Chief Executives together, SIB enables a more holistic discussion than might otherwise take place.
16. As it has developed oversight of its risks, SIB has challenged and approved high-level adjustments suggested by agencies to a particular management approach. While recognising there is more to do, by directing the collective weight of the system towards mitigating critical gaps and vulnerabilities, SIB has made a significant contribution.
17. SIB has completed this work on Ministers' behalf. Many of these risks have subsequently led to Ministerial decisions over the course of this year.

## Core initiatives that have informed SIB's management of risks

18. Agencies routinely assess and manage risks for which they have responsibility. Those processes constantly inform the cross-system management of all national security risks and vice versa. Examples of major strategic initiatives that have informed SIB's management of national security risks in 2018 are:
- a. Development of the **Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018**. This document provides updated Defence policy settings, based on the Government's national security and foreign policy priorities. It has and will continue to provide a policy basis for Cabinet consideration of upcoming decisions on Defence (and other national security) issues, including Defence capabilities required to give effect to the Government's national security priorities.
  - b. Changes to the formulation of the **National Security Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs)** – adopting an explicitly risk-based approach that recognises the contribution of intelligence to broader efforts. Implementation of the NSIPs will provide intelligence insights to assist agencies' understanding, monitoring and management of national security risks.
  - c. Development of a **National Security Workforce Programme**—a club-funded initiative sponsored by SIB Chief Executives and the Ministry for Primary Industries.

Aspirations for this programme are the development of a workforce that can work in partnership; across boundaries; in support of an emerging set of priorities; and is managed by high-quality leaders.

d. s6(a)

e. s6(a)

- f. Improvements to the **Protective Security Requirements (PSR)**, including the establishment (TBC) of two new functional leads<sup>1</sup> to drive system-wide leadership of protective security.
- g. SIB reviewed and endorsed the Maritime Security Oversight Committee's draft **Maritime Security Strategy**. The strategy is focused on ensuring that New Zealand, in light of an increasingly demanding maritime security environment, continues to be supported by fit for purpose interagency arrangements. Officials expect to take this strategy to Cabinet sometime in 2019 for Ministers consideration.
19. SIB has also engaged with its Australian counterparts at an annual Trans-Tasman National Security Dialogue. With many of our national security risks being transnational and similar to Australia's, this provided the opportunity to identify concrete opportunities for the two countries to cooperate and collaborate more closely.
20. SIB agencies have also continued to develop and deliver initiatives – informed by interagency coordination and consultation – to support Government's objectives for the sector.
- a. SIB agencies supported Cabinet's decision to acquire four **Boeing P-8A Poseidon** maritime patrol aircraft and training systems. The P-8A will bring enhanced capability to the roles performed by the P-3K2 Orions over many decades such as contributing to the international rules-based order through peace and security operations, search and rescue, disaster response, resource and border protection and environmental and marine resource monitoring. The P-8As will ensure that New Zealand can maintain awareness of its demanding maritime domain and make significant contributions to global peace and security for many decades to come.
- b. The Ministry of Defence, in close consultation with the Defence Force and other SIB agencies, continued the programme of enhanced **Defence Assessments** that positioned the Ministry well to deliver the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. One of these assessments – *The Climate Crisis: Defence Readiness and Responsibilities* – was launched publicly by the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Climate Change in December 2018.
- c. The Ministry of Defence, the New Zealand Defence Force and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in consultation with other SIB agencies have developed advice on, and sought approval for, a series of **international deployments**. These included:
- i. offshore and inshore patrol vessels to Fiji;

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<sup>1</sup> Functional Lead, Protective Security – led by Director-General of Security, Rebecca Kitteridge; and Functional Lead, Information Security – led by Director-General of GCSB, Andrew Hampton.

- ii. a new deployment of one officer to Mali (MINUSMA);
- iii. deployment mandate renewals for New Zealand Defence Force deployments to South Sudan (UNMISS), Egypt (MFO), Israel (UNTSO), Afghanistan and Iraq;
- iv. deployment of a P-3K2 Orion to North Asia; and
- v. deployments of Royal New Zealand Navy frigates to the Asia-Pacific region.

Preliminary work has also commenced on the review of the Iraq deployment and the strategic reassessment of Afghanistan, both due in 2019.

## Decisions and actions that SIB has undertaken to better manage key National Security Risks

Threat	Risk-coordinating agency(s)	Trends and key vulnerabilities	SIB's engagement and broader risk management activity
Terrorism	New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), New Zealand Police	<p>The emergence and expansion of ISIL and other Islamist extremist groups has consolidated a global brand of terrorism. While the territorial caliphate ISIL sought to build in Iraq and Syria has been reversed, ISIL's narrative endures and its broader strategy of directing, enabling and inspiring foreign attacks will continue to be felt throughout the Western world and in our region.</p> <p>New Zealand remains vulnerable to terrorism for reasons shared by many other countries: the ubiquity of the internet, the connectedness of international travel and trade systems, regional extremism, as well as the presence within all societies of disconnected or vulnerable individuals susceptible to extremist messaging or ideology.</p>	<p>Key elements of the work undertaken by SIB agencies include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• delivery of a framework for the prevention of violent extremism, ensuring broader, proactive, inter-agency management of at-risk individuals;</li> <li>• approval of a "South East Asia Counter Terrorism (CT) Strategy" which outlines how agencies will work together to progress New Zealand's aims in our wider region;</li> <li>• collective CE and Ministerial support for a review of the existing CT legislation;</li> <li>• consideration of anticipated changes to aviation security settings, driven in part by global terrorism developments;</li> <li>• development of a "CT Playbook" to assist Ministers and senior officials in understanding their role in the event of a terrorism emergency;</li> <li>• work undertaken to recommend designation of terrorist entities under the provisions of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. The Terrorist Designations Working Group provides recommendations to SIB for their review and endorsement.</li> </ul> <p>DPMC established a new senior role within its National Security Group, to act as New Zealand's Specialist Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (CT). A comprehensive strategic counter-terrorism framework and work</p>

