

5 September 2023

Ref: OIA-2023/24-0114

Dear

# Official Information Act request for information related to the National Security Longterm Insights Briefing

Thank you for your Official Information Act 1982 (the Act) request received on 11 August 2023. You requested:

"I trust this message finds you well. I am writing to request information under the provisions of the Official Information Act. The purpose of this request is to seek comprehensive details related to the recently released "G74 Let's talk about our national security:

NATIONAL SECURITY LONG-TERM INSIGHTS BRIEFING. MARCH 2023" a document of significant public interest.

I am seeking the following information:

#### Academic Contributions:

A list of academics who contributed to the document.

Details of each academic's contributions, including research areas and expertise.

#### Think-Tank Involvement:

A list of think tanks involved in developing the document.

Details of the contributions made by these think tanks.

### Contributions from Armament Manufacturers or Their Representatives:

Records indicating contributions from armament manufacturers or their representatives.

# Meetings and Agenda Items:

A detailed list of all meetings held during the document's formation.

Information on meeting dates, locations, participants, and agenda items.

#### Correspondence and Documentation:

Any correspondence (emails, letters, meeting minutes) related to communication between contributors and the document's development team.

Supplementary documents from contributors, such as research papers, reports, or presentations.

### Contributor Roles and Input:

Names and roles of the authors of the document.

Breakdown of areas/topics in which each contributor provided input.

Outlines, drafts, or notes highlighting the evolution of contributors' ideas.

### Evaluation and Incorporation Process:

The process to evaluate and incorporate contributors' input.

Documentation outlining the review/editing process for integrating contributions.

# Reviewer and Validator Engagement:

Correspondence/records of engagement with external reviewers or validators who assessed contributions.

Records of reviewer feedback that led to document adjustments.

Budget and Cost Breakdown:

The budget and breakdown of costs for generating the document."

## **Development of the National Security Long-term Insights Briefing**

Before responding to your request, I thought it would be useful to provide some background information on the National Security Long-term Insights Briefing (National Security LTIB), and how it was developed.

Long-term Insights Briefings (LTIB) are a new requirement introduced under the Public Service Act 2020 as a way for government to identify and explore issues that matter for the future wellbeing of the people of New Zealand. Each Government agency is required to develop a Long-term Insights Briefing at least once every three years.

For more information about LTIBs, their general role and purpose, please visit Te Kawa Mataaho's website at: <a href="https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/publications/long-term-insights-briefings/">www.publicservice.govt.nz/publications/long-term-insights-briefings/</a>.

The process for developing an LTIB is laid out by the Department of the Prime Minster and Cabinet's (DPMC) The Policy Project which describes in detail the eight steps that must be undertaken to complete delivery of an LTIB. You can read more about the development process for LTIBs overall at our website: <a href="https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/policy-project/long-term-insights-briefings">www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/policy-project/long-term-insights-briefings</a>

The 2023 National Security LTIB is the first LTIB developed by DPMC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) on behalf of agencies that make up the Security Intelligence Board. The National Security LTIB was developed over a two-year period by the following [nine] agencies:

- DPMC (co-lead),
- MFAT (co-lead),
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment,
- Ministry of Defence,
- Government Communications Security Bureau,
- NZ Customs Service,
- NZ Defence Force,
- NZ Police, and
- NZ Security Intelligence Service.

The 2023 National Security LTIB was created as a joint briefing by the above-named agencies to provide one national security-focused joint briefing instead of each agency producing its own individual briefing.

Consistent with guidance on the development and delivery of LTIBs, public engagement was central to the briefing's development. Members of the public were invited to participate in consultation throughout the National Security LTIB's development, as part of both the topic selection and during drafting stages via online feedback forms, a national security public survey and through both in-person and virtual hui. No limits were placed on who could participate in public engagement with consultations being hosted on agencies' websites, advertised via agencies' e-newsletters, and social media platforms. We sought to hear from as broad a range of people as possible throughout all our public engagement.

