

15 February 2023

Ref: OIA-2021/22-0953

Dear

# Official Information Act request relating to Australia-New Zealand National Security Dialogue

Thank you for your Official Information Act 1982 (the Act) request received on 7 February 2022. You requested:

ONE: A copy of the full document Australia-New Zealand National Security Dialogue: Briefing Pack (12 March 2021) – i.e. including the parts of this document not processed for release for the OIA request above as they were not in scope.

TWO: Copies of all other "Briefing Packs" produced for each Australia-New Zealand National Security Dialogue since the inaugural dialogue in October 2016.

As advised in our response to you on 17 January 2023, ongoing consultation required a further delay to the release of information relating to the briefing pack for the national security dialogue. Following this consultation, I am now able to respond with the final tranche of documents from the 2018 meeting.

I can advise that 10 documents were identified within scope of your request for this year. I have decided to withhold in full (including titles) nine of these documents, under section 6(a) of the Act, as the release of the information would be likely to prejudice the national security and/or the international relations of New Zealand.

I have released one document to you in part, and information that has been withheld has been removed from this release document. I have withheld this information under section 6(a) of the Act, as the release of the information would be likely to prejudice the national security and/or the international relations of New Zealand.

I again apologise for the prolonged delay in responding to your request. DPMC has now responded to all parts of your request and considers this request closed.

You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to investigate and review my decision under section 28(3) of the Act.

This response may be published on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet's website during our regular publication cycle. Typically, information is released monthly, or as otherwise determined. Your personal information including name and contact details will be removed for publication.


Yours sincerely



Tony Lynch Deputy Chief Executive National Security Group



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# Two above pages are withheld in full under the following section of the Act:

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Section 6(a)

	Foreign Interference
Situational assessment	We are aware of foreign interference activity     So(a)     second assessing the extent and impact is difficult.
	50(a)
ussessment	
Offensive interest –	<ul> <li>Maximise the benefits of our open economy and society, while managing the risks at the margins in a proportionate way.</li> </ul>
	• Leverage our strengths, including high levels of transparency, trust in government, low levels of corruption and our robust media and academic communities.
what are we trying to	S6(a)
achieve	S6(a) New Zealand takes foreign interference risks seriously S6(a)
	• S6(a)
	<ul> <li>Managing (though not necessarily eliminating) risks that foreign interference poses to our economic and democratic institutions, our national security, and our</li> </ul>
Defensive interest –	national interests.
what are we trying to	S6(a)
avoid	SS(a)
	S6(a)
What is New Zealand currently doing, or actively planning to do?	S6(a)
	56(a)
	Ministers have agreed a work programme, and are looking forward to seeing more advice.
What could New Zealand partner with Australia to	S6(a)
	S6(a)
achieve?	• \$6(a)
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Emerging Technologies		
Situational assessment	<ul> <li>The parallel development of several emerging technologies (Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things, etc.) will create opportunities and challenges for improving our national security.</li> <li>Emergent technologies may create new opportunities for states with constrained resources to compete in the defence and intelligence spheres. Conversely, they will also give new and powerful capabilities to potential rival states.</li> </ul>	
Offensive interest – what are we trying to achieve	<ul> <li>Improving our national security through the use of emergent technologies.</li> <li>Ensuring that technologies are used to improve the quality of life of new Zealanders, and contribute to a growing economy.</li> </ul>	
Defensive interest – what are we trying to avoid	<ul> <li>S (a) The use of advanced emergent technologies in ways that degrade New Zealand national security, and put New Zealanders at risk So(a)</li> <li>S (a) S (a) S (a) S (a)</li> <li>S (a) S (a</li></ul>	
What is New Zealand currently doing, or actively planning to do?	S6(a) S6(a) S6(a)	
What could New Zealand partner with Australia to achieve?	\$6(a)       •       \$6(a)	

Situational assessment	The international rules-based order is under serious, sustained challenge.
	<b>S6(4)</b>
	<ul> <li>New Zealand's interests are best served under a rules-based system.</li> </ul>
Offensive interest – what are we	<ul> <li>Free and fair trade, including multilateral trade agreements and the inclusion of agricultural rules in the World Trade Organization.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Principled security network in which NZ engages with a variety of like-minded partners.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Effective, inclusive regional institutions, including in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, that can address the complex challenges states are facing.</li> </ul>
trying to achieve	S6(a)
	Norms for cyber, space, and new weapons systems.
Defensive	<ul> <li>Increasing militarisation in our part of the world, South and the second second</li></ul>
interest – what are we	Countries opting out of the rules-based order, reverting to might is right etc.
what are we trying to avoid	<ul> <li>Exclusion of New Zealand's interests as new systems emerge.</li> </ul>
What is New Zealand currently doing, or actively planning to do?	<ul> <li>Contributing to the international campaign against terrorism through peacekeeping operations.</li> <li>Highlighting the benefits of rules; speaking up when they are breached.</li> <li>Working with like-minded-countries on WTO reform issues So(a)</li> <li>So(a)</li> <li>Re-building the social compact at home (Trade for All).</li> <li>Addressing attribution issues in the Chemical Weapons Convention.</li> </ul>
ao :	<ul> <li>Identify more coherent coalitions in favour of RBS (e.g. Alliance of</li> </ul>
What could New Zealand partner with Australia to achieve?	Multilateralists).
	<ul> <li>So(a)</li> <li>Invest in developing country capacity to benefit from rules.</li> <li>Ensure that new regional systems So(a) support, rather than undermine, the rules-based system.</li> <li>So(a)</li> </ul>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	Identify and pursue new architectures to meet reinforce the order.
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Situational assessment	Terrorism is a pervasive, cross-border threat.
	<ul> <li>NZ has its own demographic, socio-cultural profile – but remains vulnerable to terrorism for reasons common to other countries (the ubiquity of the internet, ease of travel, presence of individuals susceptible to extremist messaging)</li> </ul>
	National terrorism threat level remains at Low.
	<ul> <li>But there are a number of individuals of concern to authorities both within New Zealand or off-shore with the potential to return.</li> </ul>
Our Counter Terrorism Approach	New Zealand's underlying objectives are to protect New Zealanders and contribute to the global effort to counter terrorism
	<ul> <li>At the strategic level, risk reduction involves a focus on social inclusion and building strong inter-community relationships.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>At the more tactical, reactive level it involves a clear focus on identifying, managing specific individuals, law enforcement and public safety</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Focus on a number of key enablers – governance and strategy, information and intelligence, legislative settings, relationships and partnerships, capability and readiness</li> </ul>
What is New Zealand currently doing, or actively planning to do?	<ul> <li>Recent and current domestic priorities include: Counter Terrorism (CT) legislation, cross-agency violent extremism prevention case management, CT Strategic Framework, CT Playbook, threat assessment, foreign fighter returnee planning, CT risk management framework, aviation security, stocktake of activity to counter extremism online</li> </ul>
	• S6(a)
Areas of common interest for further engagement/ discussion?	Exchange expertise and experience around inter-agency case management, the role of social agencies in managing individuals with violent extremist views.
	<ul> <li>Managing foreign fighter returnees (potentially including dual citizens)</li> <li>Continued engagement on key topic areas via the ANZCTC, including particular sub-committees areas via the ANZCTC.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Sharing views and approaches to the challenge of online extremism.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Shared interests, approaches and plans off-shore</li> </ul>
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