			programme has been developed. SIB regularly provides direction on the work programme.
<b>Pacific instability</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)	<p>Instability in the Pacific – whether caused by corrupt governance, natural hazard events, transnational organised crime, resource insecurity, or other shocks and stresses—has direct flow-on impacts for our own national security.</p> <p>Intensifying domestic pressures and competition among external actors for influence have combined to make the Pacific environment both strategically complex and potentially volatile.</p>	<p>With strong Ministerial interest and the context of the Government's Pacific Reset, SIB has engaged closely on this risk, with CEs collectively testing and affirming the direction of officials' advice to Ministers.</p> <p>s6(a)</p> <p>CEs are also supporting agencies to take coordinated steps to maintain New Zealand's positive influence in the Pacific.</p>
<b>Espionage and foreign interference</b>	NZSIS, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)	<p>This is not a new risk for New Zealand. However officials have become increasingly concerned about the risk of subtler, wide-ranging acts of interference, including acquisition of sensitive technology, economic coercion and attempts to interfere in our critical infrastructure and democratic institutions.</p>	<p>The need for a broader, cross-system approach to foreign interference risks to New Zealand's economy and democracy has become increasingly clear over the reporting period. Under SIB's oversight, a cross-agency group of officials have worked to better understand the nature and scope of the risks, while ensuring that the Government has the checks and balances to intervene in support of national interests where necessary.</p> <p>SIB's convening role has supported better management of this risk, key to which has been bringing MBIE into the fold as a risk-coordinating agency. In September 2018 a meeting of relevant Ministers was convened by the Prime Minister to discuss the Government's approach to foreign interference. A key outcome of this has been assignment of Ministers to lead specific foreign interference work streams.</p>
<b>Malicious cyber activity</b>	Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), New Zealand Police, New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), MBIE	<p>New Zealand is increasingly dependent on information communication technology and an open, trusted Internet. Our potential vulnerability to hostile and criminal cyber threats is growing in proportion to our dependence.</p>	<p>SIB has engaged closely on New Zealand's cyber security vulnerabilities, ensuring public and private sector risk management arrangements remain fit-for-purpose in the context of a constantly evolving threat environment. SIB has also supported the current refresh of the National Cyber Security Strategy, insisting that agencies lead with a clear problem definition and work to clarify roles and responsibilities.</p>
<b>Transnational organised</b>	New Zealand Police,	<p>TNOC's foothold in New Zealand is growing, as criminal groups not previously seen here have started</p>	<p>A multi-agency work programme, overseen by deputy Chief Executives, is being developed. Additional effect</p>

<b>crime (TNOC)</b>	Customs	targeting our lucrative illicit drug market, and those with an entrenched presence continue operating here. TNOC is also supplying larger volumes of illicit drugs, and using more complex methods to avoid detection and surveillance.	will be given to combating TNOC by the Government's investment in 1800 additional police officers, of which 720 have been allocated to organised crime, national security, financial crime and cybercrime, , and more resources for Customs to disrupt TNOC's supply chains upstream before risk reaches New Zealand.
<b>Space-related threats</b>	MBIE	<p>Space is an increasingly important domain of activity across national security and wellbeing, with opportunities and risks of national significance stemming from:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. New Zealand's developing space industry;</li> <li>b. Increased public and private sector use of, and reliance on access to, space-based assets for critical services.</li> </ul>	<p>A number of risks under SIB's consideration relate to the space domain. Key to coordinating a Government approach to space is MBIE's development of a national space strategy. While the strategy will be focused on the opportunities available to New Zealand, it will contain clear messaging about New Zealand's values on space risks and the partnerships we will engage in. A cross-agency forum also exists for increasing understanding and collectively managing risks to our emerging space industry and wider space capabilities</p> <p>Other space-related national security risks are managed within established national security work-streams. SIB agreed that current risk management arrangements, as coordinated by the above agencies, are developing in a way that is satisfactory.</p>

21. SIB has also considered other national security risks that, while not focus areas over the reporting period, are also important:

<b>Threat</b>	<b>Risk-coordinating agency(s)</b>	<b>Trends and key vulnerabilities</b>	<b>SIB's engagement and broader risk management activity</b>
<b>Corruption</b>	Serious Fraud Office (SFO)	New Zealand has a strong culture of integrity and our institutions remain largely free from systemic corruption. Arguably, our greatest risk is of complacency. However, there are increasing global and domestic risks relating to corruption that require proactive efforts to respond to.	SIB CEs directed the Serious Fraud Office to develop an anti-corruption work programme. In August 2018, Cabinet approved this approach, directing work on phase one of the programme to begin immediately.
<b>People smuggling</b>	MBIE	Officials are concerned that New Zealand has become <b>s6(a)</b>	SIB has engaged closely on this and CEs have worked together to support a ministerial conversation about the risk, resulting in direction on preferred policy approaches. The principles underlying New Zealand's policy framework to prevent, deter and disrupt maritime mass arrivals remain fit for purpose. There are however resourcing implications for lifting our

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			engagement on implementing the Strategy, an approach which has been endorsed by SIB.
<b>Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation</b>	MFAT, Customs	New Zealand's economy has diversified into high technology sectors such as in space, biotechnology, 3-D printing and computing. This technology often has dual-use potential for weapons proliferation and is attractive to external actors who may seek to acquire it by overt or covert means.	SIB has agreed that the emerging challenge of securing knowledge in New Zealand and developing controls over intangible transfers warrant increased attention on counter-proliferation. SIB has directed an inter-agency group of officials to assess New Zealand's proliferation and proliferation financing risks, before returning with an update report and list of options.

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22. This concludes the summary of the work that SIB Officials have undertaken for Ministers over the 2018 reporting period.

## Forward planning and 2019 priorities

23. In April 2019, SIB will refresh its priority risks, informed by agency assessment of changes to national security risks over the preceding year.
24. SIB will also establish a programme for the rolling review of its 12 risk profiles, led by risk-coordinating agencies. This review programme will inform subsequent annual reporting to Ministers at year-end and provide assurance that progress is being made with reducing risks over time.
25. As a result of its 2018 activity, SIB has already identified several system-level gaps in risk management that require additional attention. Subject to the review process just mentioned, it is our intention that in 2019 we focus on understanding and treating the following gaps on behalf of Ministers:
- a. Reviewing counter-terrorism legislation, to make it more effective in the current environment.
  - b. Developing effective and proportionate controls over foreign interference in New Zealand's economy and democracy.
  - c. Working collaboratively with Australia to support Pacific countries in better understanding and managing their security environment and how that affects New Zealand's security objectives.
  - d. Enhancing the resilience of our critical infrastructure through effective engagement with owners and operators on all national security risks including disruption to space assets; cyber threats; espionage; sabotage; and coercion.
  - e. Delivering the refreshed cyber security strategy 2018, in order to address the increasing cyber risk.
  - f. Developing a TNOc Strategy, under the leadership of Police.
  - g. Examining how emergent technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and financial and space technology) can influence security-related issues (e.g. data privacy, decentralisation and the digital spread of ideas), and setting policy direction to deal with future challenges.