# Our response

For ease of response, I have grouped parts of your request for similar information together.

### **Contributions and reviews**

Academic Contributions:

A list of academics who contributed to the document.

Details of each academic's contributions, including research areas and expertise.

Think-Tank Involvement:

A list of think tanks involved in developing the document.

Details of the contributions made by these think tanks.

Contributions from Armament Manufacturers or Their Representatives:

Records indicating contributions from armament manufacturers or their representatives.

As outlined above, we sought to engage with as broad a range of people living in New Zealand as possible throughout the briefing's development by adopting an approach to seeking input and feedback on the National Security LTIB, where all members of the public were invited to provide input and feedback via online forms and virtual or in-person hui.

While we are aware, anecdotally, that certain groups (such as academics, migrant community leaders, youth organisations, Non-Government Organisations, and businesses) participated in these public engagements, their participation was of their own accord and was not prescribed. Further to this, attendee lists and meeting minutes were not taken as part of hui.

Therefore, while it is possible there may have been participants in public engagement from the above groups, they were not asked to identify themselves as a requirement to participate in engagement. As such, it is necessary for me to refuse your request for information relating to academics, think-tanks, and armament manufacturers or their representatives as the information does not exist. I have made this decision under section 18(e) of the Act.

### Meetings and agenda items

A detailed list of all meetings held during the document's formation. Information on meeting dates, locations, participants, and agenda items.

During development of the National Security LTIB, a range of meetings were undertaken including public hui (as discussed above) and internal development meetings between the nine developing agencies. I have chosen to respond to your request for information relating to meetings by 'public hui' and 'internal meetings'.

## Public hui

As part of the development process, members of the public were invited to participate in both in-person and virtual hui as a means of providing feedback during both the topic selection and drafting stages.

During the topic consultation phase in October-November 2021, we held a range of virtual hui where we heard 18 oral submissions. During the draft briefing development stage, we held four hui between 12-14 July, three of which were held in-person in Auckland and the fourth was held virtually.

These meetings were not formally documented, nor were specific agendas created attendance recorded, or formal meeting minutes taken. The intention of this was keep the meetings open and allow attendees to speak on matters of importance to them without the restriction of following a prescribed agenda or being recorded in a way that would cause attendees to feel unable to share openly. Please note that a summary of key themes from

across engagements is presented on our website as previously indicated – these summaries reflect key themes from these meetings.

However, I can confirm that in general, these hui would have an approximate agenda structure as outlined in the below table.

147.1	· I I I I I I I I I I	
Welcome	opening karakia and Mihi whakatau	
LTIB context	<ul> <li>the purpose of LTIBs</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>our topic, areas of focus and key outcomes sought</li> </ul>	
Purpose of today's meeting	<ul> <li>our goals for engagement</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>where we are at in our engagement process</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>an update on engagement so far</li> </ul>	
The LTIB Topic Consultation	- what we've heard so far	
Open discussion	- focus of the LTIB topic, including risks and opportunities of	
	focus	
	- what could meaningful public participation in national	
	security look like in the future?	
Concluding remarks	- mark the end of the discussion with thanks and outline of	
-	next steps, encourage reflections or reactions from	
	participants, any key take-aways interest in remaining	
	engaged on the LTIB process	
	- closing karakia	

I am refusing to provide any other information relating to public hui, including a list of meetings, dates, locations, participants and agenda items under section 18(e) of the Act as the information does not exist, or despite reasonable efforts, cannot be found.

#### Internal meetings

As noted above, the National Security LTIB was developed over a period of two-years, across nine government agencies. As such, numerous meetings were held with a range of people across a range of topics during this period of time.