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26. SIB will commission the National Assessment Bureau to undertake a renewed Strategic Assessment.
27. SIB will also play a governance and oversight role in the implementation of the National Security Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs), which were signed off by Cabinet in early December 2018. While there is already overlap between some of the NSIPs and SIB's current areas of focus, the NSIPs will generate some additional areas and issues that SIB will need to turn its collective mind to.

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
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## Recommendations

28. I recommend that you:

- a. **Note** SIB's role in improving collective government management of national security risks on behalf of Ministers.
- b. **Note** the steps SIB has taken in 2018 to improve the management of identified key national security risks over the reporting period:
  - i. Terrorism.
  - ii. Pacific instability.
  - iii. Espionage and foreign interference.
  - iv. Malicious cyber activity.
  - v. Transnational organised crime.
  - vi. Space-related threats.
- c. **Note** SIB's oversight role in relation to a number of cross-system initiatives.
- d. **Agree** to discuss with the incoming chair of ODESC (Brook Barrington) the desirability of a meeting, between Ministers and Chief Executives on the overall assessment of New Zealand's SIB related work and SIB's priorities for 2019.



Andrew Kibblewhite, CE DPMC

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, Minister for  
National Security and Intelligence

Date:     /     / 2018

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DEPARTMENT OF THE  
PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET  
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA

# Hazard Risk Board

Report on Better Management of National Security Risks 2018

December 2018

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## Report Addressees

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**To** Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, Minister for National Security & Intelligence

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**From** Andrew Kibblewhite, CE DPMC

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**Copied to** Rt Hon Winston Peters, Hon Phil Twyford, Hon Dr David Clark, Hon David Parker, Hon Stuart Nash, Hon Iain Lees-Galloway, Hon Damien O'Connor, Hon Ron Mark, Hon Tracey Martin, Hon Kris Faafoi.

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## Key points

1. New Zealand's Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) system works to address all significant risks to New Zealanders and the nation, so that people can live confidently and have opportunities to advance their way of life. At a strategic level, work across ODESC is governed by two Chief Executive-level boards: the Hazard Risk Board (HRB) and the Security & Intelligence Board (SIB).
2. A draft Cabinet Paper and associated documentation, currently under consideration by Ministers and led by Minister Faafoi, proposes that ODESC Boards report to Cabinet on an annual basis on the steps officials are taking to better manage national security risks. This will ensure a strong link between ODESC's responsibility for coordinating New Zealand's national security and Ministers, who preside over the ODESC system. The draft Cabinet Paper also includes a proposal for a public-facing report about national risk, but that is a separate discussion that this paper stands apart from. This paper focuses primarily on officials' use of the National Risk Register framework, which is an important tool to improve the management of national risk.
3. This briefing provides a baseline for the proposed ongoing reporting. It updates Ministers on recent steps taken by HRB to improve the management of national security risks related to natural hazards and civil contingencies. Alongside an equivalent report for SIB, it reflects the intention to move the ODESC system onto a more proactive footing, anticipating and providing good governance and management rather than defaulting to a reactive state.
4. Key achievements of HRB over the reporting period include:
  - a. Work to improve core emergency management system capabilities;
  - b. Implementation of an enhanced inter-agency approach to managing the risk of communicable diseases;
  - c. Advancing New Zealand's tsunami alerting and evacuation capabilities;
  - d. Testing and better coordinating the inter-agency arrangements for water security; and
  - e. Establishing an inter-agency approach to improve New Zealand's resilience to a disruption of Global Navigation Satellite Services (GNSS).
5. In addition, future reporting will also provide an assessment of how all national security risks have changed, based on review by agencies using the standardised National Risk Register methodology. This will provide Ministers with assurance that HRB is focusing on the right risks as they develop, and that progress is being made with reducing risks over time.

## Background

6. HRB's role involves governance of natural hazards and civil contingency risks, as well as oversight of a number of core projects designed to enhance capability and resilience across the system.
7. In late 2016, the Office of the Auditor General recommended that ODESC use the National Risk Register (NRR) to establish clearer accountabilities for risk management. HRB has embraced the Office of the Auditor General findings and is actively using the NRR to drive

its work programmes. Core responsibilities for managing each of HRB risks have been assigned to individual agencies.

8. ODESC agencies manage a great number of risks. The comprehensive framework of the National Risk Register enables HRB to identify and prioritize a small number of these which are most critical at a strategic level. HRB can then focus on ensuring that these risks are being managed by agencies in a way that is both effective and proportionate to the level of risk.
9. HRB wishes to draw your attention to decisions it has made during the reporting period to improve the management of the following national security risks:
  - a. Communicable Diseases
  - b. Tsunami
  - c. Infrastructure Failure
  - d. Wild Fire
  - e. Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Disruption
  - f. Challenges to Water Security
10. These risks were prioritised by HRB after evaluation against a range of criteria, which include apparent vulnerabilities in risk management or gaps in the overall body of knowledge, 'high' or 'very high' risk ratings (based on an assessment of likelihood and consequence), and indications of otherwise heightened levels of risk. Table 1 overleaf provides more detail on each of these risks.
11. Each risk has had a significant part of an HRB agenda dedicated to it. Risk-coordinating agencies have supported HRB discussions by leading clear, timely and comprehensive presentations on the risk and current risk management efforts. These risks are usually multi-sectoral. Hence, by bringing relevant Chief Executives together, HRB enables a more holistic discussion than might otherwise take place.
12. HRB's oversight has ensured that natural hazards and civil contingency risks are properly allocated and profiled so that improvements in risk management can be identified and implemented. Its ongoing work programme has helped to make the system more fit for purpose by identifying gaps in governance, systems, and capability, and agreeing future programmes of work to mitigate these.
13. HRB's oversight should provide assurance to Ministers, who preside over the system, that risks are well managed. Where a risk is considered intolerable, HRB's collective oversight supports provision of robust cross-sector advice to Ministers on treatment options.

## **Core capability projects advanced by HRB**

14. A group of HRB Senior Officials supported the Government's response to a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) report into how New Zealand responds to natural disasters and emergencies. Government's response to the report confirmed HRB's role as the most appropriate governance body to provide stewardship for the emergency management system.

15. HRB identified that further work was needed to ensure that Officials responding to incidents at local, regional and national levels were appropriately trained, and that expected levels of competency for each role were made explicit. CEs agreed to work together towards more consistent **Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) training** and club-funded two full time positions to deliver this work programme. A next iteration of CIMS will be provided to the HRB for endorsement by mid-2019.
16. HRB developed a business case for a **Common Operating Picture (COP)** to improve the interoperability of agencies working together in a response. HRB progressed elements of a COP, including pulling together existing work on data needs;
17. HRB approved the next four-year iteration of the cross-agency, all-hazards **National Exercise Programme**, based on a rigorous process of matching risks with issues surfaced by previous exercises.
18. HRB engaged closely on development of draft **Wellington Earthquake National Initial Response Plan (WENIRP)** and assessed levels of agency Business Continuity Planning.
19. HRB engaged with development of a draft **Maritime Security Strategy** to improve coherence across the maritime security sector and inform investment and inter-agency prioritisation discussions (led by the Maritime Security Oversight Committee – a sub-committee of HRB).
20. Ministry for the Environment (MfE) and Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) were added to HRB’s standing membership. Both agencies have a significant role in risk reduction policy and regulation across a number of hazards. MfE’s membership will also support HRB’s ongoing consideration of climate change, while MBIE’s membership is important given its infrastructure responsibilities.

## Decisions and actions that HRB has undertaken to better manage key National Security Risks

Table 1: HRB's National Security Risk Management Activities & Decisions

Risk	Risk-coordinating agency	Trends and key vulnerabilities	HRB’s engagement & broader risk management activity
<b>Communicable Diseases</b>	Ministry of Health (MoH)	Outbreaks of vaccine preventable communicable diseases, such as Measles, still occur because of under immunisation in vulnerable populations. Broader determinants of public health may increase risk of certain communicable diseases especially in areas of high population density.	<p>HRB agreed that MoH would lead work on five priorities for action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Re-establishing the Inter-agency Pandemic Group;</li> <li>• Tracking cross-agency pandemic readiness;</li> <li>• Supporting agencies to update or revise their existing pandemic plans;</li> <li>• Providing a programme of four strategic discussion exercises; and</li> <li>• Developing key indicators for pandemic readiness and reporting to HRB.</li> </ul> <p>The assessment and management of this risk has reached a high level of</p>

			sophistication and is continually monitored and evaluated by the Ministry of Health. The system is experienced and fit for purpose.
<b>Tsunami</b>	Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM)	Science is continually advancing the knowledge of tsunami risk to New Zealand, including for example those generated from the nearby Hikurangi Subduction Zone off the east coast of the North Island.	<p>Tsunami risk management is largely focused on evacuation planning and warnings, alongside response and recovery planning. Considerable work has been done to embed and advance best practice.</p> <p>HRB agreed that MCDEM would determine priorities for action for a future discussion. Two of these priorities for action were agreed for progression by HRB and both have been advanced:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Tsunami vertical evacuation guidance and best practice for New Zealand</li><li>• Tsunami monitoring and detection capability using DART Buoys.</li></ul> <p>The Director CDEM contacted Auckland-based government agencies to encourage preparation for business continuity given the tsunami risk in Auckland.</p> <p>HRB sought confirmation on the preparedness of local and regional emergency management controllers to make decisions in the event of a tsunami. HRB subsequently club-funded the design and delivery of a new controllers training regime.</p>
<b>Infrastructure Failure</b>	MCDEM	Growth in parts of New Zealand is both contributing to and reducing infrastructure resilience. It has been a major driver for a number of investment programmes which will also add to network redundancy and resilience. However, it also reduces the spare capacity of existing infrastructure.	<p>Billions of dollars continues to be invested in projects that will increase the resilience of nationally-significant infrastructure, such as Wellington Transmission's Gully.</p> <p>However, a 2017 study by the New Zealand Lifelines Council highlighted a lack of consistent national standards for resilience. Government also lacks a national view on significant infrastructure customers and their levels of dependence and resilience in event of disruption. Further work is being progressed in response to this.</p> <p>HRB tested agency responsibilities for infrastructure and arranged for non-transport infrastructure lead agency responsibilities in the event of a failure to be assigned to MBIE.</p> <p>(N.B. the Security and Intelligence Board (SIB) has also progressed work on managing malicious threats to infrastructure).</p>
<b>Wild Fire</b>	Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ)	Officials anticipate a continued increase in larger, catastrophic wild fires as a result of climate change.	As illustrated by the response to the 2017 Christchurch Port Hills wild fire event, previous risk management arrangements may not have been entirely appropriate to deal with large

and challenging wild fires. The since-established FENZ arrangements (i.e. the centralisation of 40 Rural Fire Authorities into a single, national entity with the New Zealand Fire Service) helps to address previous command and control concerns.

HRB agreed that FENZ would work with the National Risk Unit to identify priorities for action arising from the risk profile.

HRB discussed incorporating elements of the Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIMS) into governance arrangements for this risk.

**Pests & Diseases**

Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI)

New Zealand's continued growth in trade and tourism increases the likelihood of incursions, through new and busier pathways.

Climate change is expected to increase the consequences of established pests, by providing additional habitat and range, and make it easier for new pests to establish. It will also alter the biosecurity risk of those countries we trade with.

Social changes such as increasing ethnic diversity, land use change and global consumer preferences will also increase pressure on the biosecurity system.

MPI is having to deal with multiple concurrent biosecurity incursions more often than in the past. HRB tested MPI's framing of the risk and advised on improvements to their risk management system.

HRB agreed to MPI leading the development of a Strategic Technical Advisory Group Terms of Reference to support future biosecurity responses. As at October 2018 this is being consulted with relevant agencies.

HRB also asked MPI to capture insights arising from the *Mycoplasma Bovis* response, and to embed these within biosecurity-related operational policy going forward (e.g. such as operational policy related to Foot & Mouth Disease response).

MPI further advised HRB that it is using *Mycoplasma Bovis* to prompt a step-change in dairy farming practices.

**GNSS Disruption**

Land Information New Zealand (LINZ)

Space-based assets are critical to everyday services such as the Internet, mobile communications, banking and stock transactions, weather forecasting, transport navigation and search and rescue operations. They are also increasingly vital for enabling New Zealand Defence Force operations.

New Zealand's reliance on these assets—and, in particular, the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)—has been increasing in line with other modern economies. However, our awareness of this reliance, and how it affects the resilience of our critical national infrastructure, has not kept pace.

HRB found no clear agency with responsibility for this risk and so agreed to establish a cross-agency GNSS disruption governance group and work programme, which will be convened by LINZ.

**Challenges to**

Climate change will almost

Water security-related challenges are



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**Water Security**

certainly increase competition for fresh water between various sectors of the economy, communities and groups.