A search of DPMC's records provides approximately 300 calendar items for internal meetings regarding the development of the National Security LTIB. These meetings included:

- weekly internal meeting between the Senior Business Owner and Project Lead at DPMC
- weekly project team meetings between DPMC and MFAT project team members, and
- monthly and then less frequent meetings and workshops with the broader interagency working group with representation across all nine agencies responsible for the National Security LTIB.

To provide a detailed list of all meetings, their dates, locations, participants and agenda items, collation and consultation on the approximately 300 identified calendar items would be necessary. Further to this, additional searches would be necessary across the systems of DPMC, MFAT and the other seven agencies to ensure all meetings in scope of this part of your request are identified.

As such, I am refusing this part of your request in line with section 18(f) of the Act as the information cannot be made available without substantial collation or research.

### **Correspondence and contributors**

Correspondence and Documentation:

Any correspondence (emails, letters, meeting minutes) related to communication between contributors and the document's development team.

Supplementary documents from contributors, such as research papers, reports, or presentations.

### Contributor Roles and Input:

Names and roles of the authors of the document.

Breakdown of areas/topics in which each contributor provided input.

Outlines, drafts, or notes highlighting the evolution of contributors' ideas.

#### Reviewer and Validator Engagement:

Correspondence/records of engagement with external reviewers or validators who assessed contributions.

Records of reviewer feedback that led to document adjustments.

DPMC does not hold readily accessible copies of correspondence, documents or names of contributors, reviewers, or validators of the documents. To provide this information would necessitate a search through numerous systems and documents, across several agencies, for a period of two years.

I am therefore refusing these parts of your request under section 18(f) of the Act as the information requested cannot be made available without substantial collation or research.

In making my decision, I have determined that charging or extending the timeframe as allowed under the Act would not facilitate the provision of this information.

## **Evaluation and incorporation process**

The process to evaluate and incorporate contributors' input.

Documentation outlining the review/editing process for integrating contributions.

The draft National Security LTIB was created through a range of meetings and workshops whereby the nine agencies involved provided their input and feedback for DPMC and MFAT to include. The draft document was held and developed by DPMC in an open, accessible form which meant that those working on the document could access and amend it throughout the drafting period. Feedback on the draft National Security LTIB was then sought through public engagement, and that feedback incorporated into the Final National Security LTIB.

Both the Draft and Final National Security LTIB documents, as well as public engagement feedback summaries, are publicly available on the DPMC website at <a href="https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-security-long-term-insights-briefing">www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-security-long-term-insights-briefing</a>

I am therefore refusing this part of your request under sections 18(e) and (d) of the Act as the information does not exist or is publicly available.

#### Associated costs

Budget and Cost Breakdown:

The budget and breakdown of costs for generating the document

The table below provides the total and breakdown of costs associated with the development of the National Security LTIB.

Item	
Translation of documents into six non-English languages (topic consultation, draft	
LTIB, and final LTIB).	
National Security Public Survey (2022)	
In-person hui held in partnership with MEC (Auckland)	
Design and printing services	
Total	

<sup>\*</sup>Costs are quoted in NZD and have been rounded up to the nearest \$100 for ease of review.

Please note that the table does not provide any costs associated with staff time. Staff from DPMC and the other named government agencies were involved in the development of the National Security LTIB as part of their day-to-day work additional to primary work roles, alongside other work efforts.

### **Further information**

We have proactively released a significant amount of information on the DPMC website at: <a href="https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-security-long-term-insights-briefing which relates to your request">https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-security-long-term-insights-briefing which relates to your request</a>. This includes copies of both the final and draft National Security LTIB in multiple languages and summaries of the input and feedback received from members of the public during consultation. I believe this information supports transparency in this work and satisfies much of the public interest in the LTIB and the work to develop it.

You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to investigate and review my decisions under section 28(3) of the Act.

This response will be published on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet's website during our regular publication cycle. Typically, information is released monthly, or as otherwise determined. Your personal information including name and contact details will be removed for publication.

Yours sincerely	
Marika Hughes	

**Acting Deputy Chief Executive**