Other pressures on water security include changing demographics, industry demand, urbanisation, land use intensification, increased tourism, reliance on primary industries and a growing demand for clean energy.

addressed across the management of a range of national security risks.

HRB's discussion surfaced that New Zealand currently does not have a mechanism to manage its overall water security in a coordinated way at a national level.

Noting significant policy work already underway in specific areas, HRB agreed not to initiate a new stream of work. CEs instead sought confirmation that a number of tasks would be undertaken to ensure that risks were effectively considered and policy work was joined up at a strategic level.

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## Forward priorities

21. In early 2019, HRB will refresh its priority risks, informed by agency assessment of changes to national security risks over the preceding year.
22. HRB will also establish a programme for the rolling review of its 27 risk profiles, led by risk-coordinating agencies. This review programme will inform subsequent annual reporting to Ministers at year-end and provide assurance that progress is being made with reducing risks over time.
23. In addition, several key pieces of work are already underway and expected to inform HRB's forward programme:
  - a. The Emergency Management System reform programme will continue to involve HRB agencies and in turn help clarify HRB's priorities and work programme over the next 6-18 months. It will also enable HRB to firm up its governance arrangements, and thus promote greater accountability for deliverables across its membership.
  - b. Implementation of the Government's response to the TAG report may involve working with HRB to include joint accountabilities in departmental Chief Executives' performance agreements, backed up by Ministerial letters of expectation.
  - c. A MCDEM-led review of volcanic activity risks including ash fall on a major centre, safety of tourism attractions such as White Island and the Tongariro Crossing, and consequences for critical infrastructure is expected to inform HRB discussion and action items.
  - d. HRB will also provide ongoing support for the National Climate Change Adaptation Work Programme, contributing expertise to development and implementation of a framework for the National Climate Change Risk Assessment (NCCRA), and engaging with MfE on the National Adaptation Plan.

## Recommendations

24. I recommend that you:

- a. **Note** HRB's role in improving collective government management of national security risks on behalf of Ministers.
- b. **Note** the specific steps HRB has taken in to improve the management of identified priority national security risks over the reporting period.
- c. **Note** HRB's oversight role in relation to the core projects designed to enhance capability and resilience across the system.
- d. **Note** that HRB's work programme over the next 6-18 months has interdependencies with decisions related to the Emergency Management System reform.
- e. **Agree** to discuss with the incoming chair of ODESC (Brook Barrington) the desirability of a meeting, between Ministers and Chief Executives on the overall assessment of New Zealand's HRB related work and HRB's priorities for 2019.



Andrew Kibblewhite, CE DPMC

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Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, Minister for  
National Security and Intelligence

Date:     /     / 2018

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Contact for telephone discussion if required:

Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact
Andrew Kibblewhite	Chief Executive	s9(2)(a)	✓
Howard Broad	Deputy Chief Executive, National Security		

Minister's office comments:

- Noted
- Seen
- Approved
- Needs change
- Withdrawn
- Not seen by Minister
- Overtaken by events
- Referred to

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# Briefing

## BENEFITS OF A PUBLICLY AVAILABLE NATIONAL RISK REPORT

To Minister for National Security and Intelligence (Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern)  
Copied to Minister of Civil Defence (Hon Kris Faafoi)

<b>Date</b>	18/01/2019	<b>Priority</b>	Routine
<b>Deadline</b>	31/01/2019	<b>Briefing Number</b>	1819 NSPD/070

### Purpose

To provide you with advice on the benefits of making the New Zealand National Risk Report publicly available, and indicate the outstanding concerns relating to its release.

### Recommendation

1. **Note** the contents of this briefing YES / NO
2. **Discuss** with Minister Faafoi how to take this work forward in 2019 YES / NO

  
Andrew Kibblewhite  
Chief Executive, Department of the  
Prime Minister and Cabinet  
  
18/01/2019

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern  
Minister for National Security and  
Intelligence  
  
...../...../2019

# **BENEFITS OF A PUBLICLY AVAILABLE NATIONAL RISK REPORT**

## **Background**

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1. On 19 December 2018, you met with DPMC officials to discuss the national risk work, including the draft New Zealand National Risk Report. This briefing responds to your request for advice on the benefits of making the National Risk Report publicly available, and the outstanding concerns relating to its release.
2. ODESC work over the last few years has made real progress in shifting government agencies to a more proactive stance helping to enable a more resilient New Zealand; however, Government is only one part of the picture. The purpose of publishing the National Risk Report is to facilitate richer, better relationships and engagement between Government and other players, including local government, businesses (especially critical infrastructure providers) and non-government organisations.
3. This briefing has been copied to Minister Faafoi, who has been representing you in Ministerial discussions on the National Risk Report.

## **Enables informed stakeholder engagement and partnerships**

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4. The draft National Risk Report (the report) is a public-facing, high-level summary of the National Risk Register (the register). The register captures the overarching assessment of national risks and is intended to support the ODESC system. It does this by informing the ODESC national security governance boards (Hazard Risk Board and Security and Intelligence Board) on hazards and threats that cross the risk management responsibilities of multiple agencies.
5. The primary audience for the report is key decision-makers in public and private organisations, including central and local government agencies, lifeline utilities and critical infrastructure providers. The report provides a platform for government agencies to engage and create partnerships with the private and non-government sectors, and encourage and foster the efforts of these external stakeholders to help manage the risks of national significance detailed in the report. The report will help all parties to deal with risks where multiple agencies contribute to their management – and ensure activities are complementary.
6. Making the report publicly available will enable external stakeholders to freely consider its contents and engage with government agencies about the management of national risks in an informed and consistent way. A range of external stakeholders have indicated their interest in the government's risk assessments, as well as the risk assessment framework that underpins them. At present, officials are not in a position to share the report or the framework outside of government agencies as they have not been approved by Cabinet for public release.
7. DPMC officials have engaged extensively with prominent figures across academia, research institutions, and industry to gather and respond to feedback on the report and the implications of its public release. Feedback has been overwhelmingly positive, especially in terms of the report serving as a foundation for furthering stakeholders' discussion on risk management within their own areas. The new Chief Science Advisor has also conveyed her

support adding that the report could have major application for public and private sector Board Directors to guide their risk management activities.

8. Ministerial endorsement and public availability of the report will increase the credibility and effectiveness of officials as they engage with external stakeholders on national risk work.
9. The report will promote engagement of risk-coordinating agencies with experts and stakeholders. This will lead to valuable feedback that will strengthen risk management.

### **Provides assurance and enhances transparency**

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10. In addition to the benefits associated with stakeholder engagement, making the report publicly available will build public understanding and facilitate an open and transparent discussion about what our national risks are, how those risks are assessed, and what steps government is taking to manage them. It will provide New Zealanders with assurance that government is taking coordinated and proactive action to better manage risk where it most needs to.
11. The report is an opportunity for the government to shape the public debate about national risks. The experience of other governments with publishing similar reports (including the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada) shows that communicating with the public about national security risks can help build resilience, reduce fear and uncertainty, and improve understanding of government decisions on managing risk – which sometimes involve tough choices about investment and tolerance for certain risks.
12. While no specific response is expected of individual citizens, the report includes the public in the conversation on how the country can take steps to reduce exposure to national risks. Many agencies and businesses have resources available to help the public understand national risks, and links are provided in the risk summaries of the report to direct readers to more information.

### **Supports responsible government and system stewardship**

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13. Making the report publicly available will give visibility to the work of a responsible government that is proactively managing national risks in a way that is appropriately transparent and forward-looking. It will also demonstrate the commitment to increase public participation, transparency, and openness around official information and the work of Government.
14. Ministers' roles are to oversee those government agencies responsible for coordinating the management of national risks. The report and the risk assessment framework that underpins it provide Ministers with a mechanism to monitor how officials are managing national risks, and where there is scope for closer work by government agencies to mitigate them.

### **Outstanding concerns with release of the National Risk Report**

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#### *Broad agency support*

15. The report has been through several rounds of inter-agency consultation involving a wide variety of agencies. The report has the broad support of agencies represented on the

ODESC national security governance boards, and other risk-coordinating<sup>1</sup> and support agencies involved in managing national risks. Given the number of agencies involved, and as individual agency work programmes to treat national risks progress, there are always updates that can be incorporated into the report.

*Broad ministerial support*

16. Following the Ministerial meeting on 6 September 2018 feedback was provided to DPMC officials<sup>2</sup>. This feedback noted general positive support from Ministers in terms of the report raising awareness, and the usefulness of having the spectrum of national risks identified in one place. As a result of the feedback, text changes and additions were made to specific sections of the report, and the communications plan was updated.

s9(2)(g)(i)

*Risk communication*

18. Comment has been made that the report is a potential 'treasure trove' of information on catastrophes that could befall New Zealand. However, media is saturated with reporting on many of the risks identified in the report, from earthquake and tsunami, to food safety and biosecurity concerns, along with malicious threats. The report will bring balance to media coverage by shedding light on government action in addressing identified risks that should not come as a surprise to readers.

19. s9(2)(g)(i)

Individual agencies are well positioned with communication plans about a range of interventions that demonstrate action to reduce or manage risk (for example, the Ministry of Health's work with business planning for an influenza pandemic).

*Other concerns*

s9(2)(g)(i)

21. In sum, officials have taken steps to resolve or put in place ways to manage the range of concerns at an inter-agency level

s9(2)(g)(i)

<sup>1</sup> ODESC has identified one or more 'risk-coordinating agencies' to take responsibility for coordinating national risk management activities for each hazard or threat on the National Risk Register.

<sup>2</sup> Ministerial attendees at this meeting: Hon Kris Faafoi (Chair), Hon Kelvin Davis, Hon Phil Twyford, Hon Dr Megan Woods, Hon Andrew Little, Hon Dr David Clark, Hon Iain Lees-Galloway, Hon Damien O'Connor, Hon Ron Mark, Hon James Shaw and Hon Eugenie Sage.





# Briefing

## PUBLIC RISK REPORT PLAN & OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE THE PUBLIC CONVERSATION

To Prime Minister and Minister for National Security and Intelligence (Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern)

<b>Date</b>	5/08/2021	<b>Priority</b>	Routine
<b>Deadline</b>	N/A	<b>Briefing Number</b>	2122NSP/016

### Purpose

This briefing provides you with a high-level plan and timeframe for the development of a public Risk Report. It shows how this aligns with other key system-level workstreams being led by NSG; the Long-Term Insights Briefing, reviews of our National Security Intelligence Priorities and Strategic Policy Settings, and national security strategy development.

The plan demonstrates that there will be substantial public engagement about national security over the next 12 months through these workstreams, while the Risk Report is being developed. This paper also includes talking points that can be used in response to questions about the Risk Report while it is in development.

### Recommendations

1. **Agree** the attached plan for developing the public Risk Report. YES / NO
2. **Note** that following your agreement on the plan, DPMC will provide advice to agencies on their role in the development of the public Risk Report through the Hazard Risk Board and the Security and Intelligence Board. YES / NO
3. **Note** the engagement opportunities over the next 12 months in the proposed plan across key system-level workstreams, which will contribute to advancing the public conversation on national security issues and risks. YES / NO

PUBLIC RISK REPORT PLAN & OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE THE PUBLIC CONVERSATION

Report No.  
2122NSP/016

- 4. **Note** the attached public Risk Report talking points. YES / NO
- 5. **Note** NSG will discuss the review of the National Security Intelligence Priorities with you at an upcoming briefing. YES / NO

Tony Lynch <b>Deputy Chief Executive, National Security Group</b>
...../...../.....

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern <b>Prime Minister</b>  <b>Minister for National Security and Intelligence</b>
...../...../.....

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**Contact for telephone discussion if required:**

Name	Position	Telephone	1st contact
Nicky Eaton	Director, National Intelligence and Risk Coordination Directorate, National Security Group	s9(2)(a)	Mobile ✓
s9(2)(a)			Mobile

**Minister's office comments:**

- Noted
- Seen
- Approved
- Needs change
- Withdrawn
- Not seen by Minister
- Overtaken by events
- Referred to

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# PUBLIC RISK REPORT PLAN & OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE THE PUBLIC CONVERSATION

## Purpose

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1. This briefing provides you with a high-level plan and timeframe for the development of a public Risk Report. It shows how this aligns with other key system-level workstreams being led by NSG; the Long-Term Insights Briefing (LTIB), reviews of our National Security and Intelligence Priorities (NSIPs), the national security Strategic Policy Settings (the Policy Review) and strategy development.
2. The plan demonstrates that there will be substantial public engagement about national security over the next 12 months through these workstreams, while the Risk Report is being developed. This paper also includes talking points that can be used in response to questions about the Risk Report while it is in development.

## Background

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3. The government uses a classified National Risk Register to coordinate a proactive approach to managing New Zealand's most significant national security risks.
4. When we spoke with you in May, you directed DPMC to produce a Risk Report that includes information about risks included in the Risk Register, and agreed NSG would provide a more specific plan for developing this alongside other key system-level workstreams.

## Advancing the Public Conversation

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### Public Risk Report: outcomes and scope

5. A Risk Report will mark a significant shift in how we engage with the public on national security risks. In particular, it will provide information about the full range of risks the government is focused on.
6. As discussed in May, the previous draft 2018 Risk Report is out-of-date and no longer fit-for-purpose. Through a new public Risk Report, and drawing on the example of the public *UK National Risk Register 2020* (the UK Report), we intend to:
  - a. Promote greater preparedness for national security risks across all levels of society, including practical steps to enhance resilience at the community level
  - b. Provide a reference point for future public debate and cooperation on complex national security risks
  - c. Support future risk and resilience investment decisions and priority-setting
  - d. Provide assurance and increase public confidence that while we can never eliminate the risks, they are being proactively managed.

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7. The UK's National Security Strategy provided a useful springboard for the launch of the UK Risk Report, and we indicated to you that New Zealand could take the same approach. The development of a national security strategy in the next 12 months, with the Policy Review as the first phase of strategy development, will give us the opportunity to ensure our National Risk Register includes the right national security risks for the New Zealand context.
8. Many of our risk assessments are out-of-date, and our methodology has not been reviewed since it was first developed in 2016. This is longer-term work that can be incorporated into future iterations of the Risk Report as it evolves. In the meantime, we can still achieve similar outcomes to the UK Report, through emphasis on the provision of useful and accessible information for the public.
9. Around 20 agencies will need to contribute to the development of the Risk Report.

### **Plan and proposed timeframes**

10. Attachment A includes a high-level plan for the development of the Risk Report. It also includes the other key system-level workstreams led by NSG, with which the Risk Report has dependencies. It shows our plan for progressing these workstreams in step, including key engagement opportunities and decision-points for your consideration. This is still evolving and can be added to over time.
11. We aim to deliver a near-final draft Risk Report for you to take to Cabinet by mid-2022, anticipating for key dependencies with other workstreams, public engagement, and agency and Ministerial reviews. We have included some proposed talking points at the end of this briefing, which can be used to respond to queries while the Risk Report is in development.
12. If you are comfortable with this plan, NSG will provide advice to agencies on their role through the Hazard Risk Board and the Security and Intelligence Board.

### **How this aligns with other opportunities to advance the national conversation**

13. The Risk Report is one platform from which to advance the public conversation on national security issues that affect New Zealanders. As discussed in May, there are other opportunities that can also be leveraged, and with which the Risk Report will align.
  - a. Through the development of the national security LTIB (the intended purpose and independence of LTIBs notwithstanding), security and intelligence agencies led by NSG will be conducting research and a series of engagements with the public to build our understanding about how to have effective national security conversations in a diverse and diversifying New Zealand. This will help inform the development of the Risk Report.
  - b. These conversations with the public on national security will continue through strategy development efforts in the new year, after Ministers have set broad direction through the Policy Review. The Policy Review process has already begun early targeted consultations, including with a cross-section of academics and at

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the end of this month will conduct consultations with Māori academics. These engagements will also help inform the development of the Risk Report.

- c. The NSIPs provide a platform for engaging with the public about the issues New Zealand intelligence and assessment agencies should focus their effort on. We are developing a specific engagement plan on the NSIPs as part of the response to the Royal Commission, which we would like to discuss with you at an upcoming briefing (and covered briefly below).
  - d. Although not included in the attached plan, there is also engagement occurring across a wide range of work programmes, such as the all-of-government Royal Commission response, and on specific risks like foreign interference, cyber, and counterterrorism and countering violent extremism.
14. These workstreams will all help lift awareness and understanding of national security issues and address the recommendations and findings of the Royal Commission report, including to foster greater transparency and a new national conversation on security issues and risks.

## National Security Intelligence Priorities

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- 15. The NSIPs underpin a well-functioning national security system, helping intelligence and assessment agencies prioritise effort to add value to national security decision-making, including on national risks.
- 16. As mandated, the updated NSIPs need to be provided to the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee this year (scheduled for November 2021), and we will provide you with a briefing and draft Cabinet paper for this item in October.
- 17. As part of the 2021 review, the national security system, led by NSG, has been working to improve the way the NSIPs are developed and implemented, in response to findings by the Royal Commission. We would be keen to discuss this with you in more detail at an upcoming briefing, including your views about engagement with other ministers, the Intelligence and Security Committee, and the public on the NSIPs.

Attachments:		
Attachment A:	Restricted	Plan for developing public Risk Report alongside other key system-level workstreams
Attachment B:	Restricted	Risk Report Talking Points

**[Note: Attachment B "Risk Report Talking Points" has been withheld in full under s9(2)(g)(i)]**

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**Attachment A: National Risk Report, NS Policy Review/Strategy, LTIB and National Security Intelligence Priorities timeline (in development)**

**For your agreement:**

Workstreams	July	August	Sept	October	November	December	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept	
<b>Public Risk Report Development</b> <i>The development of a public facing report that outlines NZ's biggest risks, what's being done to manage them and how the public can prepare and respond to them.</i>	<b>Phase 1 Planning and analysis</b>				<b>Phase 2 Initial content creation</b>						<b>Phase 3 Engage, review, refine, produce</b>					
	Project planning and scoping	Interagency review of all-hazards risk approach and National Risk Register with NS policy settings review NS&I briefing	Drafting of early content begins Confirm role of agencies in development of report Engagement international partners on risk approach and risk report	Review of risk approach & scope of risks included complete, initial rec to CE DPMC Scope of report confirmed NS&I briefing	Request for agency content	NS&I briefing						First draft produced for consultation 1 <sup>st</sup> review with HRB & SIB NS&I briefing		Second draft produced 2 <sup>nd</sup> review with HRB & SIB Near-final draft to Cabinet for review Production begins	Report finalised Final sign off by Min NS&I Production finishes	Risk Report to ERS for approval Public release once approved by Cabinet
					Substantive drafting of report											

**For your noting:**

<b>National Security Strategic Policy Settings Review ("Policy Review") and Strategy</b> <i>A review of current policy settings is the first phase of strategy development, and focuses on what we aim to achieve. The strategy will be a practical plan for how we'll do it, and will present a forward-looking positive vision for national security.</i>	Examining current settings and system coherence		Agreeing our criteria for evaluating policy settings		Applying criteria to settings...how might settings evolve?				Analysis to generate ways and means options; balancing the complement of ends, ways, means; development of strategic assessment					
	SIB	Engagement with Māori academics Interagency workshops SIB Workshop	Interagency workshops HRB	Interagency workshops Futures scanning SIB	Interagency workshops Engagement with CEs NS&I briefing	First draft of review SIB/HRB	Engagement w/ international partners on strategy and risk	Second draft of review NS&I briefing NS Policy Review	Policy Review considered by ERS Strategy development 2 <sup>nd</sup> phase begins	Public consultation begins (based on preliminary LTIB learnings)	Public consultation continues	Public consultation concludes Engagement w/ international partners	Drafting and interagency consultation	SIB/HRB considers first draft NS&I briefing on Strategy
<b>Long Term Insights Briefing</b> <i>A think piece focused on effectively engaging on national security in a diverse and diversifying nation.</i>	CE sign off and inform Mins	Public consultation on LTIB topic Research and analysis	Interagency workshops Research and analysis – consider results of first round of consultation. Summary of submissions Drafting	Interagency workshops Research and analysis Drafting	Interagency workshops Research and analysis Drafting	Drafting	Internal and agency consultation on draft LTIB	Public consultation on draft LTIB	Consider results of consultation and develop summary of submissions.		LTIB to Minister and House 30 June	Select Committee (to Dec)		
<b>National Security Intelligence Priorities Review</b> <i>NSIPs provide visibility about what national security intelligence &amp; assessment agencies focus on.</i>		SIB discusses NSIPs review NS&I briefing	Ministerial engagement on NSIPs review	NSIPs to Cabinet ERS for approval			Public launch of NSIPs & engagement plan kicked off (TBC)						Potential annual report on the NSIPs presented to SIB and Cabinet ERS for engagement	

**Summary of key dates across above workstreams**

<b>Key decision points</b> <b>Min NS&amp;I and Cabinet</b>		NS&I briefing on Risk Report & NSIPs		NS&I briefing on Risk Report Ministerial engagement on NSIPs review	NSIPs to Cabinet ERS for approval NS&I briefing On NS Policy Review	NS&I briefing on Risk Report Update Cabinet on RCOI progress		NS&I briefing NS Policy Review	Policy Review considered by ERS		NS&I briefing on Risk Report	LTIB to Minister and House 30 June	<b>Draft Risk Report to Cabinet</b> LTIB to Select Committee (to Dec)	<b>Final review and sign off of Risk Report by Min NS&amp;I</b> NS&I briefing on Strategy	<b>Risk Report to ERS for approval</b> NS Strategy considered by ERS
<b>Key engagement points with the public</b>		Public consultation on the LTIB Engagement with Māori academics through NS Policy Review	Public consultation on the LTIB				Public launch of NSIPs & engagement kicked off (TBC)	Public consultation on the LTIB	Strategy public consultation	Strategy public consultation	Strategy public consultation				<b>Public release of Risk Report once approved by Cabinet</b>

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## Appendix One: Outline of risk profiles in the National Risk Register

Risk profile title	Risk-coordinating agency(s)	Date risk profile last reviewed by appropriate ODESC governance board or otherwise confirmed by agency (month and year)	Security classification
Major biodiversity loss	Department of Conservation	June 2016	In-confidence
Ecosystem disruption (soil)	Ministry for Environment	May 2016	Restricted
Resource depletion (marine fisheries)	Ministry for Primary Industries	May 2016	Restricted
Pests and diseases	Ministry for Primary Industries	February 2018	In-confidence
Drought	Ministry for Primary Industries	October 2021	In-confidence
Earthquake	National Emergency Management Agency	October 2019, reconsidered by HRB in May 2021	In-confidence
Coastal hazards	National Emergency Management Agency, Ministry for Environment	October 2021	In-confidence
Flooding	National Emergency Management Agency, Ministry for Environment	June 2017	Restricted
Severe weather	National Emergency Management Agency, Ministry for Environment	April 2016	Restricted
Space weather	Unassigned	May 2016	Restricted
Tsunami	National Emergency Management Agency	September 2018	Restricted
Volcanic activity	National Emergency Management Agency	November 2020	In-confidence
Wildfire	Fire and Emergency New Zealand	October 2021	In-confidence
Communicable diseases	Ministry of Health	November 2017	Restricted
Vector-borne diseases	Ministry of Health	May 2016	Restricted
Food safety incident	Ministry for Primary Industries	May 2016	Restricted
Global navigation satellite system disruption	Unassigned	October 2016	Restricted
Water infrastructure resilience	Department of Internal Affairs (TBC - Interim)	Risk profile not yet created	TBC
Transport infrastructure resilience	Ministry of Transport	November 2021	In-confidence
Information and communications technology infrastructure resilience	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment	Risk profile not yet created	TBC
Energy infrastructure resilience	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment	Risk profile not yet created	TBC
Fire and explosions	Fire and Emergency New Zealand	May 2016	Restricted

Hazardous substances emergency	Fire and Emergency New Zealand	May 2016	Restricted
Major oil spill	Maritime New Zealand	May 2016	Restricted
Radiological incident	Ministry of Health	June 2016	Restricted
Major transport incident	Ministry of Transport	October 2016	Restricted
Commodity/energy price shock	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment	May 2016	Restricted
Major trade disruption	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry for Primary Industries	November 2021	Restricted
Financial crisis	New Zealand Treasury	May 2016	In-confidence
Armed conflict	New Zealand Defence Force, Ministry of Defence	November 2020	Restricted
Weapons proliferation	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	April 2019	Restricted
Civil unrest	New Zealand Police	August 2020	Restricted
Corruption	Serious Fraud Office	December 2020	Restricted
Foreign interference	New Zealand Security and Intelligence Service, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet	September 2020	Restricted
Regional instability (including both hazard and threats causing instability in the Pacific)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Defence	December 2020	Restricted
Irregular migration (Maritime Mass Arrivals)	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (Immigration New Zealand)	September 2020 risk profile developed and reconfirmed by MBIE in September 2021	Restricted
Major cyber incident	Government Communications Security Bureau, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet	October 2020	Restricted
(Maritime) Territorial incursion	New Zealand Defence Force, Ministry of Defence	July 2020	Restricted
Terrorism	New Zealand Police, New Zealand Security and Intelligence Service, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet	June 2019	Restricted
Border incursion	New Zealand Customs Service	December 2019	Restricted
Transnational organised crime	New Zealand Police, New Zealand Customs Service	August 2019	Restricted

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